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Infrahumanization is an inter-group process in which group members do not see 
members of a different group as possessing equal humanness to that of their own group. 
This is equivalent to omission from the superordinate human in-group. The 
infrahumanization effect is most commonly operationally defined as occurring when 
more uniquely human emotions or traits are attributed to a participant’s own group 
relative to a relevant out-group and non-uniquely human emotions or traits are 
attributed equally between the groups. Studies have shown that infrahumanized groups 
are granted less help and forgiveness, morally excluded, and that violence towards such 
a group results in less guilt. These effects have been replicated in a number of studies, 
mostly using nationality or ethnic inter-group contexts.
The theoretical framework of this thesis couches infrahumanization in terms of 
Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory as an outcome of social identity 
processes when the relevant dimension of inter-group comparison is humanness. 
Additional theoretical work draws comparisons between infrahumanization and other 
inter-group processes, including moral exclusion, dehumanization, delegitimization, and 
in-group projection, hypothesizing that the processes may be elicited by similar 
necessary and sufficient conditions. The theoretical section concludes with four 
overarching hypotheses for the thesis.
The initial aim of the thesis is to contribute to the body of literature analysing 
the necessary and sufficient conditions required to elicit infrahumanization. However, 
in five systematic studies, the effect is not observed in Australian samples, despite using 
several different inter-group contexts and using various measures of infrahumanization. 
At the same time, it is clear that other inter-group processes are at work such as in­
group favouritism in altruism and point allocation measures.
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The sixth study is key to the thesis, in that it is the first observation of denial 
of uniquely human traits to an out-group in an Australian context. It also observes 
differential attribution of humanness traits depending on the nature of the inter-group 
relationship. However, this is with a human-animal inter-group context so the ability to 
draw conclusions on human inter-group infrahumanization is limited. The final study is 
cross-cultural, comparing attribution of three dimensions of humanness in samples in 
Australia, Spain, Switzerland, and Poland with two different inter-group contexts.
In this final study, the methodology of the previous studies in the thesis is 
supported, as some inter-group contexts result in the infrahumanization pattern of 
humanness attribution. Broadly speaking, out-groups are denied humanness relative to 
in-groups. Infrahumanization patterns of emotion attribution are often qualified by 
valence, as is evident in previous studies in the thesis, resulting in patterns more similar 
to in-group favouritism.
The study therefore provides evidence that while infrahumanization is not 
common to all inter-group relationships, infrahumanization can occur in an Australian 
context. Published work has attempted to identify certain necessary and sufficient 
conditions (i.e. conflict or perceived morality) that will elicit infrahumanization. Based 
on the data, I argue, instead, that infrahumanization is the result of a complex interplay 
of characteristics in the meanings made of the inter-group context and of inter-group 
dynamics such as positive distinctiveness and boundary permeability.
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ChapterI: Preamble
This thesis deals with lay attributions and denials of characteristics of 
humanness to targets who are, biologically speaking, homo-sapiens. Therefore, the 
thesis requires an operationalization of what it means to be human. What is 
“humanness?” It is a question that has answers in legal, philosophical, medical, as well 
as lay domains. It is difficult to generate a definition that manages not to exclude some 
group of people, as there is so much variation within our human species. Most fields 
agree that “cognition” is an aspect that defines humanness. But what constitutes 
cognition varies from theory to theory (Campbell, Cranley Glass, & Charland, 1998). 
For example, philosophers Aristotle and Kant believe that to be human was to have the 
capacity to reason (Campbell, et ah, 1998). But this definition would exclude children 
up to a certain age. Others say it is a functioning human brain which is the key defining 
feature. Noting that this definition would exclude people in a comatose state, Coope 
argues that this definition is insufficient as “we do not suddenly cease to be human 
beings when we are knocked unconscious” (Coope, 1995, p. 100).
In 1977 a committee of academics, professionals, and members of the clergy 
produced a report entitled “Considerations Concerning the Passage from Life to Death.” 
As part of considering dying, the group needed an operational definition of what it 
means to be a living human (Walmsley, 1978). Their definition is that an individual is 
human in the degree to which he or she can establish relationships. Campbell et al. 
(1998) also argues that there is a social aspect to what it means to be human. However, 
this definition could be seen to exclude a large portion of the mentally and physically 
disabled of society.
Szathmary and Szamado (2008) assert that language is what sets humans apart 
from other animals; it is what makes humans unique. Among other “characteristically 
human traits,” Szathmary and Szamado include the ability to fashion tools, or the
capacity to learn (Szathmary & Szamado, 2008, p. 40). In another model, Dreyfus 
(1967) asserts that to have feelings or emotions is to be human, observing that while all 
people have the potential to be human, some deny or cloister their emotions and thus 
fail to fully embody their humanness.
Because this work addresses lay perceptions of humanness, what is important 
is not a technical, scientific or theoretical definition of humanness, but, rather, a lay 
definition. That is, I am measuring lay perceptions of humanness, so to impose an 
theoretical structure of what it means to be human is not suitable. Research shows that 
the lay definition of humanness is made up of three aspects, somewhat reflective of the 
above observations by Szathmary and Szamado (2008), Dreyfus (1967), and Campbell 
et al. (1998). The aspects include language, cognition and emotion (Leyens et al., 
2000a).
The focus of this thesis will be on infrahumanization, the attribution of greater 
humanness to a person’s own group than a different group, based on human emotions'. 
Research has shown that, in general, societies have lay conceptions of certain emotions 
being unique to humans and other emotions being potentially felt by animals as well 
(Leyens et al., 2000b). That means that by either implicitly or explicitly granting or 
denying those “uniquely human” emotions to an out-group, a person effectively 
acknowledges or denies the humanness of that group. This thesis investigates the inter­
group context and measures attribution of humanness to an out-group relative to an 
individual’s own group. Consistent with the usage in the literature, I will call this inter­
group denial of humanness, infrahumanization.
26
1 In the literature, infrahumanization is always described as greater attribution of humanness to an in-
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Theoretical Overview
To introduce the topic of infrahumanization, I begin with the following quote 
from Wallace Stegner’s “Angle of Repose” (p.199).
“She had rooms in her mind that she would not look into. Yet she was much 
liked by the Cornish women who came visiting, and apparently needed no other 
company, was less obviously lonely than Susan. Susan wondered if her own 
discontent was a weakness or if it was only a manifestation of greater sensibility. 
Was there something gnarly and tough about working-class people that kept 
them from feeling all that more delicately organized natures felt? If Georgie 
died, would Lizzie be prostrated, apathetic, and despairing as Augusta still was, 
or would she rise in the morning, supported by some coarse strength, and build 
her fire and make breakfast and go on as before?”
In this quote, the writer, Susan, a well-to-do artist, imagines the emotional 
experience of her maid, Lizzie. In the wake of hearing the devastating news of her 
friend Augusta’s miscarriage, the writer wonders if, upon losing her own child, Georgie, 
Lizzie would experience the full depth and breadth of emotion that her friend Augusta 
now experiences, or that she herself would experience. In doing so, she is asking if 
those of the lower class experience the same profound and complex emotions as those 
of her own class. The writer is infrahumanizing those of a lower class, and 
consequently, she is infrahumanizing her maid. That is, she is attributing less of what it 
means to be uniquely human (in this case, complex emotions) to a group that is different 
from her own.
We see in this quote several important aspects of infrahumanization. Firstly, it 
is implicit. The writer is not aware of her bias. If asked, she certainly would not 
describe the lower classes as less human that the upper classes. Secondly, 
infrahumanization is only denying humanness of an out-group by degree. The writer is
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not comparing Lizzie to an animal or saying she has the emotional capacity of a 
robot. Third, infrahumanization will not necessarily be accompanied by violence or 
overt inter-group harm. The writer will not act out against her maid based on this 
musing. Yet, finally, at the same time, such feelings or beliefs may allow the writer to 
excuse treatment of Lizzie that she would not direct towards members of her own social 
class.
In summary, infrahumanization is an inter-group process in which members of a 
group see members of another group as less human than their own group. The 
understanding of it as social phenomenon rests on several assumptions. The first is that 
social group formation, maintenance, and interaction can be partially explained based 
on the principles of Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and Self 
Categorization Theory (SCT) (Turner, 1982). A full description of the theories will be 
given in Chapter 3, but it is important to give an overview prior to explaining 
infrahumanization in more detail. According to SIT, a person has both personal and 
social identities. Social identities can be based on any of a long list of social groupings 
such as gender, nationality, religion, and ethnicity. As with personal identities, people 
can gamer positive self-esteem from their social identities (Turner, 1982). This positive 
self-esteem comes in part from making inter-group comparisons between groups that 
favour their group over others. In this way, they want to see their own social groups 
favourably in comparison to other social groups. This process may be facilitated by 
discriminating against other groups. This discrimination may take place in the form 
many processes, such as prejudice, stereotyping, in-group favouritism, and 
infrahumanization (S. A. Haslam, 2004).
The next two assumptions are that one of the ways in which social groups 
evaluate each other is in terms of humanness, and that this humanness can be granted by 
degrees (N. Haslam, 2006). A social group member may view an out-group as
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possessing varying degrees of humanness in relation to his or her own group. This 
evaluation is most likely to be implicit rather than explicit, and conceived in terms of 
one of the three lay conceptions of what makes humans unique from other beings: 
language, intelligence, and uniquely human emotions, (Leyens, et al., 2000a). For 
example, in the domain of uniquely human emotions, in indicating that out-group 
members experience less of the emotions that make humans unique from animals, a 
person is implicitly placing the out-group closer to the animal end of the human-animal 
continuum than the in-group. In this way, the person is infrahumanizing the out-group.
The fourth assumption is that the treatment of an out-group is based on a group’s 
evaluations of an out-group. If these evaluations are made in favour of the in-group, 
they may act as a means of improving group based self-esteem. This includes 
evaluations of that out-group’s humanity. This assumption finds support in research on 
the negative consequences of stereotyping (Gervais & Vescio, 2007), racism (Dovido & 
Gaertner, 1998; Jones, 1999), and other in-group favouring attitudes (Verkuyten, 2007). 
When group members favour their own group over another target out-group, or have 
racist views towards them this often has negative consequences for the treatment of the 
target group. Denial of humanity is akin to racism, and in-group favouritism, as it 
involves favouring the in-group over the out-group. Therefore, infrahumanization 
should have similar outcomes to those processes.
The fifth assumption is that social group members have a conception of morality 
that guides treatment of others. All cultures live by a moral code which dictates what 
behaviour is considered morally acceptable (Opotow, 2004). Moral treatment is 
typically reserved for humans, and does not necessarily apply equally for animals and 
automata. Therefore, the moral treatment of out-group members is based on the degree 
to which they are considered within the superordinate human group. When the 
humanness of an out-group is not believed to be equivalent to that of the in-group, a
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group member is not obligated to extend equal moral treatment to the out-group that 
would be required for the in-group. This can include discrimination or even violence 
(Opotow, 1990).
As has been described, the focus of this thesis is on infrahumanization, or the 
denial of full humanness to members of one group by another. It has been shown to 
have serious implications for inter-group relations. As a review of the literature will 
show, denying the full humanness of a group in this way can result in mistreatment of 
that group. Unfortunately, it is not a phenomenon confined to only the most brutal acts 
of genocide such as cases of Rwanda, Darfur, Cambodia, WWII Europe, though it was 
certainly present there. It happens when, in Los Angeles, a father expects to see a 
“monster” in the face of his son’s killer, but instead sees a “normal youngster” 
(Finnstrom & Cary, 2008, p. 1). In subtly denying the equal humanity of an out-group, 
a group member is no longer bound to treat the out-group member with the same moral 
considerations as the in-group. Indeed, infrahumanization has been found to result in 
consequences such as less prosocial behaviour (Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2002), less 
forgiveness (Tam et al., 2007; Tam, Hewstone, Kenworthy, & Cairns, 2008), less 
helping (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007a) as well as excusing past wrongs of the in-group 
towards the out-group and therefore deflecting feelings of guilt and blame (Castano & 
Giner-Sorolla, 2006).
Empirical Overview
Following this brief theoretical overview and before a more in-depth theoretical 
analysis, I would like to provide an overview of the thesis, to outline how the work in 
this thesis progressed over time.
In reading work on infrahumanization, I saw it as a field extremely worthy of 
study for the combination (similar to prejudice and stereotyping) of the seeming 
regularity of its occurrence (based on the existing literature) and its demonstrated
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negative effects. But I also saw much room for refinement of the theory on 
infrahumanization and ways in which the field could expand.
In particular, I saw that there were gaps in the theoretical understanding of the 
moderating variables that determine when infrahumanization happens, and a lack of 
identification of the necessary and sufficient conditions required to induce 
infrahumanization. Therefore, in the first five studies, drawing from research on similar 
inter-group processes, I began to analyse specific variables and their relation to 
infrahumanization. Another goal was to broaden the variety of inter-group relationships 
in which infrahumanization has been studied, as most studies focus on nationality as the 
inter-group context (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Cehajic, Brown, & Gonzalez,
2009; Costello & Hodson, 2011; Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007b; Delgado, Rodriguez 
Perez, Vaes, Leyens, & Betancor, 2009; DeLuca-McLean & Castano, 2009; Demoulin 
et al., 2005; Gaunt, 2009; Paladino et ah, 2002; Paladino, Vaes, Castano, Demoulin, & 
Leyens, 2004; Vaes & Paladino, 2010b; Wohl, Hornsey, & Bennett, 2011).
In the first study, I sought to examine moderators of infrahumanization, 
specifically in the form of threat (for reasons that will be explained in the following 
chapters). The inter-group context chosen was nationality, and the dependent variable 
was uniquely and non-uniquely human emotion attribution, according to prior research 
in the field (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Cehajic, et ah, 2009; Costello & Hodson, 
2011; Cuddy, et ah, 2007b; Delgado, et ah, 2009; DeLuca-McLean & Castano, 2009; 
Demoulin, et ah, 2005; Gaunt, 2009; Paladino, et ah, 2002; Paladino, et ah, 2004; Vaes 
& Paladino, 2010b; Wohl, et ah, 2011). The result was that I did not observe 
infrahumanization in a similar context to ones in which it had been found in other 
countries. I identified the possible confound of stereotype content that was in the design 
and conducted a second study to account for this confound; however, in Study 2 there
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was still no expression of infrahumanization in a migrant-Australian inter-group 
context.
In the next three studies, I continued to pursue analyses of moderating variables 
of infrahumanization, as well as necessary and sufficient conditions for its expression. 
However, in order to study infrahumanization, I needed to identify an inter-group 
context in which I would see the effect. So this next series of studies tested different 
inter-group contexts, some of which had already been studied in the broader literature, 
but this time using an Australian sample. I tried to increase the salience of the inter­
group context, so that I would observe infrahumanization. While inter-group conflict is 
not a necessary condition for infrahumanization, it does increase its likelihood (Castano 
& Giner-Sorolla, 2006), so Studies 3 and 5 employed groups with competitive or 
conflictual relationships. Study 4 manipulated the morality of the out-group, treating 
morality as an inter-group context, as well as manipulating the nationality of the out­
group. These three studies also tested different measures of infrahumanization to try to 
eliminate the possibility of methodological error. Still, there was no evidence of 
infrahumanization in the Australian samples.
Of course, one conclusion that could be drawn from this result is that 
Australians do not infrahumanize out-groups. But based on the field’s understanding of 
inter-group relations, and a great deal of work on infrahumanization in other countries 
and related processes such as delegtimization, dehumanization and moral exclusion, this 
did not seem likely. I had unpublished reports from Australian colleagues 
demonstrating that they also struggled to find the infrahumanization effect in their 
samples and with their inter-group contexts (Bain, Haslam, & Kashima, 2010). So the 
next step was to regroup and try to map out a picture of Australian infrahumanization. I 
planned and conducted two further studies.
33
Study 6 returned to the most basic inter-group context, for this work, 
measuring participants’ infrahumanization of animals. If Australians did not deny 
uniquely human characteristics to a group that is objectively non-human, then clearly I 
could not use the commonly employed methods of studying infrahumanization in an 
Australian context. This study, not surprisingly, revealed that Australians do, indeed, 
infrahumanize animals. Once this was established, I returned to the basic design of 
Study 2 and tested my hypotheses in Study 7 internationally with still different inter­
group contexts. This final study showed that Australians can, and will, infrahumanize 
an out-group, given the right inter-group context, and it lent support to my methodology 
as well as provided valuable cross-cultural comparisons.
Still, the picture of infrahumanization that I was left with is not one that suggests 
that it is as common as much of the literature claims. DeLuca (2009, p. 23) writes that 
infrahumanization happens in “everyday situations”, a sentiment that is echoed by other 
researchers in this area (Demoulin, Cortes, & Lcyens, 2009a; Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, 
Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003). I would say, rather, that perhaps infrahumanization 
happens in situations that are “everyday” in the sense that they are non-violent and even 
non-conflictual. They need not be situations of war or genocide. However, 
infrahumanization is not ubiquitous in that it has with very specific causal parameters 
based on the complex nature of inter-group relations and perhaps even individual 
differences. Groups cannot be taken as empty categories between which group 
members will discriminate along the humanness dimension. It is with this end result in 
mind that the following work can be best understood.
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Chapter 2: Infrahumanization 
Overview
There are several terms in social psychology that refer to denying or rejecting 
the humanness of an out-group, including dehumanization, delegitimization, moral 
exclusion, and, most recently, infrahumanization. The most general term, and the one 
perhaps most familiar to most social psychologists, is dehumanisation. Dehumanization 
is the phenomenon by which a group member comes to see an out-group as not human. 
At its worst, this process enables antagonistic behaviour such as inter-group violence 
and even genocide through categorization of the out-group as animals or automata, and 
not worthy of the same treatment as human groups. It is easy to think of such an 
extreme process as confined to a few unique historic instances (e.g. the Holocaust). 
However, it has been found to be rather common in different forms, both historically 
and currently, in attitudes and treatment of racial groups, criminals, the mentally ill, the 
mentally handicapped, and medical patients, among others (Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, 
& Jackson, 2008; N. Haslam, 2006).
Infrahumanization is a process that is related to dehumanization but may be less 
familiar to a broad audience. The term infrahumanization was coined in the work of 
Jacques Philippe Leyens in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Leyens, et al., 2000b). 
Leyens observed that while the effects of dehumanization are tragic and only happen in 
extreme cases, the roots of dehumanization lie in everyday implicit cognitive processes 
(Leyens, et ah, 2000a). He called this phenomenon infrahumanization, and it is the 
belief that members of an out-group are somewhat less human than a person’s own 
group. Unlike dehumanization, infrahumanization is the attribution of lesser 
humanness, and not a complete lack of humanness. From this perspective, humanity is 
seen as a continuum. One side of the continuum embodies the full human essence.
This is where a perceiver’s in-group sits on the continuum. The other side is a complete
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lack of human qualities. This is where a dehumanized group would lie. The 
continuum then allows for a wide mid-range in which out-group members are ascribed 
varying degrees of humanity. Therefore, out-group members may not be denied their 
humanness altogether, but rather denied traits that people believe make humans distinct 
from animals or automata. This process also allows for negative treatment of the out­
group, including fewer out-group helping behaviours (Cuddy, et al., 2007b) and less 
out-group forgiveness (Tam, et al., 2007; Wohl, et al., 2011).
Infrahumanization is less likely to occur when a person is required to take the 
perspective of the out-group member (Paladino & Vaes, 2009). These points all 
reinforce the argument of this thesis, that infrahumanization is highly contextually 
dependent. Indeed Gaunt (2009, p. 732) comments that, “presumably, not every social 
group infrahumanizes any other group.”
In this chapter I will begin by defining humanness for the purposes of this thesis 
and then outline the experimental definition of infrahumanization and how it has been 
measured in previous research. I will then address the potential moderating and 
mediating variables that have been assessed in the research including essentialism, 
identification, status, conflict, violence, and ideology. Next I will analyze two types of 
process by which infrahumanization is thought to occur and, finally, I will address the 
consequences of infrahumanization.
Initial Studies and Methods
Defining Humanness
So, of what does humanness consist and what is being denied in 
infrahumanization? Leyens’ first step in answering this question was to determine 
which traits are considered unique to, and defining of, human-kind. He began by 
conversationally asking friends and colleagues what attributes are unique to humans. 
Then, he more empirically surveyed both French and Spanish speakers, asking them to
spontaneously suggest what makes humans distinct from animals. The answer was 
that the lay understanding of humanness is clearly made up of three characteristics: 
intelligence, language, and the French, sentiments (Leyens, et al., 2000a). These were, 
therefore, taken to be the three “essences” of humanness. From these initial 
experiments, Leyens and colleagues hypothesized that of these three characteristics, all 
are necessary and none is sufficient to see an out-group as fully human. Therefore, if 
only one of the three characteristics is perceived to be lacking, or is denied to an out­
group relative to the in-group, then that group is being infrahumanized (i.e., viewed as 
less human than the in-group). This is important because, when members of a group are 
no longer fully considered humans, they are consequently no longer owed the treatment 
reserved for humans, particularly the moral considerations owed to members of the 
superordinate human in-group.
From this stage of Leyens’ work, the question was, to what extent do people 
attribute those human characteristics to their own group and an out-group. He and 
others (Paladino, et al., 2002) argued that ample research already focused on language 
and cognition, finding that denial of either can cause inter-group discrimination (Ng, 
2007; Walmsley, 1978)2. Therefore, Leyens decided to focus on the less researched 
third characteristic, sentiments. At this point, it is important to clarify the use of the 
term “sentiment” in French and Spanish in the early literature and how English speakers 
may understand it.
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2 While 1 disagree that ample work has already addressed the infrahumanization of out-groups through 
language and cognition, it is not a point of focus at present. In the present research, I adhered to tradition 
and mostly studied infrahumanization through emotion attribution, with the exception o f Study 3 which 
addresses language. There is another factor supporting the choice to study of emotion over intelligence 
and language. Studies find that both high and low status groups infrahumanize each other. Because 
intelligence and linguistic ability can be measured more objectively, it may be difficult for low status 
groups to discriminate positively in these domains. Emotional content, however, is more subjectively 
observed. This allows for detection o f infrahumanization in low status groups who may not be able to as 
easily dispute superiority of the higher status group in language or competency but who still discriminate 
in the domain of emotions to make the in-group positively distinct.
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The word emotion in French and Spanish refers to feelings experienced by 
both humans and animals (Leyens, et al., 2000a; Leyens et al., 2001). The Roman 
derived sentiment, a word that exists in both French and Spanish, refers to the emotional 
experience of humans in particular (or “uniquely human” emotions). It is important to 
note that this emotion distinction, between uniquely and non-uniquely human emotions, 
has been found to be a result of spontaneous categorizations and not as a demand 
characteristic of the studies (Demoulin et al., 2004a). It is an implicit distinction 
people make without realizing it, and a real and spontaneous distinction they make 
outside of the experimental demands.
Although there is no single word in English or Dutch that fully captures the 
meaning of the French and Spanish sentiment, research has found that English speaking 
Americans and Dutch speaking Belgians can also identify uniquely and non-uniquely 
human emotions. This suggests that the cognitive distinction between the two emotion 
types does exist in cultures not speaking Romance languages. Indeed, a study by 
Demoulin, et al. (2004a) found that participants speaking four different languages 
(French, Dutch, Spanish, English), all used humanness as a dimension on which to 
categorize emotions.
Experimentally, emotion and sentiment are referred to in the infrahumanization 
literature as primary and secondary emotions, respectively (Leyens, et al., 2001). 
Primary emotions are those that are assumed to be experienced by both humans and 
animals (e.g., pain, fear, surprise, pleasure) and secondary emotions are those assumed 
to be experienced only by humans (optimism, humiliation, hope, guilt).
In addition to the basic difference of human uniqueness, there are several other 
lay distinctions between primary and secondary emotions. Demoulin et al. (2004a) also 
analysed participants’ perceptions of the characteristics of primary and secondary 
emotions. In addition to humanness, emotions were assessed on their universality;
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visibility to others; age of inception; duration of experience; indication of morality; 
requirement of cognition and internal or external causation; desirability; acceptability; 
intensity; gender bias; and indication of an individual’s sensitivity. For all four samples 
studied (i.e., English, Dutch, Spanish, and French), compared with primary emotions, 
secondary emotions are believed to be more internally caused, more cognitive, more 
moral, less visible, less intense, longer in duration, and appear later in life (Demoulin, et 
al., 2004a). This work is important as it focuses particularly on the lay understanding of 
emotion, rather than taking the view of the biological or socioconstructivist perspectives 
of emotion. It finds that, while the lay and scientific perspectives largely overlap, they 
do differ, and it is the lay conception with which the infrahumanization research is 
concerned (Demoulin, et al., 2004a).
Measurement -  Emotion Attribution.
Measurement of infrahumanization has used both implicit and explicit 
techniques (Leyens, 2009). There is no argument in the literature over which is more 
theoretically valid, and so the type used in the present thesis is the explicit technique. 
Measurement of infrahumanization is done by measuring the difference in attribution of 
secondary emotions to the out-group versus the in-group. A group is said to be 
infrahumanized if there is an interaction between primary and secondary emotion 
attribution and the group rated. To be considered infrahumanization, the pattern should 
be that there is a difference between rating of secondary emotions, with greater 
attribution to an in-group than an out-group (Leyens, et al., 2000a; Leyens, et al., 2001). 
Studies, therefore, are structured so that the main independent variable is the inter-group 
context and the dependant variable is the ascription of various primary and secondary 
emotions to the in-group and the out-group (if the variable is within participants), or just 
to one group (if the emotion variables are between participants). Both within- and
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between-participants designs are present in the literature. As there is no theoretical 
distinction between them, I used a mixture of both throughout the thesis.
Some studies have used a selection method in which participants selected which 
emotions from a list that they believed the group was most likely to experience (Leyens, 
et al., 2000a; Leyens, et al., 2001). Further studies have also used scale measures of 
emotions, such that the participant rates all emotions by asking, “Please rate to what 
extent does (the group) experience the following emotions.” Ratings were made on a 
scale from 1 (very little) to 7 (quite a bit) (Cortes, Demoulin, Rodriguiez, Rodriguez, & 
Leyens, 2005; Gaunt, 2009; Leyens, et al., 2001; Paladino, et al., 2004).
According to Leyens and colleagues’ earliest work, infrahumanization has 
occured when there is a significantly greater attribution of both positive and negatively 
valenced secondary emotions to the in-group compared to the out-group, and when the 
attribution of primary emotions do not differ between the two groups (Leyens, et al., 
2001, study 3). However, this experimental definition of infrahumanization is not 
always consistent throughout the literature, as will be explained below.
Denial o f humanness. Due to the inconsistencies in the literature regarding the 
interpretation of primary emotions, it is necessary to analyse the different perspectives 
on primary emotions and the operationalization of infrahumanization. The initial studies 
of Leyens et al. argued that there was no theoretical reason for primary emotions to be 
expected to differ between the in-group and out-group. Therefore, they said that 
infrahumanization should be indicated only by the over-attribution of secondary 
emotions to the in-group compared to the out-group (Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt,
& Paladino, 2007; Leyens, et al., 2000a). Indeed, one of Leyens et al.’s earliest studies 
(2001), showed no differences in the attribution of primary emotions. Yet, in the same 
paper, they observed over-attribution of primary emotions to the out-group and 
interpreted this result as infrahumanization as well (Leyens, et al., 2001, Experiment 1).
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Similar to Leyens et al.’s original argument, a study by Cortes et al. makes the 
hypothesis that “no difference should be observed for the attribution of primary 
emotions to the different targets because primary emotions are common to humans and 
animals” (2005, p. 245). Another article makes a similar assessment that because 
primary emotions are common to both humans and animals, they are not informative in 
the differentiation between in-group and out-group (Boccato, Cortes, Demoulin, & 
Leyens, 2007).
However, contrary to Leyens et al.’s original argument, other studies interpret 
differences in primary emotions as meaningful, and some even claim these primary 
emotions as indicators of infrahumanization, in addition to secondary emotions 
(Paladino, et al., 2004). But Leyens restates in a more recent article that to observe 
overattribution of both primary and secondary emotions to the in-group speaks to a 
general belief of greater emotionality possessed by the in-group (Leyens, et al., 2007).
In sum, there is no clear stance in the literature on the meaning of primary emotion 
attribution. For the present thesis, primary emotions will be included in analysis as a 
means of comparison or “baseline.” Therefore, in the thesis, infrahumanization will be 
indicated by a two-way interaction between the group being rated (in-group or out­
group) and the level of emotion (primary and secondary), in which there is greater 
attribution of secondary emotions to the in-group than the out-group and a 
comparatively lesser difference in primary emotion attribution. Figure 2.1 shows one 
example of this hypothesized interaction pattern. In this figure, secondary emotions and 
primary emotions are both attributed to the in-group to a greater extent, but the 
difference is greater in secondary emotions. Figure 2.2 shows an alternative pattern that 
is also infrahumanization, in which slightly more primary emotions are attributed to the 
in-group than the out-group, but the difference between secondary emotions is still 
greater than primary emotions. These are not the only patterns that would indicate
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infrahumanization, but they show the key features of greater attribution of secondary 
emotions to the in-group than the out-group, and greater difference between secondary 
emotions and primary emotions.
" in-group 
“  — “  out-group
primary
emotions
secondary
emotions
Figure 2.1. Interaction pattern for infrahumanization. Greater secondary emotions to 
the in-group than the out-group and greater difference between secondary emotions and 
primary emotions.
in-group
“ “  out-group
primary secondary
emotions emotions
Figure 2.2. Alternative interaction pattern for infrahumanization. Again, greater 
secondary emotions are attributed to the in-group than the out-group and there is a 
greater difference between secondary emotions and primary emotions.
Over-attribution of humanness.
When observing the attribution of primary and secondary emotions to an in­
group and an out-group, one potential effect is the infrahumanization pattern described 
above. Another potential pattern is the greater attribution of secondary emotions to an 
out-group compared to an in-group. This is relevant to the thesis because it is a pattern 
found in several of the studies. What, then, do we call this type of emotion attribution 
pattern? In the infrahumanization literature, this pattern has not been described as
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infrahumanization of an in-group. Other possible descriptions are 
“superhumanization” or “suprahumanization” of the out-group. But, should an out­
group that is attributed more secondary emotions really be considered superior to the in­
group in humanness?
By way of addressing this issue, one study measures attributions of humanness 
to beings thought to be greater than humans (Demoulin, Saroglou, & Van Pachterbeke, 
2008; N. Haslam, Kashima, Loughnan, Shi, & Suitner, 2008a). Demoulin et al. (2008) 
analysed attribution of primary and secondary emotions to beings that are supernatural, 
or thought to have greater capacities than humans. They found that God was attributed 
less primary, but equal secondary emotions as the self. They found that another 
supernatural being, Satan, was attributed less primary emotions as well but also less 
secondary emotions than the self.3
The finding that I think is of note is the attribution of secondary emotions that 
show' that even God was not attributed w'ith higher secondary emotions than the in­
group. If even God (what many consider the highest being) is not attributed with 
greater secondary emotions than an in-group member, then it does not seem appropriate 
to describe a human group that is attributed greater secondary emotions than an in­
group as “suprahuman” or “super-human.” Demoulin et al. (2008) made the point that 
it is possible that gods differ from humans on different dimensions from how humans 
differ from animals (language, cognition, and secondary emotions). Therefore, while 
God was equal to humans on secondary emotions, God would be superior in other
3 In this interpretation, attribution of humanness to the “se lf ’ is equated with attributions to “humans” in 
general. While 1 think this interpretation is problematic, I will discuss the results in the terms used by the 
authors. Another finding of note in this study was that implicit measures (the specific type of which is 
not documented) revealed no differences between the target groups. That is, participants did not 
differentiate Satan and God from humans in emotions on implicit measures, only in explicit. This finding 
is one example from the published literature o f the lack o f robustness o f the infrahumanization effect.
This will be expanded on throughout the thesis.
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important ways. Therefore, attributing greater secondary emotions to an out-group 
would not be likening them to supernatural beings such as God or Satan.
From this research, I do not think “superhumanization” is an appropriate way of 
describing attribution of greater secondary emotion to the out-group than the in-group. 
While “infrahumanization” of the in-group seems to be a suitable description for the 
pattern that is opposite to infrahumanization of an out-group, this term does not appear 
in the literature. Therefore, I will describe the effect simply as “humanization” of the 
out-group.
Measurement -  IATand Other Implicit Measures
While the explicit emotion attribution methodology is popular in 
infrahumanization research, there have been several implicit methods employed to study 
infrahumanization as well. Leyens et al. (2000a) initially used an adaptation of the 
Implicit Association Task (IAT) to study infrahumanization because they assumed that 
people would not explicitly attribute greater humanness traits to the in-group over the 
out-group. The stimuli they used were in-group and out-group names and primary and 
secondary emotions. They compared response latencies when in-group names were 
paired with secondary emotions and out-group names were paired with primary 
emotions to when the opposite pairings were provided. They found evidence that 
response times were faster when the in-group was paired with uniquely human 
(secondary) emotions and the out-group was paired with non-uniquely human (primary) 
emotions. This shows an implicit association for emotion level (primary, secondary) 
and group (in-group, out-group) (e.g. secondary with the in-group and primary with the 
out-group). However, it was unclear if the process was association of secondary 
emotions with the in-group, association of primary emotions with the out-group, denial 
of secondary emotions to the out-group, or denial or primary emotions to the in-group.
45
Other researchers have also made use of the IAT in similar studies. In studies 
by Paladino et al. (2002), participants reacted faster to in-group names paired with 
secondary emotions and out-group names paired with primary emotions than to in­
group names paired with primary emotions and out-group names paired with secondary 
emotions. From this and the above IAT research we see that infrahumanization can be 
an implicit process, as the IAT measures implicit attitudes.
Sequential priming procedures have also been used to assess infrahumanization, 
including the person categorization task (PCT) and the lexical decision task (LDT) 
(Boccato, et al., 2007; Delgado, et al., 2009). Boccato et al. (2007) reasoned that 
findings of previous research using IATs of faster responses between the in-group and 
secondary emotions could be attributed to either association between the in-group and 
secondary emotions, or between the out-group and primary emotions. From their own 
findings using implicit measures, they conceptualize infrahumanization as a stronger 
automatic association between the in-group and uniquely human emotions than between 
the out-group and uniquely human emotions. They conclude that the significant effects 
found in previous implicit measures studies are based on the association between in­
groups and secondary emotions rather than out-groups and primary emotions.
In a different experimental design, Gaunt et al. (2002) tested participants’ 
memories for pairings of in-group or out-group names with secondary or primary 
emotions. Though the point is debated, some memory research indicates that people 
have better memory for information that is inconsistent with beliefs about a group 
because it requires more processing than consistent information (Smith, 1998; Srull & 
Wyer, 1989; Stangor & McMillan, 1992). Consistent with this, Gaunt et al. found that 
participants had better memory for pairings of secondary emotions and out-group names 
than in-group names. This study supports two propositions. The first is that the 
connection between emotion and group is driven by beliefs about the in-group and
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secondary emotions, as pairings between in-group and secondary emotions were less 
remembered. This supports the findings of the previous study by Boccato et al. (2007). 
Secondly, because the study used an implicit recognition memory measure, the data also 
indicate that beliefs about in-groups, out-groups, and the level of emotions experienced, 
act at an implicit level.
Frequency
A recent chapter that reviews research on infrahumanization concludes that 
“despite the variety of paradigms that have been used, results were unanimous at 
supporting our hypothesis that people generally attribute more secondary emotions to 
their in-group than to out-groups” (Demoulin, et al., 2009a, p. 156). While it is true that 
most of the published literature on infrahumanization reports finding the effect, I 
believe that this thesis will show that the effect is not necessarily as general as 
Demoulin et al. (2009a) describe,
and that the field would be incorrect to assert that results are “unanimous.” Rather, this 
present work will demonstrate that infrahumanization is a phenomenon that is highly 
contingent on the meaning made of the inter-group relationship. That is, the degree to 
which a group member attributes humanness to an out-group is dependent on the way in 
which the group defines itself in comparison to the other group.
One published study that supports the argument for the contingent nature of 
infrahumanization is by Marcu, Lyons, and Hegarty (2007). The authors used a 
qualitative discourse analysis approach to analysing the construction of the human- 
animal divide in British and Romanian samples. They found that, for both cultures, the 
places of humans and animals on the “humanity continuum... may vary [as a] function 
of context or rhetorical purposes” (p. 889). Animals could at once be humanized 
through the anthropomorphism of pets and then dehumanized to justify animal 
experimentation for medical purposes. Marcu et al. compare this to the Romanian
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treatment of a stigmatized group, the Romas (or ‘Gypsies’), saying that while the 
Romas may be infrahumanized when the inter-group context makes human suffering 
relevant, they are humanized when the inter-group context makes their popular music 
relevant.
Another study by Bain, Halsam and Kashima (2010) uses a methodology more 
similar to that of other infrahumanization work, but again presents inter-group contexts 
in which infrahumanization would be expected to occur, but did not. In this study, 
Australian participants were asked to rate the human uniqueness of the in-group 
(Australians) and four out-groups (Singaporeans, Britons, Indonesians, and Americans). 
The data showed that ratings of human uniqueness were equivalent between Australians 
and each of the other countries. That is, there was no infrahumanizations of any of the 
four out-groups. By giving examples of inter-group contexts in which 
infrahumanization is not observed, both this study and Marcu et al. (2007) challenge the 
view that findings are “unanimous” and set the scene for the findings of this thesis.4 
Context
Overall, studies in infrahumanization have primarily focused on ethnic and 
national group contexts (Leyens et al., 2003). In these cases, Leyens, et al. (2003) have 
likened infrahumanization by emotion to the opposite side of the nationalism coin. By 
this they mean that infrahumanization is a set of implicit beliefs that the people of one’s 
own nation are superior to those of other nations, as opposed to the explicit beliefs of 
nationalistic sentiments . The favoured group context in the published literature is 
testing the principles of infrahumanization with the native citizens as the in-group and 
the most recent and controversial immigrant group as the out-group (Castano & Giner- 
Sorolla, 2006; Cehajic, et al., 2009; Costello & Hodson, 2011; Cuddy, et al., 2007b;
4 The studies discussed here used different methodologies. The method o f Bain et al. (2010) is more 
common to the infrahumanization literature than that used by Marcu et al. (2007). Still, both studies 
measured attribution of humanness to in-groups and out-groups and did not observe consistent denial o f 
humanness traits to out-groups.
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Delgado, et al., 2009; DeLuca-McLean & Castano, 2009; Demoulin, et al., 2005;
Gaunt, 2009; Paladino, et al., 2002; Paladino, et al., 2004; Vaes & Paladino, 2010b; 
Wohl, et al., 2011).
Another popular group context has been between language groups of Dutch 
speaking and French speaking Belgians (Cortes, et al., 2005; Paladino, et al., 2002). 
More recent work by Demoulin and colleagues (2009b) has found infrahumanization 
with meaningful, yet far less fundamental group distinctions such as favourite colour 
and chosen profession. They referred to these groups as “quasi minimal groups” (p. 6) 
and found that infrahumanization could be measured even for quasi minimal group 
contexts with relatively low levels of salience and identification. This thesis will use 
national inter-group contexts as well as other novel contexts.
Mediating and Moderating Variables
The above section described methodological issues, measurement types, 
frequency of observation, and context. I now turn to outlining the variables that affect 
the infrahumanization process. The following sections will outline the findings on the 
contextual variables of status, identification, conflict, violence, threat, and ideology. 
Identification and Essentialism
Leyens et al. (2003) postulated, and obtained evidence in support of the view 
that there are two necessary conditions to infrahumanization; these include both a 
perceived essentialized difference between groups, and perception that the groups are 
significantly meaningful. Therefore, Leyens et al. put forth the idea that two 
moderators of infrahumanization are social identification and essentialism, writing that, 
“people infrahumanize as a function of their identification with their in-group and to the 
extent that they look for an essential difference between their in-group and the out­
group” (p. 712). First, I look at essentialism.
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Essentialism. An essential trait is a deep and natural quality of an organism 
that determines how characteristics are presented on the surface. Research on 
psychological essentialism refers to both “natural kinds” and “human artifact” 
categories (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). Human artifact categories are those such as 
home, skirt, and couch that have been conceived of for the sake of organizing the social 
world. Natural kinds are categories such as dog, flower, and silver, that have their 
basis in the physical or biological characteristics. It is only natural kinds that have an 
actual underlying and objective “essence” that defines the category. However, it has 
been shown that people are prone to treating human artifact categories as natural kinds. 
Essentialism is, therefore, treating as essential those socially created categories or 
treating human artifact categories as having an essence.
For example, sex, as a category, which involves biological characteristics that 
are determined by chromosomes, can be described as a natural kind. But gender, the 
characteristics which are culturally determined to be masculine and feminine, is a 
human artifact. Psychological essentialism, however, describes the belief, valid or not, 
that a human artifact, like gender, is a natural kind and that the human artefact has 
inborn, biological attributes. Essentialism is also the attribution of non-biological 
characteristics (e.g. intelligence) with a natural kind (e.g. race). This becomes 
important in social psychology, as the belief in an essentialized social trait, such as 
gender, will affect how a group is treated. If group members are thought to possess 
certain traits by their very’ nature, another group will see it as valid to treat them 
according to those in-bom traits.
It is also true that people do not always need to know what constitutes the 
“essence”, but merely that one exists. We can rely on a biologist to tell us that a 
manatee is a mammal, not a fish, despite the fact that it shares many of what we
50
consider fishlike qualities. We do not need to understand the anatomic makeup 
ourselves.
In the social domain, this tendency not to need to identify the essence is crucial, 
because the “essence” of a social group can be assumed without any direct evidence of 
its existence. So a group of Australians can believe there is some deep underlying 
inborn characteristic that determines Australianness, when, in fact, this is just a matter 
of where a person was bom. Again, a human artefact category is being treated as a 
natural kind. Therefore, what is important in social psychology is not whether a 
category, such as Australian or New Zealander, has an essence, but whether or not 
people believe it does. It is this belief that affects behaviour towards socially 
constructed groups.
Outside of the social realm, the reason people sometimes essentialize non- 
essential social groupings is because people can often correctly discern between 
whether or not a trait is essential. If it looks like a fish and acts like a fish, it is probably 
a fish. However, in the social world, just because it looks a certain way, or is grouped 
by a human artifact name, does not mean it belongs to that group as a result of a deep 
underlying natural kind. The social group “Australians” is useful as a human artifact 
categorization, but if such an attribute as nationality is essentialized and treated as a 
natural kind, discrimination and prejudice can result. This is important because, in 
some cases, people feel that discrimination on the basis of natural kinds is legitimate 
and essentialism can legitimize discrimination.
In the infrahumanization literature, the relation between essentialism and 
infrahumanization can be explained in the following way. Essentialism is the belief that 
socially constructed group categorizations are natural kinds. If this belief exists, when 
social groups differ, people believe that the groups differ in their essence, often 
specifically in, their human essence. If groups are perceived to differ in human essence,
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this perception may manifest in how uniquely human traits, such as language, 
competence and secondary emotions, are ascribed to them (Paladino, et al., 2004).
The process of infrahumanization and its relation to essentialism (and 
identification) is succinctly summarized by a quote from Vaes (2006, p. 5):
If people think that their group is superior to other groups, and attribute 
different essences to the in-group and out-groups, then it follows that people 
should ascribe a better essence to their own group. As a consequence, on a 
dimension as fundamental as humanity, people believe that “the” human essence 
belongs to their in-group and that the infra-human essence characterizes (some) 
out-groups.
Identification. The following chapter will focus in more detail on the idea of 
group formation and identification, but to explain briefly, the social world has many 
psychological groups with which a person may be aligned. These groups provide a 
person with information about him or herself and the social world. A person will feel 
more strongly about his or her alignment with some groups than others (e.g. the gender 
group to a feminist or the political party to a politician). That is, some groups will be 
“significantly meaningful groups,” and some will not. Leyens et al. (2003) 
hypothesized that for an individual to infrahumanize an out-group, the relevant inter­
group social category must be “meaningful” (p.712). They stopped short of giving this 
term an operational definition, but suggest that this is identification with the social 
category.
Therefore, Leyens (2009) suggests that identification with the in-group is a 
necessary condition, although, not sufficient in itself to trigger infrahumanization in all 
cases. It has generally been found that infrahumanization is stronger for participants 
who identify strongly with the in-group (Demoulin et al., 2004b), but there are mixed 
data on this effect (Demoulin, et al., 2004b; Gaunt, 2009; Paladino, et al., 2004;
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Rohmann, Niedenthal, Brauer, Castano, & Leyens, 2009). A positive relationship 
between social identification and infrahumanization has been replicated in several 
studies, including Demoulin et al. (2004b) who found that the more people identify with 
their in-group, the more they infrahumanize an outgroup. However, a recent study by 
Gaunt (2009) found mixed results for the moderating effect of identification. In two 
studies of Israeli and Palestinian youth, identification did not interact with 
infrahumanization in Study 1. In Study 2, the association was partially present. The 
more participants identified with their Palestinian identity, the more they 
infrahumanized the Jewish out-group; but this did not occur among Israeli participants.
Interestingly, a study using German and French participants showed that varying 
the manipulation of identification affected observation of infrahumanization in the same 
inter-group context. In two studies with the inter-group context of German and French 
participants, Rohmann et al. (2009) found that in a low conflict context, the 
manipulation of identification varied the effect of infrahumanization. In Experiment 1, 
when identification was measured and not manipulated, infrahumanization was only 
found among high identifiers. However, in Experiment 2, when the identification was 
manipulated, the infrahumanization effect was evident for both low and high identifiers. 
The authors comment that the infrahumanization was, in this latter case, made possible 
by the introduction of an inter-group comparison in the identification manipulation. 
These results cast doubt on whether identification affects infrahumanization, as only 
primed or manipulated identification affected infrahumanization whereas non- 
manipulated identification did not have a relationship with infraumanizaiton. It 
suggests a lack of robustness of the infrahumanization effect, at elast as it is related to 
identification.
Another area in which the data are mixed is how identification affects the pattern of 
attribution of emotions to the out-group. In one study, not only did highly identified
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participants grant more secondary emotions to the in-group than the out-group, but 
they were also more reluctant to grant secondary emotions to out-groups (Leyens, et al., 
2001, Study 3). In another study, high identification predicted more attribution of 
secondary emotions to the in-group, but had no relationship with attribution to the out­
group (Paladino, et al., 2004). It is therefore unclear if high identifiers are affording 
secondary emotions to the in-group or denying secondary emotions to the out-group or 
both.
These findings of Leyens et al. (2001) and Paladino et al. (2004) introduce 
another unresolved issue in the infrahumanization literature. There is debate in the 
literature on the process by which emotions are being granted and denied. There is 
mixed evidence of whether infrahumanization is in-group favouritism, out-group 
derogation, or both. These studies have conflicting results, with Leyens et al. indicating 
infrahumanization is both in-group favouritism and out-group derogation, as 
participants were affording secondary emotions to their in-group and denying them to 
the out-group. In the findings of Paladino et al., there is no out-group derogation by 
denial of secondary emotions, but rather only overattribution of emotions to the in­
group indicating the process is in-group favouritism. This issue will be addressed more 
fully below.
Superordinate Identification. Another issue relevant to identification and 
infrahumanization is whether identification at the superordinate (shared) level will 
reduce infrahumanization. This is also an area that has revealed conflicting results. 
Gaunt (2009) found that the more that Arab and Jewish youth considered Arabs to be 
part of the superordinate Israeli category (with the assumption that Jews are already 
included), the less Jewish youth infrahumanized Arabs. Also, the more Arab Israeli 
youth considered themselves to be part of the superordinate Israeli identity, the less they
infrahumanized the Jewish Israeli out-group. This work suggests that shared 
identification in a superordinate category reduces infrahumanization.
However, another set of studies that manipulated national identity versus 
superordinate European identity in German and French participants found conflicting 
results. It was expected that there would be infrahumanization by those primed to have 
their national identity salient. In contrast, it was expected that there would be no 
infrahumanization for participants primed with the superordinate group identity. While 
there was an overall infrahumanization effect, this was not moderated by the type of 
identification made salient (Rohmann, et al., 2009). So, in summary, high identification 
with the in-group may increase infrahumanization and superordinate identification may 
decrease infrahumanization, but neither of these outcomes are found consistently. 
Therefore, identification is not a necessary condition, as both low and high identifiers 
can infrahumanize an out-group. Perhaps, instead, identification is a sufficient 
condition to cause infrahumanization, as studies show that manipulating identity can 
result in infrahumanization.
Status
One aspect of infrahumanization that has been replicated across several studies 
is the finding that infrahumanization is detected among both high and low status groups 
(Demoulin, et al., 2004b; Leyens, et al., 2001). Stated more generally, high or low 
status is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for infrahumanization to occur.
While most studies that have observed infrahumanization have used high status 
in-group and low status out-group contexts, several studies have tested low status in­
groups and high status out-groups. In a Wason Selection Task (WST) design5, it has
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5 The Wason Selection Task (WST) is a test in which participants select cards showing certain pairings 
which are either informative or not informative for confirming a rule of which pairs belong together. 
Adapted for infrahumanization, participants were selecting from four types of cards which paired in­
group or out-group with secondary emotions and in-group or out-group with primary emotions. In this 
way, if participants are motivated to reach the conclusion that the in-group has the human essence, in-
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been found that dominated groups claimed more uniquely human emotions for 
themselves than dominant groups (Demoulin, et al., 2004b). Similar results have been 
found by Paladino et al. (2002) in an IAT design. In this latter study, the Belgian inter­
group context was such that the somewhat lower status and certainly minority French- 
speaking group rated themselves as having more secondary emotions than the somewhat 
higher status and majority group of Flemish-speaking Belgians. The researchers found 
the same pattern of results as found in the Demoulin study (2004). The IAT found an 
implicit bias for associating the in-group with uniquely human secondary emotions and 
the out-group with non-uniquely human primary emotions, rather than the reverse 
pairings. The lower status French-speaking group, therefore, infrahumanized the higher 
status group exhibited by association of greater humanness with the in-group than the 
out-group.
Demoulin et al. (2004b) also varied group status across several studies and 
measured infrahumanization using explicit attribution tasks. They found that two low 
status groups (Canarians and Belgian Walloons) infrahumanized higher status out­
groups (Mainsland Spanish and Belgian French, respectively). Gaunt (2009) also found 
that a low-status group (Arab Israelis) infrahumanized a high status group (Jewish 
Israelis). These findings suggest that reservation of humanness for the in-group is not 
unique to high status groups. I will return to this idea in a section on the in-group 
projection model in Chapter 4.
Conflict
Interestingly, one of the conditions that has been shown to be unnecessary for 
infrahumanization is conflict (Leyens, 2009). That is to say that infrahumanization 
occurs between groups that are not in direct conflict and does not interact with
group-secondary cards are more informative than out-group-secondary emotion cards. Indeed, the out­
group-secondary emotion cards would be least relevant.
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perceived conflict in groups that do experience conflict (Demoulin, et al., 2004b;
Gaunt, 2009). Demoulin et al. used group contexts including Belgian Flemish speakers 
and French speakers, as well as Americans (specifically from the east coast) and 
Mexicans.6 There was infrahumanization between both of these groups that the authors 
argue are not in direct conflict with each other. Also, in a study of youth who do have 
a conflictual relationship with each other (Jewish-Israeli and non-Jewish Israeli), 
perceived conflict did not interact with infrahumanization (Gaunt, 2009). These studies 
show that conflict is not necessary for infrahumanization.
One study that suggests conflict may be sufficient to cause infrahumanization is 
by Castano and Giner-Sorolla (2006). They found that infrahumanization of an out­
group increased from baseline after there had been inter-group killing of members of an 
out-group by the in-group. Though conflict was not a measured variable, we can 
conclude that knowledge of killing was knowledge of inter-group conflict, and 
therefore, infrahumanization increased with knowledge of past conflict. In summary, 
while conflict is believed to be non-necessary for infrahumanization, it may be a 
sufficient condition to trigger infrahumanization. However, this hypothesis is yet to be 
fully tested.
Violence
One study has evaluated violence as a moderator of infrahumanization (Delgado, 
et al., 2009). In this study, researchers found that exposure to photos of violence 
directed at humans triggers infrahumanization of an out-group even when that violence
6 Demoulin et al. (2004b) argue that the two intergroup contexts used in their study are not ones in which 
conflict exists. While 1 agree there is no explicit physical, violent conflict between these groups, I would 
argue that there are certainly social tensions, and some degree of political conflict. There is a lot o f 
migration from Mexico into the US, resulting in many Americans feeling threatened economically and 
culturally (Hitlan, Carillo, Sarate, & Aikman, 2007; Lee, Ottati, & Hussain, 2001). Likewise, many 
Mexicans feel threatened by American cultural and economic influence in Mexico. Indeed, the authors 
did not measure perceived conflict so there is no way to know how much conflict the groups perceived in 
the intergroup relationship. In the Belgian French and Belgian Flemish context, “there is a long history of 
political and institutional conflicts” (Paladino, Leyens, Rodriguez, Rodriguez, Gaunt, & Demoulin, 2002, 
p. 111. I suggest that with both intergroup contexts, it is likely that there was a degree of perceived social 
conflict.
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is not related to the out-group or in-group specifically. In the same study, Delgado et 
al. and colleagues analyzed why the salience of violence (not directed at the out-group) 
was causing infrahumanization. Primary emotions were taken as a baseline as these are 
theoretically equally attributed to both in-group and out-group. Secondary emotions 
were taken as a deviation from the baseline. From this analysis, Delgado et al. saw that 
it was not the in-group that was humanized more, but rather the out-group that was 
granted lesser humanity. This suggests that the reason violence triggers 
infrahumanization is because violence changes the perception of the out-group (to 
which less secondary emotions are attributed) rather than the in-group (to which 
secondary emotion attribution remains stable as compared with baseline).
Ideology
Ideologies often inform approaches to intergroup interaction. It is often the case 
that these approaches “affect how minority group members are treated and, thus, the 
social climate that they encounter when they interact with members of the dominant 
group” (Vorauer & Sasaki, 2011, p. 309). Ideologies such as Right Wing 
Authoritarianism (RWA) (e.g. high levels of conventionalism, submission to 
conventional authorities, and aggressiveness toward conventional targets) have been 
shown to predict social attitudes such as racism (Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2005). In a 
similar way, several ideologies have been shown to predict infrahumanization, 
including conservatism, RWA, and sexism.
Work by DeLuca-McLean and Castano (2009) shows that conservatism is a 
moderating ideology of infrahumanization in the context of providing aid in the 
aftermath of a natural disaster. While their study did not detect a significant two-way 
interaction between an in-group and out-group and attribution of secondary emotions 
(infrahumanization), there was a three-way interaction that included degree of political 
conservatism. In the study, Caucasian participants were told about the effects of a 
hypothetical hurricane on either a Caucasian or a Hispanic family. Results showed that
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conservatives attributed more secondary emotions to an in-group following a natural 
disaster than an out-group, following the infrahumanization emotion attribution pattern. 
Liberals attributed emotions equally between groups.
In addition, the suggested treatment strategies for coping in the aftermath of a 
natural disaster also suggested infrahumanization by conservatives. Conservative 
participants were more likely to suggest behavioural modification in the aftermath of a 
natural disaster rather than psychotherapy for a Hispanic (out-group) family than a 
Caucasian (in-group) family. Though it was not a direct measurement of 
infrahumanization, the authors reported that this second effect was indicative of 
infrahumanization. They claimed that conservatives were reserving the more 
exclusively human therapy (psychotherapy) for the in-group and selecting a treatment 
suitable for humans and animals (behaviour modification) for the out-group.
Another ideology, RWA, has also been identified as a moderator of the 
attribution of humanness (Motyl, Hart, & Pyszczynski, 2010). Motyl et al. used 
violence as a measure of infrahumanization by presenting violence as infrahuman (an 
instinctual and animal act) or humanized (involving abstract meanings and motivations). 
The authors hypothesized that participants would agree to in-group perpetration of 
violence if it was portrayed as human, but reject it if it was portrayed as animalistic or 
infrahumanized. In this way, participants would reject the in-group taking infrahuman 
actions. Participants assumed the role of commander-in-chief of the US Armed Forces 
and indicated their support for various military actions. They found that participants 
high in RWA rejected violence when it was presented as infrahuman but endorsed 
violence when it was humanized. For participants low in RWA, there was no difference 
in support for violence when it was described in the two conditions. The authors 
conclude that people high in RWA have a greater need to distinguish their in-groups 
from animal groups and that when violence is linked to animality, they are more likely
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to reject violence than when it is humanized. Therefore, RWA is a moderating 
ideology of infrahumanization.
Research by Viki and Abrams (2003) pointed out that benevolent sexism and 
hostile sexism were mediators of infrahumanization. Hostile sexism is an ideology of 
antipathy towards women and their inferiority as a gender. Benevolent sexism is the 
belief in women as inferior or capable of only fulfilling restricted roles, but exhibited in 
subjectively positive or flattering ways (Abrams, Viki, Masser, & Bohner, 2003). 
Relating to infrahumanization, high hostile sexism predicted low attribution of positive 
secondary emotions (infrahumanization) to women whereas high benevolent sexism 
predicted high attribution of positive secondary emotions to women. Sex of the 
participant, however, did not have any effect on infrahumanization (Viki & Abrams, 
2003). The first effect of participants high in hostile sexism suggests that hostile sexism 
predicts infrahumanization of women. The second effect for participants high in 
benevolent sexism may be explained by stereotyping women as more emotional than 
men. I will explore stereotyped emotions in Study 2 (Chapter 6) in this thesis. Taken 
together, from these three studies on the relationships of sexism, RWA and 
conservatism with infrahumanization, it is clear that several ideologies are related to 
people’s views of the humanness of social groups.
Process
Research has addressed the question of the process by which infrahumanization 
occurs or whether infrahumanization is a process of in-group favouritism, out-group 
derogation, or both. To get a sense of how the patterns of each would look in 
infrahumanization by emotion attribution measures, it is necessary to assess the levels 
of attribution of primary and secondary emotions. In the case of infrahumanization, 
attribution of primary emotions can be taken to be a baseline as it is assumed to be the 
same between in-group and out-group. Therefore, it is the secondary emotions that vary
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and express either in-group favouritism and out-group derogation. If primary 
emotions are equal between different groups, then, in-group favouritism is exhibited by 
over-attribution of secondary emotions to the in-group, and out-group derogation is 
under-attribution of secondary emotions to the out-group compared to the primary 
emotions baseline.7
So is infrahumanization either of these patterns of emotion attribution or both? 
Studies show that in-group favouritism and out-group derogation are two separate 
processes that do not necessarily happen in concert (Turner, 1978). Leyens et al. (2003) 
described infrahumanization as a combination of both in-group favouritism and out­
group derogation. However, this statement was theoretical, and not based on empirical 
work. The empirical work is mixed. In their research, Gaunt et al. (2002) suggested 
that the infrahumanization process was in-group favouring, as data showed “increased 
attribution of secondary emotions to the in-group rather than decreased attribution of 
secondary emotions to the out-group” compared to primary emotions (p. 512). Another 
study by Demoulin et al. (2009b) found in-group favouritism without out-group 
derogation using groups based on colour preference and career choice. DeLuca (2009) 
observes that in attribution of humanity via secondary emotions expressed by group 
members, attribution patterns in some cases suggested a motivation to favour the in­
group and in other cases more motivation to derogate the out-group.
Research by Demoulin et al. (2005) has begun to look in the area of motivation 
as part of the infrahumanization process in discerning in-group favouritism from out­
group derogation. Using the WST, Demoulin et al. (2005) examined both high and low 
status groups, with and without conflict relationships in various countries. They 
conclude that there are two simultaneous motivations behind infrahumanization. One
7 Of course, this assumes that primary and secondary emotions are attributed to an equal degree. It is 
possible that all humans are viewed as possessing secondary emotions to a greater or lesser extent than 
primary emotions. That is, the average attribution level o f secondary emotions, at baseline levels, may be 
greater or less than primary emotions. However this point has not yet entered the debate.
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motivation is, first and foremost, in-group favoring. Groups were most motivated to 
select confirming information pairing in-groups with secondary emotions. The 
researchers also found that there was a second motivation of out-group derogation. 
Participants were least motivated to seek information pairing out-groups with secondary 
emotions.
Work by Gaunt et al. (2002) again investigated in-group favouritism and out­
group derogation, specifically with the function of memory. They begin with the 
assumption that familiar conclusions are less memorable than unfamiliar conclusions. 
That is, when a piece of information is less consciously remembered, it is a sign of 
information being consistent with beliefs. The authors found that while people’s 
memories associating in-groups with primary emotions and out-groups with primary 
emotions do not differ, people’s memories associating in-groups with secondary 
emotions are less conscious than those associating out-groups with secondary emotions. 
They conclude that people perceiving in-group and secondary emotions pairings less 
consciously than out-group secondary emotion pairings is a sign that participants 
believed the in-group had more uniquely human emotions than the out-group. In this 
way, the in-group was being perceived as more human than the out-group. In using 
primary emotions as a baseline, the researchers found greater attribution to the in-group 
with secondary emotions rather than decreased attribution to the out-group of secondary 
emotions. Therefore, the process was in-group favouring and not out-group derogating.
Taken together, the above studies provide mixed evidence for whether 
infrahumanization is in-group favouring, or both in-group favouring and out-group 
derogating. It is clear that the process is at least in part in-group favouring. While two 
studies found the simultaneous presence of out-group derogation, one study did not. 
Several years after Leyens’ first statement on the subject, given the above evidence,
Leyens et al. (2007) again made the claim than infrahumanization is both in-group 
favouring and out-group derogating.
While the debate is interesting, theoretically, I do not think that it is imperative 
to establish a single process pathway as indicative of infrahumanization. Rather, I think 
it is theoretically valid to say that seeing the in-group as more human than the out-group 
and seeing the out-group as less human that the in-group are both infrahumanization. In 
essence, denying an out-group humanness relative to the in-group and granting the in­
group greater humanness than the out-group are both differentiating the in-group and 
out-group in humanness terms, in a way favouring of the in-group. Theoretically, both 
or either process can be classified as infrahumanization and it does not matter which or 
both are happening at any one time. Therefore, two additional infrahumanization 
patterns of emotion attribution would look like the following Figures 2.3 and 2.4.
Figure 2.3 shows in-group favouritism, as the in-group is being attributed greater 
secondary emotions than the baseline primary emotions and out-group secondary 
emotions. Figure 2.4 shows out-group derogation, as the out-group is being attributed 
lesser secondary emotions compared to the baseline primary emotions and in-group 
secondary emotions.
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in-group
“ “  out-group
primary secondary
emotions emotions
Figure 2.3. Hypothetical in-group favouritism pattern of infrahumanization.
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in-group
________________________  —  —  —  out-group
primary secondary
emotions emotions
Figure 2.4. Hypothetical out-group derogation pattern of infrahumanization.
Consequences
As a process akin to dehumanization, researchers believed that 
infrahumanization is worthy of study because of the pathway that it opens towards 
mistreatment of the out-group and hypothesized that the consequences of not seeing an 
out-group as possessing equal humanness to the in-group might range from passive 
neglect to active harm. Several studies have looked at specific outcomes of 
infrahumanization (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Cehajic, et al., 2009; DeLuca- 
McLean & Castano, 2009; DeLuca, 2009; Demoulin, et al., 2004b; Gaunt, Sindic, & 
Leyens, 2005; Goff, et al., 2008; Vaes, et al., 2002; Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2006).
The above research has shown that, in general, people believe secondary 
emotions are experienced by the in-group. Vaes et al. (2002), therefore, theorized that 
expression of an emotion typical of the in-group would lead a perceiver to reason that 
the target is an in-group member. So, on the positive side of humanness attribution, a 
stranger (whose group membership is unknown) who expresses of secondary emotions 
is humanized, resulting in more helping and perspective taking of the stranger by the 
perceiver. By extension, a target’s expression of secondary emotions should be 
interpreted by participants as similarity with targets, and should therefore elicit helping 
responses. Vaes et al. (2002) tested this with a “lost email” technique, similar to the 
lost-letter technique used by Milgrim (1977). Researchers found support in that 
participants who received an errant email from a person who expressed a secondary
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emotion responded with more familiar or “nicer” responses than when the writer 
expressed a primary emotion. Another study found that people displayed more 
conformity to the ideas of political candidates from their own party who expressed 
secondary emotions, but not those of candidates from an opposing party expressing 
secondary emotions (Vaes, Paladino, & Magagnotti, 2011).
While in-group secondary emotions elicit positive responses, there has also been 
work done on the differences in reactions to in-group and out-group expression of 
secondary emotions. It has been found that, when an out-group member does, in fact, 
express a secondary emotion (an act which runs counter to the in-group’s beliefs about 
the group), there are negative consequences for the out-group (Demoulin, et al., 2004b; 
Vaes, et al., 2003; Vaes, et al., 2006). In the work of Vaes et al. (2003), secondary 
emotions elicited more approach behaviours when expressed by the in-group and 
elicited avoidance behaviours when expressed by the out-group, whereas primary 
emotions had no difference. Work by Demoulin et al. (2004b) has also found that the 
expression of secondary emotions by the out-group elicits less positive reactions from 
an in-group such as decreased solidarity responses.
This result of negative responses to out-group secondary emotions has been 
further investigated by Vaes et al. (2006) to directly test if expression of secondary 
emotion by in-group and out-group members elicits different humanness representation 
by participants. Building on research on memory and stereotype activation, they 
hypothesized that secondary emotions would activate the human concept more when 
expressed by an in-group member than an out-group member. First, they reasoned that 
there is a positive association between humanity and secondary emotions and a positive 
association between in-groups and secondary emotion. At the same time, there is a 
negative association between out-groups and secondary emotions. Taken together, this 
means that there should be a positive association between a person’s perception of an
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in-group and humanity, but a negative association between a person’s perception of 
an out-group and humanity. The results confirmed this hypothesis in two experiments, 
with both positive and negative emotions. Importantly, the researchers also showed that 
the results were not a factor of an overall positivity bias to a group that possesses 
secondary emotions. All representations in each of the conditions did not differ in 
positivity, but rather humanity activation in particular.
In a similar study with more dire consequences, DeLuca (2009) found that 
participants were more likely to support a military mission that would kill civilians but 
catch terrorists when those civilians were out-group members expressing secondary 
emotions versus out-group members expressing primary emotions or in-group members 
expressing either primary or secondary emotions. However, it is theoretically unclear as 
to why expression of emotions counter to beliefs have such a negative effect in the 
above two studies.
Unfortunately, work in the area has found that there are additional negative 
outcomes when secondary emotions are denied to the out-group. Such consequences 
are decreased helping behaviour and forgiveness for a group that is infrahumanized 
(Cuddy, et al., 2007b; Goff, et al., 2008; Wohl, et al., 2011) as well as decreased mental 
health aid for an out-group who may be in need of it (DeLuca-McLean & Castano, 
2009). This finding is believed to be generalizable to overall decreased willingness to 
provide aid to an infrahumanized group.
In another study on forgiveness, Wohl, Hornsey, and Bennett (2011) found that 
after an apology, out-group forgiveness was only granted to the extent that a person 
perceives the capacity for the out-group to experience secondary emotions. When the 
out-group is not perceived to experience secondary emotions (that is, when it is 
infrahumanized), an apology including secondary emotions is seen as ingenuine.
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There are situations, however, in which the experience of out-group 
secondary emotions cannot be denied. In highly emotional situations, when in-group 
members believe out-group members experience secondary emotions to some extent, 
the secondary emotions are believed by in-group members to be much shorter-lasting 
than those of the in-group (Gaunt, et al., 2005). It could, therefore, be predicted that a 
group member may perceive that any negative action taken towards an infrahumanized 
out-group would be less consequential, as its impact would only be short-term.
Another negative consequence of infrahumanization is that it can act as a 
justification for past violence. In three studies, Castano and Giner-Sorolla (2006) found 
that feelings of collective responsibility for the killing of an out-group member 
increased infrahumanization towards that out-group. The authors concluded that this 
cognitive strategy allows the in-group to excuse past wrongs and to manage collective 
guilt. The authors also hypothesize that it may allow the in-group to commit further 
wrongs against the out-group, such as withholding reparations for an offense. Using a 
different experimental design with a similar research question and hypothesis, Goff et 
al. (2008) have found evidence that infrahumanization of African American criminals 
by implicitly likening them with apes, is correlated with excusing police violence in 
custody and higher instance of death penalty in sentencing.
Conclusion
Emotions can be categorized into those that are common to both humans and 
animals (primary) and those that are unique to humans. Infrahumanization is the 
attribution of greater secondary emotions to the in-group than the out-group with 
relatively equal attribution of primary emotions between the two groups. It can be 
observed in both implicit and explicit measures. The field is yet to find the necessary 
and sufficient conditions that lead to infrahumanization, but several moderating 
variables have been identified. The consequences of infrahumanization are that it can
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limit the acknowledgement of out-group suffering, decrease helping behaviour, 
decrease forgiveness of an outgroup, and justify past violence toward an out-group.
These very relevant and topical findings on the outcomes of infrahumanization 
make a strong case for the importance of infrahumanization research. Not only does 
infrahumanization affect the treatment towards an out-group, but, as Demoulin et al. 
(2009a) observe, it can have compounding effects for the series of actions and reactions 
between in-group and out-group. For example, two groups may each infrahumanize 
each other. This affects each group’s analysis of the opposing group’s actions, and 
results in inter-group misunderstandings. Each group will then react based on a 
misunderstood interpretation of the out-group’s actions. The misunderstandings may 
then escalate from initial misperceptions to eventual hostility and antagonistic 
behaviour. For example, while perceiving the in-group experience of secondary 
emotion leads to empathy for the in-group, it is reasonable to predict that failure to 
recognize these emotions in out-group members will lead to a lack of demonstration of 
empathy (Cehajic, et al., 2009; Vaes, et al., 2003). The negative effects of the initial 
infrahumanization may then increase such that, when the out-group fails to receive 
empathy, they may develop a view of the in-group as cold and unfeeling, thus further 
straining inter-group relations. In this way, the present thesis understands 
infrahumanization as an inter-group process which can have cumulative and 
degenerating negative effects.
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Chapter 3: Foundations of Inter-group Processes
In previous research on infrahumanization, infrahumanization is described as 
having certain similarities with the process outlined in Social Identity Theory (SIT), and 
puts the two on equal footing as theories (Demoulin, et al., 2004b). SIT is described as 
a “related” theory to infrahumanization, which is itself also described as a “theory” 
(Demoulin, et al., 2004b, p. 267). My approach to infrahumanization is different. I see 
infrahumanization resting on the concepts and assumptions of SIT, with SIT being a 
framework for understanding the concept of infrahumanization.
SIT began as a way to understand inter-group discrimination, of which 
infrahumanization is a type (for a review see S. A. Haslam, 2004). SIT develops the 
ideas around social identification and perceived inter-group interaction, concepts that 
are key to infrahumanization. The current chapter outlines key concepts of SIT as well 
as related theoretical perspectives of Self-Categorization Theory (SCT) and social 
identity threat, and how these theoretical perspectives frame the work on 
infrahumanization.
Social Identity Theory
A person’s social identity is a component of a person’s self-concept that is 
associated with one or more of his or her group memberships (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
SIT was developed out of initial experimentation with minimal groups, groups formed 
on such seemingly minor and meaningless conditions as to be expected to provide no 
basis for group-based discrimination. It was found, however, that even these minimal 
groups were sufficient to provoke in-group favouritism, or preferential allocation (of 
money and points) to in-group members relative to out-group members (Turner, 1982). 
In that sense, group members discriminated against an out-group without this 
discrimination being based upon personal interests, and without any prior relationship 
of antagonism between the two groups (Turner, 1982). Thus, the simple perception of
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belonging to a group and identifying with it was sufficient for displaying some inter­
group behaviour, specifically in-group favouritism (Turner, 1982). Initial, as well as 
subsequent, studies have found that “interpersonal attraction is not necessary for group 
formation and not sufficient to increase inter-group discrimination” (Turner, 1982, p. 
24), however social identification with a group is sufficient.
From the social identity perspective, the social group is defined as two or more 
people who are linked by a psychological understanding of shared “social unity,” 
(Turner, 1982, p. 15) without the need for formal institutional organization. Groups not 
only provide a way to classify the social world, but also a way to define the self in the 
social arena (Turner, 1982; Turner & Reynolds, 2001) as well as a means of gaining 
self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1999). In that way, a positive group 
identity satisfies needs for positive social self-identity (as distinct from individual level 
self-esteem) on the condition that in-group is positively distinct from the relevant out­
group (Turner, 1982).
Thus, positive social identities come from positive comparisons with relevant 
out-groups on relevant dimensions (Turner & Reynolds, 2001). For example, in an 
intra-hospital status context, a person with the social identity of doctor (a high status 
identity) may compare him or herself with the relevant out-group of nurses on the status 
dimension and establish a positive social identity. Infrahumanization can result when 
the relevant dimension being compared on is humanness.
Another element of SIT that is relevant to infrahumanization is that, in the event 
that negative as opposed to positive comparisons are made with relevant out-groups, the 
group members will desire to change groups psychologically, or try to change the group 
identity in imaginative ways (Turner & Reynolds, 2001). This process is called “social 
creativity.” An example of this in infrahumanization terms would be low-status group 
members psychologically changing their group identity by attributing more humanness
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to their own group through secondary emotions, a trait that is not dependent on status. 
The previous chapter described several examples of this. Demoulin et al. (2004b), for 
example, found that members of two low status groups (Canarians and Belgian 
Walloons) infrahumanized higher status out-groups (Mainsland Spanish and Belgian 
French, respectively). Gaunt (2009) also found that members of a low-status group 
(Arab Israelis) infrahumanized a high status group (Jewish Israelis).
It must also be observed that a social group is not always going to derogate a 
relevant out-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Mere group categorization does not cause 
inter-group discrimination necessarily (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Six aspects of the inter­
group relationship that affect the likelihood of inter-group discrimination are: (1) the 
degree to which an individual identifies with a group, (2) the degree to which the in­
group is compared with an out-group, (3) the degree of relevance of that out-group to 
the in-group, (4) the perceived status of the two groups, (5) the legitimacy of that status, 
and (6) permeability between group boundaries (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
1 will explain the above six aspects in greater detail here. Inter-group 
discrimination is, first, dependent on the degree to which an individual identifies with 
the group. This means that it is not sufficient for others to define the individual as a 
group member, but that he or she subjectively identifies with the in-group. Without 
internalizing the group as a part of the self, there is no reason for the individual to act 
based on group membership.
The next two points are that inter-group discrimination is dependent on the 
nature of comparison between an in-group and an out-group and this comparison is 
related to the degree of relevance of the out-group. A compared out-group becomes 
relevant through social context. Relevant comparison opens the door to potentially 
negative self-esteem if the comparison favours the out-group. In this case, there may be 
inter-group discrimination to try to reverse that negative in-group self esteem. Even if
the comparison favours the in-group, this positive comparison must be maintained for 
positive group-based self-estteem to be maintained. So if the positive comparison 
becomes threatened, inter-group discrimination may result (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
Coming to the fourth and fifth points about status and legitimacy, the theory 
does not assume direct relationship between a variable, such as status, and inter-group 
discrimination, but rather a multi-faceted interplay (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). For 
example, in the case of unequal status, if the in-group is of higher status, this high status 
results in positive social self-esteem for the in-group through downward comparisons 
and in-group favouritism. However, the low status group does not necessarily accept 
their position as low-status, and have the opposite reaction to the high-status group, 
experiencing low group-based self-esteem and lacking a basis for inter-group 
discrimination.
For the low-status group, the theory distinguishes two possible avenues to regain 
positive group-based self-esteem. When status differences are perceived to be fair and 
legitimate, the lower status group may defer to the higher status out-group, at least on 
certain dimensions of comparison. In this case, group members may dis-identify with 
their low status group. But if the status differences are unfair or illegitimate, there will 
be social competition and/or social creativity (S. A. Haslam, 2004). Social competition 
is a process by which people directly try to change the relative status (e.g., a minority 
group working for civil rights) of their in-group. Social creativity includes comparison 
of groups on a different dimension in which the formerly low status group can be 
categorized as high status relative to the out-group. For example, this might involve an 
economically low-status minority migrant group comparing to the majority not on an 
economic dimension, but on a cultural dimension upon which it may compare more
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favourably.
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The final aspect of the inter-group relationship that affects outcomes of inter­
group discrimination is permeability. If the boundaries between the groups are 
permeable, that is, individuals can change groups, an individual may be likely use social 
mobility to attempt to re-align him or herself with a higher status group. For example, 
social mobility may involve a low-status minority migrant taking steps to become a 
citizen. (Of course, this may be met with resistance by the high-status group.) If the 
boundaries are impermeable and illegitimate, the low-status group as a whole will likely 
use social creativity or social change methods to change status differential to a more 
favourable in-group status (S. A. Haslam, 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
My approach to infrahumanization is informed by these six aspects of how inter­
group dynamics affect inter-group discrimination and group based self-esteem. I do not 
expect that all groups, at all times, will infrahumanize an out-group, but rather that 
infrahumanization will be dependent on the complex nature of the inter-group 
relationship. For example, as outlined in the previous chapter, identification and 
essentialism have been proposed to be necessary conditions to elicit infrahumanization. 
There is an assumed positive relationship between infrahumanization and identification, 
and infrahumanization and essentialism. However, these seemingly simple 
relationships may be inherently complex in the same way that a factor such as status 
may differently affect inter-group discrimination based on factors such as permeability 
and legitimacy.
If we assume for the moment that infrahumanization is a similar process to in­
group favouritism and/or out-group derogation, the two processes could be assumed to 
have similar parameters affecting their expression. We can then provide an example of 
how infrahumanization might be affected by complex inter-group relationships in a way 
similar to in-group favouritism described above. High identification, for example, may 
increase levels of expressed infrahumanization, but only to the extent that the
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comparison group is relevant for comparison. Otherwise, even with heightened 
levels of social identification, infrahumanization levels may not change. Also, 
infrahumanization would depend on the content of the in-group identity. If the group’s 
identity is characterized by tolerance or positive inter-group relations, then high 
identification would not predict high infrahumanization.
Similar to identification, essentialism might have a complex, rather than linear, 
relationship with infrahumanization. Essentialism has previously been proposed to have 
a unidirectional positive association with infrahumanization. However, essentialism is 
simply the belief that surface characteristics of a group (or individual) are determined 
by some inherent or essential quality. Logically, there is no reason why that inherent 
quality might be humanness. Inter-group comparisons are made on many dimensions 
and a high status group may, indeed, recognize the inherent humanness of a lower status 
group. It may even grant it superiority on this trait, and yet it may still be of higher 
status based on different qualities.
These examples may help to explain why there has yet to be evidence of direct 
causal relationships between status, conflict, or identification with infrahumanization. 
The inter-group relationships are sufficiently complex, that it would be oversimplifying 
to describe them as having one linear relationship.
Self-Categorization Theory
Self-Categorization Theory (SCT) was developed in part to explain the 
psychological process by which people can (and do) act as unique individuals and can 
(and do) act as group members (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987).
SCT outlines three broad demarcations of categorization: the superordinate human 
level, the social group level, and the personal or individual level. The theory states that 
when a psychological group is salient to an individual, and this group is relevant to the 
situation, the person will then identify as a member of that specific social group. This
process of self-categorization at the group level rather than the individual level is 
caused by a variety of individual and contextual factors, but is enhanced when the 
differences between members of the in-group (intra-group comparison) are seen to be 
less than the difference between members of the in-group and members of some 
relevant out-group (inter-group comparison) (Turner, et al., 1987).
When the person then identifies as a social group member, depersonalization 
occurs, which is stereotyping the self in terms of group traits (Turner, et al., 1987). In 
depersonalization, the process of categorization leads the perceived differences between 
individual members within a group (intra-group comparison) to be minimized and the 
differences between in-group and out-group members (inter-group comparison) to be 
maximized (Turner, 1999; Turner, et al., 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 
1994). In-group members then become more willing to associate prototypical, or 
broadly representative, in-group characteristics and attitudes with the self. To the 
degree to which this takes place, the person perceives the self as psychologically 
interchangeable with other group members (Turner, et al., 1987; Turner & Reynolds, 
2001).
The individual, now perceiving the self and others as group members, perceives 
the self and others as having traits of group members (Turner, et al., 1987). These traits, 
or category characteristics, come from category exemplars. These exemplars include 
fellow group members, who are prototypically representative of the group and who may 
include the self (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). Shared 
characteristics include not only traits, but also needs, goals, and attributes (Turner,
1999). Because depersonalized group members are assumed to share views, the group 
member perceives that his or her individual views are views shared by other group
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members (Turner, et al., 1987).
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This becomes relevant in the assessment of infrahumanization.
Infrahumanization researchers often ask how “people” (meaning other members of the 
in-group) typically perceive the out-group, as opposed to asking how the person 
individually perceives the out-group. If the individual is perceiving the self as a group 
member with attitudes and views of a group member, the infrahumanization researcher 
can assume that the views of “the group” are also views of the individual.
In a similar vein, it is observed that infrahumanization is less likely to occur 
when an out-group member is individuated (N. Haslam, Loughnan, Kashima, & Bain, 
2008c). It is only when out-group members are being perceived as group members and 
not as individuals that they are infrahumanized. This relates to the principles of SCT in 
that, when categorization is taking place at the group level rather than the individual 
level, out-group members (as well as in-group members) are depersonalized and 
perceived as interchangeable with each other. In this way, out-group members are 
perceived as a homogenous group (Turner, 1982). It is at this group level of 
categorization when out-group members are depersonalized that their uniquely human 
emotional experience (the variable relevant to infrahumanization) can be generalized 
because the emotions of one can be assumed to reflect the emotions of all.
In this way, infrahumanization is assumed to occur at the social group level 
rather than at the individual level or the superordinate level (for the groups that are 
included in the superordinate identity). Therefore, if a social group is recategorized on a 
higher (i.e. superordinate) level, either one inclusive of the particular in-group and out­
group, or inclusive of all groups at the human level, inter-group discrimination such as 
infrahumanization should decrease (Gaunt, 2009). This is because the former out-group 
members become psychological in-group members and the newly formed set of group 
members are now believed to share a new set of traits, emotions, beliefs and values that 
are characteristic of the prototypical superordinate group member. Because social
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groups are often a source of positive self-esteem, these traits, emotions, beliefs, and 
values of the newly formed superordinate group are likely to be as subjectively positive 
as those of the former in-group. As uniquely human traits, emotions, beliefs and values 
are subjectively positive in the view of human groups, the characteristics of the 
superordinate group are likely to be those that are characteristically “human.”
Similarly, changing the comparative context of the in-group and out-group from 
the social group level to the individual level will decrease the degree of assumed 
prototypicality of in-group and out-group members. As described above, 
recatcgorization of the group member as an individual (decategorization) would result 
in less assumed prototypicality and less knowledge of characteristics as individuals than 
there would be as group members. That would result in less ability to infer individual- 
level characteristics, such as the secondary emotions of the individual. Therefore, there 
should also be less infrahumanization at the individual level of categorization than at the 
group level. This has, in fact, been observed by N. Haslam et al. (2008c)
Moreover, members of an out-group that was infrahumanized in one context are 
not necessarily likely to be infrahumanized in a different comparative context. Each 
inter-group categorization results in a unique comparative context with different 
relevant inter-group characteristics. Categorization of the same group members in one 
domain may involve different salient and relevant characteristics from the same group 
in another domain. For example, in a nationality categorization of Australians and New 
Zealanders, the salient and relevant characteristics of out-group members may not 
involve lesser humanity. In a nationality context, the two countries have a relatively 
positive and cooperative relationship and share the commonality of being members of 
the British Commonwealth. However, change the categorization to international rugby 
and in this new comparative context the groups Australians and New Zealanders 
(containing the same members) suddenly have a conflictual relationship. Depending on
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the nature of the inter-group relationship, humanity may become a salient and 
relevant characteristic. (The specific inter-group characteristics that would lead to this 
are unclear, as are the necessary and sufficient conditions required to elicit 
infrahumanization.) If so, an Australian rugby fan in-group may infrahumanize a New 
Zealand fan out-group and vice versa.
The idea in SCT that social groups are evaluated within a frame of reference of a 
higher level of inclusiveness can be taken one step further (Turner, et al., 1987). The 
above example of Australia and New Zealand only included two social groups, 
compared under one superordinate identity of either nationality or international rugby.
So each group had a single frame of reference for comparison with the other. 
Inclusiveness also varies with the frame of reference when more than two groups are 
concerned.
At the inter-group level, in the process of depersonalization, group members see 
intragroup similarties between some examplar or prototypical group member and other 
group members. This prototype may not actually be embodied, but rather is the ideal of 
what it means to be a member of that group. This idea of single individual exemplars of 
a social group also applies to inter-group comparisons within a single superordinate 
identity. So a single group may be considered prototypical of the superordinate group. 
However, each group may have a different idea of the characteristics prototypical of the 
superordinate group. Therefore, different groups may have different ideas of which 
group is prototypical of the superordinate group. That is, the characteristics of 
prototypicality may not be consensual between groups. Groups are likely to each 
project their own in-group characteristics on the superordinate identity, a concept that 
will be explained further in Chapter 4 (Wenzel, 2003).
For example, imagine that groups A, B, and C belong to superordinate category 
X. From the viewpoint of group A, group C may be most prototypical, or highly
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representative of what it means to be an X group. But from the viewpoint of group B, 
group C may be less representative of X compared to B itself. So if we have X category 
of international rugby teams, and teams A) Australia, B) New Zealand, and C) South 
Africa, Australians may see South Africa as prototypical, but New Zealand may see 
themselves as more prototypical than South Africa.
These subjective evaluations not only vary between groups but between 
situations. Therefore, it is group C’s (South Africa’s) relative superordinate group 
representativeness at a particular time that determines its belongingness to the 
superordinate group. For example, the year they win the world cup, they may appear to 
their own group and others as more a more prototypical rugby team than the previous 
year.
In the case of infrahumanization, the superordinate group is humans and the 
degree of infrahumanization is determined not by a group’s prototipicality based on 
some objective conception of humanness, but rather the relative prototypicality in any 
one inter-group context. A group may seem more human when leading an international 
humanitarian aid organization than when leading a coalition of allies in war. So, in 
summary, comparative context, based on self-categorization principles, will affect 
infrahumanization in that a group may be differentially granted humanness based on 
different inter-group categorizations.
Social Identity Threat
Social Identity Theory (SIT) is inclusive of the idea of social identity threat 
which is relevant to the study of infrahumanization. Social identity threat is 
psychological distress experienced when negative evaluations of one’s social group 
gives way to negative feelings about the self based on group membership (Aronson & 
McGlone, 2009; Branscombe, et al., 1999). Self-categorization theory (SCT) explains 
that when social identity is salient and the self is depersonalised, self-esteem is garnered
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from the social rather than personal identity (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002;
Tajfel & Turner, 1979). As SIT states, positive in-group evaluation, and therefore 
positive social identity, comes from favourable comparisons with the out-group 
(Aronson & McGlone, 2009; Shelton, Richeson, & Vorauer, 2006). Sometimes, the 
identity of the group is not positive, and favourable inter-group comparisons are not 
possible, and then the identity poses a threat to group-based self-esteem.
This threat can be caused in many ways, including negative stereotypes of the 
in-group, direct competition by the out-group, poor performance by the in-group, lack 
of distinctiveness between comparison groups, and/or exclusion from a valued group 
(Aronson & McGlone, 2009). Social processes that are outcomes of social identity 
threat for threatened group members are varied, but those most relevant to 
infrahumanization are in-group favouritism and out-group derogation (Aronson & 
McGlone, 2009; Shelton, et al., 2006). That is, when the group member feels 
threatened by having a negative social-identity, he or she may react with in-group 
favouritism or out-group derogation.
In research on infrahumanization, participants who are part of a common social 
group are presented with the a relevant inter-group context and a relevant out-group that 
is to be evaluated. In this way, there is an implicit comparison being made between the 
in-group and out-group. As described above, it is possible that, in this comparison, the 
identity of the group member may be threatened in various ways (e.g. stereotypes, 
competition, poor performance, lack of distinctiveness, and exclusion). He or she may 
then react with infrahumanization, thereby changing the comparative context to 
humanness, and granting greater humanness to the in-group than the out-group. 
(Whether this is through in-group favouritism or out-group derogation is not important.) 
This means that the comparison being made in infrahumanization research (greater 
humanness for the in-group) can be used as a response to out-group threat, as it will
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reaffirm the favourable comparison of the in-group over the out-group. It is a change 
of, or a selection of, comparison context that will be favourable. For this reason, the 
study of social identity threat becomes relevant to the present work on 
infrahumanization
The literature outlines several types of social identity threat: categorization 
threat, distinctiveness threat, acceptance threat, threats to relative status, and value 
threats. Each type’s relevance to infrahumanization and potentially affected groups 
varies, and will be described further below.
Categorization threat is that of being placed in a social category with which one 
is not comfortable (Branscombe, et al., 1999; Shelton, et al., 2006). This is most 
relevant for low identifiers who are likely to react with disidentification with the group 
and identification with the personal self-identity which would not include 
infrahumanization.
Distinctiveness threat is when the distinctiveness of the group in comparison 
with other relevant out-groups is called into question (Ellemers, et al., 2002; Nadler, 
Harpaz-Gorodeisky, & Ben-David, 2009). This type of threat is relevant to both low 
and high identifiers who will react in different ways. Low identifiers will choose to 
shift their self-definition to a different identity, possibly the superordinate group 
(Ellemers, et al., 2002; Nadler, et al., 2009), in order to re-establish positive group level 
self-esteem. High identifiers will react with out-group derogation and increased self­
stereotyping and, therefore, may engage in infrahumanization as a means of re­
establishing positive group-level self-esteem (Nadler, et al., 2009). The difference in 
reaction by low and high identifiers is due to differing levels of commitment to the in­
group.
Acceptance threat is when an individual’s place within the group is made 
insecure (S. A. Haslam, 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In this case, low identifiers are
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not likely to experience threat, but high identifiers may react with out-group 
derogation to prove loyalty to the group (S. A. Haslam, 2004), and this may include 
infrahumanization.
Threats to relative status challenge the existing position of one group relative to 
another based on competence, knowledge, or resources (Branscombe, et al., 1999). In 
this case, those who identity with the group may try to reaffirm superiority to the out­
group in a new domain, which may include humanness.
Finally there can be threats to the value of social identity, particularly the 
group’s competence and morality (Branscombe, et ah, 1999; Ellemers, et ah, 2002). In 
this case, low identifying group members will react by emphasizing the heterogeneity of 
the group or with disidentification with the in-group (Ellemers, et ah, 2002). This is 
because, while those with low identification may feel personally threatened by criticism 
of the group, they may not be sufficiently committed to desire defending the group. For 
those who remain high identifiers, superiority on humanness may counteract threats to 
both competence and morality as humans are seen as more intellectually competent and 
moral than animals, so infrahumanization may occur.
In summary, the types of social identity threat most relevant to the study of 
infrahumanization are distinctiveness threat, acceptance threat, value threats, and 
relative status particularly for high identifiers. In planning the inter-group context of 
Study 1 and trying to create an inter-group context in which I would observe 
infrahumanization, I tried to create threats to the relative status for the in-group. I also 
tried to create distinctiveness threat in Study 1 by saying that the out-group was causing 
changes to the nature of the out-group. I will explain this more in Chapter 6.
To conclude, the present work will approach infrahumanization from an SIT 
framework, inclusive of SCT. Accordingly, the infrahumanization process deals with 
groups in which individuals are self-categorized in terms of a social identity rather than
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personal identities. Through social identity threat, the group members of one group 
come to discriminate against an out-group by a combination of in-group favouritism and 
out-group derogation. The specific domain in which the groups are compared is 
humanness. Under certain circumstances, with categorization made under certain inter­
group contexts, group members may come to see members of the out-group as 
posessing less uniquely human traits and emotions than their own group. It is then that 
there are negative inter-group outcomes.
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Chapter 4: Related Topics 
Introduction
Infrahumanization shares characteristics with, but is distinct from, other 
processes in the social-psychology literature. The first part of this chapter identifies and 
describes similar processes, paying special attention to necessary and sufficient 
conditions for their expression. I will analyse five similar processes to make predictions 
for which types of variables should be tested in work on teasing out the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for infrahumanization to occur. This is the focus of Studies 1-5 of 
the thesis. Part 2 of the chapter addresses the research on types of humanness in more 
detail, and describes how two distinct types of humanness relate to the research on 
infrahumanization
Related Research
Moral Exclusion, Dehumanization and Delegitimization
Infrahumanization, and its similar processes delegitimization and 
dehumanization, can be classified as types of moral exclusion. Moral exclusion is when 
individuals or groups are no longer considered to deserve moral treatment (Opotow, 
1990). First, I will describe delegitimization and dehumanization in more detail, and 
then I will describe the overarching concept of moral exclusion.
Delegitimization. Delegitimization is defined as “categorization of a group or 
groups into extremely negative social categories that are excluded from the realm of 
acceptable norms and/or values” (Bar-Tal, 1990, p. 65). Similar to infrahumanization, it 
is the denial of a group’s humanity, and allows for moral exclusion (Bar-Tal, 1989). 
However, delegitimization is described as an inter-group relationship that is more 
extreme than that described by infrahumanization, usually appearing in cases of 
intractable conflict (Oren & Bar-Tal, 2007). It is the complete rejection of an out-group 
from the society of the in-group (Opotow, 1990; Oren & Bar-Tal, 2007). Like
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infrahumanization, it can be the cause of harm to the out-group and then, afterwards, 
the justification for harm (Bar-Tal, 1990).
One contextual factor responsible for precipitating delegitimization is that the 
delegitimized out-group’s perceived nature, qualities, or goals are ones that threaten the 
well-being of the delegitimizing group (Bar-Tal, 1989, 1990). In particular, when there 
is the perception that the goals of the out-group are irrational, hazardous, and zero-sum 
in relation to the in-group, delegitimization can frame the relationship. It is important to 
note that it does not matter if the goals are actually contradictory and zero-sum; what 
matters is that they are perceived that way (Bar-Tal, 1990). The type of relevant threat 
can be material, such as threatening the economy of the in-group, or symbolic, such as 
threat to the culture, religion, or values of the in-group (Bar-Tal, 1990). I will study 
each of these types of threat in Study 1. Bar-Tal (1990) also observes that 
delegitimization can occur in the absence of conflict between groups. This point is 
important for drawing a parallel with infrahumanization, which is also (sometimes) 
observed outside of conditions of conflict. Finally, another contextual factor that affects 
delegitimization is the presence of minimal social contact between the members of the 
two groups (Oren & Bar-Tal, 2007).
Dehumanization. Dehumanization is theoretically ambiguous in its 
distinctiveness from infrahumanization. There is no clear delineation between the two, 
nor consistency in the way the terms are used. Therefore, while work on 
dehumanization can potentially inform work on infrahumanization, it is important to 
first engage with the literature on their similarities and differences.
According to one definition, while dehumanization is viewing the out-group as 
completely non-human, infrahumanization is a “milder form of dehumanization that 
happens in everyday situations” (Demoulin, et al., 2009a, p. 154; Leyens, et al., 2007). 
At the same time, the two are sometimes used interchangeably (DeLuca-McLean &
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Castano, 2009; Marcu, et al., 2007). But if infrahumanization is described as a less 
severe form of dehumanization, as if the two are parts of a continuum of humanness, the 
question remains, what are the limits which separate dehumanization from 
infrahumanization?
One answer to that question comes from a study using implicit measures by 
Boccato, Capoza, and Falvo (2008). Infrahumanization was classified as faster 
identification of human faces preceded by in-group than out-group names and 
dehumanization as faster identification of ape faces preceded by out-group than in­
group names. In that way, infrahumanization is the greater likening of the in-group 
with humans and dehumanization is the greater likening the out-group with animals. 
However, a similar differentiation is used in the debate of whether infrahumanization is 
in-group favouring or out-group derogating. Likening the in-group to humans was 
labeled by Gaunt et al. (2002) as in-group favouritism, and likening the out-group to 
animals was labeled as out-group derogation. Therefore, this theoretical distinction 
between infrahumanization and dehumanization is confounded with the definitions of 
in-group favouritism out-group derogation in the literature. There seems to be no clear 
definitions at this point.
If dehumanization and infrahumanization are two points along a continuous 
scale of humanness attribution, then it is likely that the mediators, consequences, and 
precipitating factors for one are similar to the other. In this manner, knowing the 
precipitating factors of dehumanization is likely shed light on those of 
infrahumanization. For that reason I, now, turn to research on the antecedents of 
dehumanization to look for probable similarities with conditions that induce 
infrahumanization.
Several variables, including the individual difference measure of hawkishness, 
as well as socioeconomic status have been found to have positive relationships with
88
dehumanization (Maoz & Clark, 2008). Looking at another individual difference 
measure, Hodson and Costello (2007) found that dehumanization was predicted by 
heightened disgust sensitivity, and that this effect was mediated by individual 
differences in Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). In a related finding, out-groups 
stereotyped to be low on warmth and competence (which produces disgust and 
contempt) tend to be dehumanized groups (Harris & Fiske, 2006). Finally, Esses et al. 
(2008) studied members of the public’s perceptions of refugees, using perceived 
immorality, barbarian image, and low justice values, as measures of dehumanization. 
From this study the authors concluded that, to the extent an out-group is perceived as 
immoral, it is likely to be dehumanized. I examined morality of the out-group as an 
independent variable in Study 4 and Study 7.
Moral exclusion. Moral exclusion is a term developed by Opotow (1990) that is 
said to occur “when individuals or groups are perceived as outside the boundary in 
which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply. Those who are morally 
excluded are perceived as nonentities, expendable or undeserving” (p. 1). A sa result, 
harming or discriminating against morally excluded groups is seen as “appropriate, 
acceptable, or just” (Opotow, 1990, p. 1) because they are either unfeeling or unworthy.
It is important to note that Opotow (1990) does point out that the consequences 
of moral exclusion can vary in their severity. The result can be active violence and 
discrimination, or more passive neglect when we see groups undergoing physical or 
emotional hardship and we fail to respond in a way that acknowledges them as moral 
beings. This passive form of moral exclusion is the one under which infrahumanization 
can be categorized.
Moral exclusion occurs when an out-group is not included in a group’s moral 
community, or the psychological boundaries that determine to which beings justice is 
extended. While it has been emphasized previously that out-groups are attributed with
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different characteristics to the in-group, most groups can still be categorized under 
some superordinate level identity. For most groups, one of the most inclusive 
superordinate levels of identification is the moral community. Groups have existing 
norms for the composition of the moral community (e.g. the extent to which nonhuman 
animals or criminals are included). So the boundaries of the moral community are 
partially determined by social norms of superordinate group identification.
In studying the antecedents of moral exclusion, Opotow (1995) found that there 
are several qualities of the inter-group relationship that are influential. In her research, 
both utility (or the extent to which the out-group is beneficial to the in-group) and 
conflict had a relationship with moral exclusion. Conflict had a positive relationship 
with moral exclusion, with escalated conflicts causing more exclusion. Utility had a 
negative relationship with more useful groups being less morally excluded. The degree 
of similarity between the in-group and the out-group does not appear to predict moral 
exclusion (Opotow, 1995). Although this latter finding may seem surprising, as 
similarity might imply shared norms and values and less inter-group discrimination, 
similarity could also lead to threatening relationships (Ellemers, et al., 2002; Nadler, et 
ah, 2009). As previous research on social identity threat showed, groups value positive 
distinctiveness and when distinctiveness is threatened, non-distinct groups may react 
with negative inter-group behaviours.
There are also a number of normal psychological processes that can, at their 
worst, contribute to the moral exclusion of an out-group. For example, exclusion would 
not be possible without social categorization, the division into social group categories to 
which meaning is attached and that can serve to justify structural inequalities. Another 
psychological process that can be influential is “just world thinking” which allows us to 
be aware of inhumane conditions of other groups but not take action against it; this is 
another example of moral exclusion in a passive sense (Opotow, 2001b).
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Finally, Opotow discusses “unconnectedness” with an out-group, or distance 
in the psychological proximity of two groups as affecting moral exclusion. Those who 
are psychologically closer to us are assumed to deserve more moral considerations than 
those who are distant from us (Opotow, 2001b). Distance can be created by a 
breakdown in community or through zero-sum conflicts, particularly over resources 
(Opotow, 2005). To relate this research back to infrahumanization, denial of 
humanness denies moral deservingness. In this way, infrahumanization is a type of 
moral exclusion, and thus the antecedents of moral exclusion may predict 
infrahumanization. Of these antecedents of moral exclusion, I will study social 
categorization, in the sense of identification with the in-group in Studies 2-5, and degree 
of conflict (in the form of competition) in Study 5.
In-group Bias
Infrahumanization has been described as a type of in-group bias (Gaunt, et al., 
2002). To clarify, in-group bias is being used here as a general term for attitudes and 
behaviours which show partiality to an in-group over an out-group, not for merit, but for 
no other reason than group affiliation. Indeed, infrahumanization is attributing more of 
a valued quality (secondary emotions) to an in-group than an out-group. In this way, 
variables affecting in-group bias are relevant to the study of infahumanization.
Hewstone, Rubin and Willis (2002) provide a review of variables that affect in­
group bias. Identification with the in-group has a positive relationship with in-group 
bias and has already been found to influence infrahumanization. For this reason,
Studies 2-5 will measure identification. Also, as has been found with 
infrahumanization, both high and low status groups display in-group bias (Hewstone, et 
al., 2002). While low status groups may concede the high status group’s superiority on 
certain traits, low status groups will favour the in-group more on status-unrelated 
measures (Reichl, 1997). High status groups also differentiate between status related
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and unrelated measures and display less in-group bias when attributing status 
unrelated traits (Reichl, 1997). Still, high-status groups express greater in-group bias 
overall (Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, & Hume, 2001). As already addressed in the 
previous chapter, threat, particularly distinctiveness threat, has also been found to affect 
inter-group bias, particularly for groups that are not extremely similar or extremely 
distinct from the in-group (Hewstone, et al., 2002). In-group bias can serve an identity 
function in maintaining positive distinctiveness between the groups (Ellemers, et al., 
2002; Nadler, et al., 2009). Therefore, we can hypothesize that identity threat would 
lead to infrahumanization. Identity threat is an independent variable in Study 1. 
In-Group Projection
The In-Group Projection Model (IPM) describes effects of in-group and out­
group identification with the superordinate group and makes predictions about inter­
group responses to re-categorization and categorization at a superordinate level. As the 
following section will describe, in-group projection can be argued to be very similar to 
infrahumanization. In fact, the in-group projection model has been found to be able to 
predict infrahumanization patterns (Paladino & Vaes, 2009).
According to the IPM, the meanings of superordinate categories provide a basis 
of comparison for lower level categories (Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 
2003). Groups perceive their own group to be more similar to, or representative of, the 
superordinate group. That is, they construct the meaning of the superordinate group by 
projecting in-group characteristics onto the superordinate group. Therefore, the out­
group’s characteristics are excluded from the meaning of the superordinate group by the 
nature of the construction of the superordinate group characteristics. The more the in­
group traits are projected onto the superordinate category (and, therefore, the more the 
in-group is representative of the superordinate category), the less is the potential for the 
out-group to be identified with the superordinate category. This process is particularly
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prevalent for highly identified group members and when the superordinate category is 
valued (Paladino & Vaes, 2009).
In this research on infrahumanization, we can assume that, for many inter-group 
contexts, humanness is a valued superordinate category. Therefore, if the human 
superordinate category is salient, in-group projection would involve the in-group 
projecting its own characteristics on the superordinate group “human.” If the in-group 
were to then to show in-group favouritism (attribution of more valued traits to the in­
group), they would be infrahumanizing the out-group, because they would attribute the 
human characteristics (now in-group traits) to the in-group more than the out-group.
The IPM predicts that attribution of high superordinate group characteristics to 
both the in-group and out-group is not likely to occur simultaneously unless the groups 
are quite similar. It also predicts that when humanness is the superordinate category, 
high attribution of in-group characteristics to the superordinate group would exacerbate 
infrahumanization. This is because having in-group characterize the superordinate 
identity precludes attribution of superordinate group traits to the out-group. At the same 
time, attribution of high superordinate traits to the out-group (if this were to occur) 
would have the opposite effect, reducing infrahumanization.
The theoretical predictions of the IPM were supported in a study by Gaunt 
(2009) on infrahumanization. The two processes, therefore, appear similar. Gaunt 
tested the moderating role of superordinate categorization on infrahumanization of an 
out-group. Data showed that participants who identified the out-group with the 
superordinate identity did not exhibit infrahumanization. From an IPM perspective this 
would be because characterizing the out-group as representative of the superordinate 
category means that the superordinate identity (humanness) is not made up of 
characteristics exclusive to the in-group.
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Paladino and Vaes (2009) also observed that the IPM may underlie 
infrahumanization. They tested the directionality of ascribing traits to the in-group, out­
group, and superordinate category. Most infrahumanization work uses emotions and 
traits that (according to experimental data) are perceived to be part of humanness, and 
observe the attribution of these traits to in-group and out-group. That is, traits and 
emotions are attributed to the in-group and out-group based on their humanity.
Paladino and Vaes (2009) find a reverse pattem, in line with the IPM, that traits and 
emotions may be characterized as human because they are thought of as in-group traits. 
They conclude that traits and emotions should not be seen to have a set humanness 
quotient, but rather that the humanness of a trait is dependent on the perceiver’s 
perspective and membership. It follows then, that belongingness to the human category 
is dependent on sub-group membership as well as possession of humanness traits and 
emotions.
The work of Paladino and Vaes (2009) and Gaunt (2009) suggests that the 
process of in-group projection may be the process that underlies infrahumanization. 
Still, more work needs to be done to assess whether moderators of each (e.g., 
identification with the superordinate category and perceived complexity of the 
superordinate category for the IPM) are consistent with each other in order to fully 
determine whether the IPM is a suitable model for infrahumanization. Such work is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.
Two Senses of Humanness 
Human Nature and Human Uniqueness
At this point, it is necessary to review work that has run parallel to that of 
infrahumanization that analyses the make-up of humanness. In initial studies of 
infrahumanization, no distinction was made between human uniqueness and human 
nature; rather, the terms were used interchangeably (Paladino, et al., 2002). More
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recently, researchers outside of the area of infrahumanization have studied 
conceptions of humanness itself and this work has distinguished between two types of 
humanness. They have found that in the lay understanding humanness has two distinct 
aspects, human nature (HN), and human uniqueness (HU) (N. Haslam, Bain, Douge, 
Lee, & Bastian, 2005; Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). Simply put, human uniqueness 
traits are those that separate humans from animals, while human nature traits are those 
that separate humans from automata (Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). By this definition, 
infrahumanization research has, so far, concentrated on human uniqueness qualities, 
specifically, secondary emotions that distinguish humans from animals. HU can also 
include higher cognition, sophisticated language, and morality. HN includes those 
attributes that involve warmth, flexibility and animation (Loughnan & Haslam, 2007).
Haslam (2006) has argued for the separateness of these two dimensions of 
humanness and their distinctness as two individual continua. In fact, the two senses of 
humanness have been found to be uncorrelated among research participants’ ascriptions 
to out-groups (N. Haslam, et al., 2005). Therefore, while infrahumanization measures 
the ascription of HU, it is also necessary to observe attribution of HN to fully 
understand the way the humanity of the out-group is being perceived. Both HN and HU 
are analyzed in Studies 5 and 7.
One paper in the infrahumanization literature to date addresses how the work of 
Haslam et al. and Loughnan et al. on the HN and HU distinction is related to 
infrahumanization (Leyens, et al., 2007). In this article, the authors express agreement 
with the concept of there being two domains of humanness: what separates us from 
animals (HU), and what separates us from automata (HN) (Leyens, et al., 2007). 
However, there is a difference in the way Haslam et al. (2005) and Leyens et al. (2007) 
discuss these two dimensions that is relevant to the distinction of infrahumanization 
from dehumanisation. Haslam, Loughnan, Kashima and Bain (2008c) refer to denial of
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HU and HN as animalistic dehumanisation and mechanistic dehumanization, 
respectively, and not as infrahumanization. Leyens et al. (2007) refer to HU trait denial 
as infrahumanization and the HN trait denial as dehumanisation, using the differences in 
the content of the concepts as a means of distinguishing infrahumanization from 
dehumanization. For this thesis, I will adhere to the precedent set by Leyens et al. and 
describe denial of HU as anamalistic infrahumanization and denial of HN as 
mechanistic dehumanization.
Research has shown that the two distinct categories of humanness are attributed 
differently to different social categories (Bain, Park, Kwok, & Haslam, 2009; Loughnan 
& Haslam, 2007). This has been observed in both implicit associations and explicit 
ratings. Importantly, work by Loughnan and Haslam (2007) shows that non-derogated 
groups can be denied either HU or HN, but not necessarily both types of humanness.
For example, business people were denied HN and artists were denied HU, but each 
was granted the other form of humanness. Therefore, HU and HN can be denied 
selectively. I will return to this idea in Chapter 10.
The above study also further supports the idea that denial of humanness can 
exist outside of conflict or persecution. Artists and businesspeople enjoy relatively non- 
conflictual relationships with the broader society. In general, they are not stigmatized 
groups. Yet both are subtly dehumanized. Therefore, attribution of lesser humanness to 
these groups, in particular, emphasizes how subtle forms of infrahumanization and 
dehumanization can be part of everyday inter-group processes.
As another demonstration of denial of humanness in everyday life, Bain, Park, 
Kwok, and Haslam (2009) show that the different forms of humanness can be attributed 
and denied in a complementary pattern. They found that Australians differentiated 
themselves from Chinese using HN traits and Chinese differentiated themselves from 
Australians using HU traits. Importantly for our work, Bain et al. (2009) found that
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Australians did not differentiate their group from Chinese based on HU traits.
However, this does not mean that they were not differentiating the humanness of these 
two groups. In both explicit and implicit measures, Australians rated their own group as 
higher on HN traits than the Chinese. That is, Australians were seen as more feeling 
and “only human” compared to the Chinese who they perceive as more stoic and less 
emotive. Therefore participants could recognize the stereotypical strengths of one 
group on HU traits but reserved the other type of humanness (HN) for their own group. 
A similar but reversed pattern of results was found for the Chinese participant group 
who granted HN to Australians, but reserved HU for their own group.
Bain et al. (2009) hypothesized that there is a difference in the type of 
humanness that is relevant to a group based the nature of the comparison group. For 
most European groups, for example, their nation’s history is one of cultivation of 
culture and colonial rule of lesser “developed” nations. These nations should, therefore, 
value HU most, as HU traits include ones such as civility, refinement, rationality and 
maturity. Indeed, these countries are where most of the infrahumanization research 
(which measures HU) has been carried out. Without this same history, the authors 
hypothesize that Australians may be more inclined to see HN as a more important point 
of pride than HU as HN is more a part of their national narrative, including traits like 
warmth, individuality, and openness Therefore, they hypothesize that research will 
more often find denial of HN and not HU with Australian samples. A second paper by 
Bain et al. (2010) furthers this argument, describing in-group stereotype content as a 
determinant of HU/HN attribution.
Bain et al. (2009) point out that denial of the two different forms of humanness 
might yield different effects on inter-group relations. Denial of HN may make members 
try to create or maintain social distance, either personally or at a national level. Denial 
of HU may lead to not taking an out-group seriously and, therefore, seeing it as
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undeserving of respect or acknowledgement of autonomy. At the same time, the 
authors also point out that because the two forms of humanness can be complimentary, 
attribution of one may make up for the negative consequences of denial of the other 
(Bain, et al., 2009).
Distinctions between the two types of humanness and research demonstrating 
the differential attribution of HU and HN to the same group is important for the present 
research. Studies 1-4, only measured secondary emotions, which separate humans from 
animals, much like HU traits. However, human nature traits were not measured. Based 
on the findings of Studies 1 -4, Studies 5 and 7 measured human uniqueness and human 
nature traits. I assess the complimentary attribution pattem and its background in 
Chapter 10, Study 7.
Conclusion
This chapter brings together research on several concepts related to 
infrahumanization that can inform the research in this thesis as it moves forward. In 
particular, variables that affect moral exclusion, delegitimization, dehumanization, in­
group favouritism, and in-group projection will inform the design of Studies 1-5. Also, 
the conception of two distinct types of humanness, HN and HU, provides a more 
nuanced definition of humanness to that described in infrahumanization research. The 
humanness research of N. Haslam et al. also provides two additional measures to those 
used in previous infrahumanization research (primary and secondary emotions) to 
enrich the analysis of the inter-group attribution of humanness, a concept that will be 
explored in Studies 5 and 7.
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Chapter 5 : Introduction to Studies 1-5
The previous chapters have provided an overview of the research on 
infrahumanization that has been carried out thus far. They have situated 
infrahumanization in the broader context of research on inter-group relationships. They 
have looked at a theoretical framework for social group identification and for inter­
group interaction as well as social-psychological processes related to infrahumanization. 
The present chapter brings together the concepts that have been covered thus far to 
introduce Studies 1-5, the first set of studies in the thesis. The first part of this chapter 
describes the goals and intentions for Part 1 of the thesis, which includes Studies 1-5. 
The second part of this chapter outlines the broad theoretical hypotheses for the thesis 
which will guide the first set of studies.
Goals of the Thesis
After engaging with the research on infrahumanization that had been published 
prior to 2007, when I started my PhD, it seemed that the most logical step forward in the 
field was to continue to pursue research on identifying the necessary and sufficient 
conditions that cause infrahumanization. This was the first goal of Studies 1-5.
Chapter 2 on infrahumanization described the background of research on 
infrahumanization as well as the methods and basic findings, potential mediators, the 
process, and consequences. It addressed the interaction of the variables status, 
identification, conflict, essentialism, ideology, and violence with infrahumanization. 
Conflict and high status are unnecessary conditions for triggering infrahumanization 
(but may still have a degree of influence). Certain ideologies, and exposure to violence 
enhance infrahumanization, but are not necessary conditions. Identification, 
meaningfulness, and essentialism have been suggested by researchers as necessary 
conditions, but as infrahumanization has been found with quasi-minimal groups, this is 
called into question.
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So, despite a good deal of research into the question, it seemed that the field 
had so far insufficiently identified the necessary and sufficient conditions required to 
elicit infrahumanization. Indeed, even Leyens, the founder of the term and research in 
the area wrote as recently as 2009 that “the most challenging problem facing 
infrahumanization is to find the conditions that lead an out-group to be infrahumanized 
or not. We have not the slightest solution to this problem” (Leyens, 2009, p. 809).
This seems perhaps an overstatement of the situation. The field has insights into 
non-necessary and non-sufficient conditions (status and familiarity), non-necessary and 
sufficient conditions (conflict), and necessary and non-sufficient conditions 
(identification). But it is true that the necessary and sufficient contextual conditions 
required to induce infrahumanization are un-identified. Therefore, one overarching goal 
of the thesis was to contribute to the body of research on the contextual factors that 
precipitate infrahumanization. As described in the previous chapter, the plan was to 
take cues from research on related processes and test variables that affect those 
processes for how they might influence infrahumanization.
A second overarching goal was to expand the types of inter-group contexts 
evaluated, as most have focused on nationality. If national or ethnic groups were the 
only groups for which a humanness comparison was relevant, infrahumanization would 
need to be shown as distinct from nationalism and ethnocentrism. So, I was interested 
in the boundary conditions surrounding infrahumanization, and wanted to test to what 
extent the process occurs in groups outside of nationality. Below, I will describe how I 
addressed these goals in the first five studies.
Goals o f Studies 1 and 2
The main goal of Study 1 was to examine the effect of threat on 
infrahumanization. As was described in the previous chapter, threat is known to 
influence the concepts of delegitimization (Bar-Tal, 1990) and in-group favouritism
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(Hewstone, et al., 2002). As was also described previously, threat can be either 
realistic (also termed material; i.e., competition over scarce resources such as jobs, 
education, land, food) or symbolic (the potential to change the culture, values, religion, 
language, identity of a group).
As described in Chapter 3, group members can experience threat based on the 
contextual comparison of a relevant out-group. Research on symbolic threat is similar 
to the research from social identity theory on distinctiveness threat. Loughan, Haslam 
and Kashima (2009) hypothesized that symbolic threat, in particular, may be a 
necessary and sufficient condition for causing infrahumanization. Realistic threat can 
be a type of threat to the relative status of the group, as described in Chapter 3. Those 
who identify with the in-group would try to reaffirm the high status of the in-group 
through inter-group discrimination, possibly including infrahumanization.
Study 1 will address both symbolic and realistic threat, and how the threatening 
presence of an out-group affects infrahumanization of that out-group. The inter-group 
context is nationality, with the in-group being Australians, and the out-group being 
immigrants to Australia. Realistic threat, in this context, was operationalized as threats 
to the economy, to the education system, and to increased taxes and job competition. 
Symbolic threats were operationalized as changes to the language, dominant religion, 
and overall culture of the country. In the context of nationality and immigration, I 
hypothesized that these operationalizations of realistic and symbolic threats would 
affect the infrahumanization of the out-group of immigrants by the in-group of 
Australians.
Study 2 is a follow-up study based on the findings of Study 1. Results of Study 
1 suggested that stereotype content may have played a part in the participants’ inter­
group emotion attributions. I hypothesized that the out-group was attributed certain 
emotions in Study 1 because those particular emotions were part of the group’s
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stereotype content. This hypothesis is supported by work of Paladino et al. (2004) 
who reported similar findings in the inter-group context of Italians and Germans. The 
researchers suspected that the stereotype of Italians as more emotional than Germans 
may have interfered with studying attribution of humanness when humanness was 
operationalized by secondary emotions. Viki and Abrams (2003) also had findings 
which the authors believed were complicated by emotional stereotype content using 
gender as an inter-group context, given that women are stereotyped as experiencing 
more emotions than men. I investigate this hypothesis further in Study 2 by 
operationalizing humanness only with non-stereotyped uniquely human emotions so 
that stereotype content would not be a confounding variable.
Goals o f Studies 3, 4, and 5
Studies 1 and 2 did not succeed in creating an inter-group context in which 
infrahumanization was exhibited. Presenting an inter-group context in which 
infrahumanization would be observed was essential to the successful study of relevant 
mediating and moderating variables. Therefore, the following three studies focused on 
creating an inter-group context in which infrahumanization would be observed.
Studies 3, 4, and 5 increased conflict in the inter-group context, a variable that is 
not necessary for, but has been shown to enhance infrahumanization (Castano & Giner- 
Sorolla, 2006). Conflict was also relevant as it has been shown to influence moral 
exclusion, a process related to infrahumanization (Opotow, 1995). I varied the inter­
group relationships using a sporting context (not confounded by nationality); a 
University college (i.e. dorm) context; and a moral context, with morality (moral or 
immoral individual) treated as an inter-group context. Again, in these studies, I also 
incorporated variables that influence processes similar to infrahumanization, as was 
addressed in the previous chapter. The purpose of doing so was that, in the event, that
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infrahumanization was observed, I would be able to analyze those variables’ 
relevance to infrahumanization.
To create an inter-group context that would facilitate infrahumanization, Study 3 
used fans of rival sports teams. Half of participants were primed for a rugby inter-group 
context by watching a clip of a match between the two relevant teams. The other half of 
participants were attending a match of the in-group rugby team. Study 4 again used a 
sports context, but this time used nationality of the groups and morality of the groups as 
variables. Morality is a variable that has been shown to affect dehumanization, with 
perceived immorality of the out-group increasing dehumanization (Esses, et al., 2008). 
Finally, Study 5 sampled participants of a residence hall on a University campus and 
their attitudes towards residents of another rival hall. These halls have a particularly 
competitive and conflictual relationship with occasional incidents of provocative 
behaviour even off of the sports field. Identification of the participant with the in-group 
was measured in all three studies. This is a variable that has been shown to be related to 
infrahumanization, as well as moral exclusion and in-group favouritism.
Broad Theoretical Hypotheses
Before beginning with the data collection phase of the thesis, I could made 
several broad theoretical hypotheses. These were based on my background research on 
infrahumanization, my situating of infrahumanization within the theoretical frameworks 
of SIT and SCT, and the overview of infrahumanization’s similarities with several other 
psychological processes. These hypotheses are non-specific to any particular 
operationalized variables or experimental conditions, but rather are general to the work 
as a whole.
Hypothesis A
The infrahumanization effect will be replicable using similar inter-group 
contexts as those used in the published research on infrahumanization.
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Previous work on infrahumanization has noted the success of studies at 
observing infrahumanization, particularly in a nationality inter-group context. For 
example, a recent chapter that reviews research on infrahumanization observes that 
“despite the variety of paradigms that have been used, results were unanimous at 
supporting our hypothesis that people generally attribute more secondary emotions to 
their in-group than to out-groups” (Demoulin, et al., 2009a, p. 156). This may be an 
overstatement and, indeed, Hypothesis B qualifies it. However, it is certainly true that 
as of the start of this thesis in 2007, there was sufficient research out of various 
countries which had found an infrahumanization effect (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; 
Delgado, et al., 2009; DeLuca-McLean & Castano, 2009; Demoulin, et al., 2009b; 
Demoulin, et al., 2004b; Gaunt, 2009; Paladino, et al., 2002; Viki & Abrams, 2003) to 
allow me to predict that I would be able to replicate similar findings with Australian 
samples.
Hypothesis B
Infrahumanization is not common to all inter-group relationships.
Previous work on infrahumanization has noted the success of studies at finding 
infrahumanization in many different inter-group situations. The quote from Demoulin 
et al. (2009) is an example. While it is true that most of the published literature on 
infrahumanization reports finding the effect, there are works that do not find the effect 
(Bain, et al., 2010; Bain, et al., 2009; Marcu, et al., 2007). Other researchers have also 
noted the limitations of the phenomenon. Leyens et al. (2000) did not expect all inter­
group contexts to be characterized by infrahumanization. As with other phenomena 
such as in-group favouritism, moral exclusion, delegitimization, and dehumanization, 
these expressions of inter-group discrimination are induced by a complex set of 
contextual inter-group characteristics. Similar to those inter-group processes, some 
inter-group relationships are harmonious, or even irrelevant to group members, and no
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inter-group bias is observed. I believe that the findings of the present thesis will be 
in keeping with previous theory and research on inter-group processes.
Hypothesis C
Infrahumanization can be reliably predicted based on a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions
Infrahumanization is an inter-group process. In this way, it should be similar to 
other inter-group processes such as stereotyping, social identification, and self­
categorization. As previous chapters have described, the conditions under which a 
person engages in those inter-group processes have been experimentally tested and quite 
clearly defined (Branscombe, et al., 1999; S. A. Haslam, 2004; Schwartz & Struch,
1989; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1982, 1999; Turner, et al., 1987; Turner & 
Reynolds, 2001). In a similar way, I expect that there are specific parameters under 
which infrahumanization will occur.
And indeed, the focus of the literature has been on finding the necessary and 
sufficient conditions under which infrahumanization will occur. While the matter is far 
from settled, research has revealed that while status and familiarity do not affect 
infrahumanization, conflict and identification do have an effect. I expect that further 
research will reveal predictable conditions under which infrahumanization will occur. 
Hypothesis D
Infrahumanization will be moderated by similar variables as related concepts 
that have been introduced in previous chapters such as in-group favouritism, moral 
exclusion, dehumanization, and delegitimization.
While I would not, prior to more research, equate infrahumanization with any of 
the related phenomena I have reviewed thus far, I do make the prediction that 
infrahumanization is similar to these processes and will, therefore, be moderated by
similar processes. In particular, I suspect that threat, identification, morality, and 
conflict will affect the extent to which an in-group infrahumanizes an out-group.
I now turn to the first of five studies assessing the variables which impact 
infrahumanization in several different contexts, using an Australian sample.
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Chapter 6: Studies 1 and 2 
Introduction
As described in the previous chapter, Study 1 sought to extend research on 
infrahumanization by evaluating the potential relationship between threat of an out­
group towards an in-group and the infrahumanization of that out-group. The literature 
on inter-group threat is quite broad, with many different types of threat identified. In 
Study 1 ,1 brought together two perspectives in my theoretical analysis and 
operationalization of inter-group threat types.
In Chapter 3 ,1 reviewed literature on Social Identity Threat, a body of work that 
identifies threat types that are encountered in inter-group relationships, but are 
specifically related to how the out-group characteristics or actions affect the identity of 
the in-group and how this affects group based self-esteem. I proposed several types of 
threat that are specifically identity related and that are relevant to infrahumanization, 
including categorization threat, distinctiveness threat, acceptance threat, threats to 
relative status, and value threats.
As introduced in Chapter 5, a distinct but related literature on inter-group threat 
called integrated threat theory describes two broad categories of inter-group threat, 
symbolic and realistic (Stephan & Renfro, 2004). Symbolic threat is threat to the 
content of the group identity. It is threat to a group’s characteristics or makeup such as 
potential to change the culture, values, religion, language, identity of a group. Symbolic 
threat is also referred to in the literature as cultural threat (Buckler, Swatt, & Salinas, 
2009; Glaser, Dixit, & Green, 2002). Realistic threats are those that challenge the 
material well-being of the group. These are competition over scarce resources such as 
jobs, education, land, and food, that would contest a group’s prosperity and social 
standing. Realistic threat is also referred to in the literature as economic threat
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(Buckler, et al., 2009; Glaser, et al., 2002). It is these types of threat that have been 
investigated in the literature on infrahumanization.
Threat has been both theorized as a predictor of infrahumanization and a 
mediator between infrahumanization and discrimination. A recent study on 
infrahumanization found that infrahumanization of a nationality out-group affected 
discrimination against that out-group and that this relationship was mediated by 
symbolic threat. Discrimination was operationalized as not allowing the group (Turkey) 
into the European Union and symbolic threat was operationalized as the extent to which 
Turkey’s presence would change European values, customs, identity, and culture 
(Pereira, Vala, & Leyens, 2009). So presentation of the out-group as lacking secondary 
emotions affected the degree of humanity of the out-group and this degree of humanity 
influenced the perception of symbolic threat and the opposition to Turkey’s admission 
in the EU.
Testing a different relationship between infrahumanization and threat, Leyens 
(2009) cites two unpublished studies that measure the effect of threat on 
infrahumanization. The first showed that symbolic threat correlated positively with 
infrahumanization and another showed that symbolic threat produced 
infrahumanization. Study 1 of this thesis manipulated threat to investigate the effect of 
threat on infrahumanization, and also measured threat and altruism to analyze the 
mediation of perceived threat of an out-group on altruism towards an out-group.
For Study 1 ,1 chose to operationalize threat as both symbolic and realistic to be 
in keeping with the infrahumanization literature. At the same time, I saw parallels 
between the threat types described in the integrated threat theory literature and the 
Social Identity Threat literature. In particular I drew a comparison between what is 
termed symbolic threat and what is described as distinctiveness threat in the Social
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Identity Threat literature. Likewise, I drew a comparison between realistic threat 
and status-based threat from the social identity threat literature. I made predictions 
based on these conceptual relationships. I will explain these relationships in more detail 
below.
The concept of distinctiveness threat follows from the SIT idea that positive 
self-esteem can be garnered from positive in-group distinctiveness in a relevant social 
comparison (Ellemers, et al., 2002). Group members value being different from an out­
group in a positive way. Study 1 presents participants with an Australian and migrant 
inter-group context. Participants were Australians reading about migrants to Australia.
I hypothesized that posing migrants as a symbolic threat, an influence to change the 
culture, religion and language of Australia, would pose distinctiveness threat to 
Australian participants. If “we” change to be like ’’them,” we lose our positive 
distinctiveness. Highly identified threatened group members are likely to respond to 
distinctiveness threat with self-stereotyping to emphasize distinctiveness (Nadler, et al., 
2009), inter-group differentiation, and/or out-group derogation (Branscombe, et al., 
1999). As described in Chapter 4, the infrahumanization process involves intergroup 
differentiation that denies the valued trait of humanness. Therefore, symbolic threat is 
likely to lead to distinctiveness threat, which would lead to positive intergroup 
differentiation, which may be expressed as infrahumanization.
Threats to relative status occur for high status groups when low status groups 
threaten the established status differential. In Study 1, the in-group is Australians and 
the out-group is migrants. According to data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS), compared with native Australians or citizens, migrants to Australia have lower 
social participation, have fewer friends and social support, are less likely to be 
employed ("Social participation of migrants," 2008), are less likely to be purchasing a 
home and more likely to be renting ("Housing arrangements: Housing of recent
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migrants," 1998), are more likely to work blue collar jobs, and are less likely to 
speak English ("Paid work: Migrants in the labour force," 1998). From this I concluded 
that migrants in Australia are perceived to have a lower status than Australian citizens. 
This inter-group relationship was important for the status based and realistic threat 
condition.
The realistic threat condition presents information that the out-group is 
threatening the economic wellbeing of the in-group (i.e. taking high paying jobs and 
abusing government assistance). Therefore, realistic threat is likely to lead to a threat to 
the relative status of the high status in-group, Australians. Participants read about how 
tax-paying Australians are losing money in government programs to fund migrants and 
losing high status jobs to new competition posed by the mignant out-group. Research 
shows that high identifiers are likely to engage in inter-group differentiation as a result 
of status threat (Ellemers, et al., 2002). Again, as the infrahumanization process 
involves inter-group differentiation, therefore realistic threat is likely to lead to status 
based threat, which will be expressed as infrahumanization.
In summary, symbolic threat is likely to cause distinctiveness threat, resulting in 
infrahumanization, and realistic threat is likely to cause threats to relative status of the 
in-group and this is also likely to result in infrahumanization.
A relevant question would be, then, which type of threat (symbolic or realistic) 
is most influential in determining to what extent an out-group will be infrahumanized? 
The research on infrahumanization has only suggested symbolic threat as a factor 
influencing infrahumanization (Leyens, 2009). Leyens cites unpublished work in which 
symbolic threat both did and did not have a relationship with infrahumanization. 
However, I propose that both types of threat have the potential to affect
infrahumanization.
I l l
Symbolic threat and realistic threat are threats to two different types of in­
group characteristics. Symbolic threat challenges characteristics that are the cultural 
aspects of what makes the group positively distinct. Realistic threat challenges 
characteristics that are the more material aspects of what defines the group. Several 
studies find that perceived symbolic and realistic threat posed by the in-migration of 
non-citizens affect attitudes towards immigration and immigrants. In some 
circumstances, such as an Australian sample evaluating refugees, both symbolic and 
realistic threats are predictive of prejudice towards immigrants (Schweitzer, Perkoulidis, 
Krome, Ludlow, & Ryan, 2005).
In other studies, realistic and symbolic threat are found to be differentially 
predictive of prejudice and discrimination based on the nature of the intergroup 
relationships. For example, symbolic threat was related to Arab immigration and 
realistic threat was related to Mexican immigration in a US sample (Hitlan, Carillo, 
Zarate, & Aikman, 2007). In a similar study, symbolic threat predicted prejudice 
toward Hindus and realistic threat predicted prejudice toward Muslims in an Indian 
sample (Tausch, Hewstone, & Roy, 2009).
Symbolic and realistic threat can also have different effects depending on the 
outcome measure. While realistic threat predicted opposition to immigrants in 
European countries, symbolic threat predicted opposition to naturalization of 
immigrants (Pereira, Vala, & Costa-Lopes, 2010). And realistic threat mediated effects 
of individual differences on employment attitudes toward migrants, symbolic threat 
mediated effects on cultural assimilation of migrants.
Based on these findings of the effects of symbolic and realistic threat on 
attitudes towards immigrants and immigration, I expect that symbolic and realistic 
threat are both likely to influence immigration. It seems that, at times, both impact out­
group attitudes and, at times, the particular intergroup relationship or the particular
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attitude being assessed are differentially affected by symbolic and realistic threat. I 
wanted to test the idea that when a group’s symbolic characteristics (culture) were 
important for the self-definition of the in-group, symbolic threat would have an effect 
on infrahumanization. But when realistic characteristics (economy and security) were 
important for the self-definition of the in-group, realistic threat would have an effect on 
infrahumanization.
To examine this process, Study 1 of the thesis measured attribution of 
humanness to migrants to Australia and Australians in an Australian sample after being 
presented with either symbolic or realistic threats. To give a brief overview of the 
study, in Part 1, participants were first primed to either think of the “national nature” of 
Australia as either based on symbolic (e.g., Vegemite, mateship) or realistic (e.g., low 
unemployment, high standard of living) attributes. In Part 2, they were presented with 
the manipulation of the threat type, which gave information that migrants are a 
challenge to either the symbolic or realistic integrity of the nation.
Therefore, for some participants, the self-definition attributes and threat type 
“matched”. That is, they were primed to think of both symbolic self-defining attributes 
and symbolic threat or both realistic self-defining attributes and realistic threat. For 
other participants, the se lf definition attributes and threat type did not match.
Finally, participants attributed emotions to either the Australian in-group, or the 
immigrant out-group. Emotion words are classified in terms of their level 
(primary/non-uniquely human and secondary/uniquely human) and in terms of valence 
(positive or negative). Infrahumanization would be indicated by greater attribution of 
positive and negative secondary emotions to the in-group than the out-group.
Firstly, I predicted that Australians would infrahumanize migrants. That is, 
secondary emotions would, overall, be rated as more characteristic of Australians than 
of migrants, irrespective of the valence of the emotions (H. 1.1). I further predicted that
113
infrahumanization would be greatest when migrants are posing a threat to the very 
characteristics that define the country (“matched” conditions). Therefore, 
infrahumanization would be greatest if the type of threat posed by immigrants in Part 2 
was the same type of characteristic which defined Australia in Part 1. Otherwise, the 
threat presented in Part 2 would not be relevant to the in-group identity presented in Part 
1, and there would be less infrahumanization of the out-group (H. 1.2).
Study 1
Methods
Participants. Two hundred, thirty-two participants (125 male, 107 female, mean 
age 24.46) were recruited from public spaces on the campus of Australian National 
University. Participants were invited to complete an anonymous and voluntary 10- 
minute questionnaire without compensation.
Design. Each participant was randomly assigned to one condition of a 2 
(national nature: symbolic/realistic) x 2 (threat type: symbolic/realistic) x 2 (group 
rated: in-group/out-group) between participants design. Within each condition was 
another 2 (level of emotion: primary/secondary) x 2 (valence of emotion: 
positive/negative) within subjects design. Therefore, the full design was a five-way 
mixed design. The in-group was Australians and the out-group was migrants to 
Australia.
Materials. Questionnaires were comprised of three parts. The first and second 
parts were, ostensibly, two separate studies, that were combined into one questionnaire 
“to save paper.” I will refer to the first part as “Study 1” and the second two parts as 
“Study 2”, as they were presented to participants. In reality, Parts 1 and 2 were the two 
between participants manipulations. The third part contained the emotion assessment 
items and demographic questions.
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“Study 1” was a manipulation of the national nature of Australia variable, 
using a linguistic framing paradigm (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997). The goal was 
to have participants in the realistic national nature condition agree with mildly worded 
statements regarding the realistic character of Australia and disagree with extremely 
worded statements about the symbolic character of Australia. In this way, participants 
would be primed to believe that the realistic characteristics of Australia are what make 
up the national nature. In the symbolic national nature condition, there would be 
extreme realistic statements and mild symbolic statements and this would lead 
participants to agree that symbolic characteristics of Australia are what make up the 
national nature.
Specifically, participants were asked to indicate agreement or disagreement with 
12 statements in two categories. Symbolic characteristic statements were labeled 
“Habits” and realistic characteristics were labeled “Stability.” Agreement was indicated 
by circling the word “agree” or “disagree” after each statement. The “stability” 
statements suggested that the nature of Australia was based on its realistic, economic 
and defence strength, while the “habits” statements suggested that the nature of 
Australia was based on its symbolic cultural traits. In each condition, the statements for 
the intended salient condition were made more moderate and easy to support than those 
in the non-salient condition, thereby aiming to generate more agreement with the salient 
category. For example, in the “habits” salient condition, participants were given 
moderate statements regarding Australian culture and people (e.g., “Australians are 
relatively straightforward in their dealings” and “Lots of Australians enjoy the footy”) 
and extreme statements regarding Australian realistic and defense stability (e.g., 
“Australia is absolutely secure against international threat” and “Everyone in Australia 
can earn a decent living”). The goal here was to make participant agree with the more
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moderate statements, thereby persuading the participant to agree that “habits” (or 
symbolic factors) are what characterize Australia.
By contrast, in the “stability” salient condition, participants were given more 
moderate statements regarding Australian economy and defence (e.g., “Australia is 
generally secure against international threat” and “Most people in Australia can earn a 
decent living”) and more extreme statements regarding Australian culture and people 
(e.g., “Australians are absolutely straightforward in their dealings” and “Everyone in 
Australia enjoys the footy”). The goal of this manipulation was to persuade the 
participant to agree that “stability” (or realistic factors) are what characterizes Australia 
by making the statements that support that opinion more acceptable than those 
supporting the opinion that “habits” (symbolic factors) define Australia.
Following each set of traits (habits/symbolic and stability/realistic) was an item 
asking participants how many times they agreed with the above statements. The goal of 
this question was to draw the participants’ attention to the nature of their agreement or 
disagreement with the information given. They would do this by noting their agreement 
with the realistic (“stability”) or symbolic (“habits”) statements. The final question 
asked participants with which set of traits they most agreed, and therefore which set 
they believed was most representative of Australia. This was a manipulation check 
which provided evidence of which set of statements the participant found most 
persuasive, and, therefore, which national nature (symbolic or realistic) was primed.
“Study 2” began with the second manipulation (i.e., threat) in the form of one of 
two prepared reports on the effects of the migrant population on Australia. One report 
described the realistic impact of immigration and the other described the symbolic 
impact of immigration. All statistics used in the reports were taken from the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics census data available on their website ("Educational attainment: 
Migrants and education," 1996; "Family formation: Cultural diversity in marriages,"
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2000; "Labour force participation of migrants," 2006; "Population composition: 
Asian-born Australians," 2001; "Population composition: Languages spoken in 
Australia," 1999; "Population growth: Coming to Australia," 2001; "Religious 
affiliation and activity," 2004).
In the “Culture” (symbolic threat) condition, information was given about 
migrant influence on Australian population, language, marriage and religion. Statistics 
included such statements as, “Between 1971 and 2001, the proportion of all Australians 
affiliating with Christianity fell by about 20%, while those affiliating with a non- 
Christian religion increased 5 times,” and “In 1996, 15% of Australia's population spoke 
a language other than English at home.” In the “Economics” (realistic threat) condition, 
information was given about migrant influence on Australian population, employment, 
housing, and education. Statistics included such statements as, “In 1999 the 
unemployment rate was much higher for migrants (6.2%) than for people bom in 
Australia (4.9%)” and “30% of all recent migrants were receiving financial assistance 
from the government for housing.”
Each condition closed with three manipulation check questions to assess reading 
comprehension. Participants were asked to indicate their degree of agreement (1 = very 
little; 7 = very much) with statements reflecting information found in the passage they 
had just read. For the realistic threat condition, items included, “The number of 
migrants employed as professionals is higher than Australian bom citizens,” “The 
migrant population in Australia is increasing,” and “The unemployment rate for recent 
migrants is higher than for Australian bom citizens.” For the symbolic threat condition, 
the items included, “The migrant population in Australia is increasing,” “The number of 
Australians affiliating with a non-Christian religion is increasing,” and “The number of 
mixed marriages in Australia is increasing.” All statements correctly reflected the 
information given, so higher numbers reflected comprehension of the manipulation.
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“Study 2” continued with a section on emotion attribution. This section 
contained the dependant variables and was between-subjects for the variable “group 
rated.” Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they believed that each 
emotion was felt by one of two groups, either “Australians” or “migrants in Australia.” 
Emotions were rated on a 7-point scale (1 = just a little; 7 = quite a lot; Demoulin et al., 
2004). The section included 12 emotions. Emotions belonged to each of four 
categories of primary positive (happiness, surprise, pleasure), primary negative (pain, 
anger, fear), secondary positive (optimism, hope, nostalgia), and secondary negative 
(guilt, shame, remorse) (Cortes, et al., 2005; Demoulin, et al., 2004a; Leyens, et al., 
2001). Emotion categories were balanced in their mean values for valence and level 
within each category, according to Demoulin et al. (2004a).8 For valence, positive 
categories had means of 6.13 (primary) and 5.75 (secondary) and negative categories 
had means of 2.58 (primary), and 2.82 (secondary). For level, primary categories had 
means of 2.69 (positive) and 1.93 (negative) and secondary categories had means of 
5.50 (positive) and 5.31 (negative). The emotions were ordered randomly on the page.
“Study 2” included a section on demographic information about the participant 
(age, gender, ethnicity, citizenship, number of years in Australia and first language). 
These questions were followed by four items measuring perceptions of the overall 
impact of migrants in Australia. This part was a manipulation check to see if 
participants were persuaded by the manipulation of migrant threat type in Part 2. 
Participants were asked to indicate the degree of positive and negative impact they 
believe migrants have had on Australian culture (symbolic) and economy (realistic) (1 = 
very little; 7 = very much). Items were worded as “Please indicate the degree of 
positive impact you believe migrants have had on Australian culture,” “Please indicate
lS The Demoulin et al. (2004) study surveyed US English speakers on the ratings o f level and valence of 
emotions. For Studies 1-6 of this thesis, I categorize the level and valence o f the emotion words based on 
these data.
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the degree of negative impact you believe migrants have had on Australian culture,” 
“Please indicate the degree of positive impact you believe migrants have had on the 
Australian economy,” and “Please indicate the degree of negative impact you believe 
migrants have had on the Australian economy.”
Procedure. Participants were approached by the researcher in public spaces on 
the campus of Australian National University during the lunch hour over the course of 
two weeks. Participants were told that the researcher was a psychology student looking 
for participants to take part in two consecutive studies. They were then asked to 
complete a 10-minute questionnaire. Participation was anonymous and voluntary, and 
no compensation was offered. Those who agreed to participate were provided with a 
pen and a questionnaire. The researcher then left to let the participants complete the 
questionnaire privately. The researcher returned approximately 10-minutes later to 
collect the pen and questionnaire. Participants were asked if they had any questions 
about the study. They were then debriefed and all questions were answered.
Results
Manipulation checks. Because of the nature of the group context (Australian in­
group) and the task required of the study (reading a passage), non-citizens and people 
for whom English was a second language were removed from the sample. This left a 
sample of 211 participants (116 male, 95 female, mean age 24.54). There was also a 
potential need to eliminate participants based on failure of the final 4-item manipulation 
check in Part 3. This manipulation check asked participants to what degree migrants 
had a positive/negative effect on Australian culture/economy. If the manipulation in 
Part 2 of the type of threat posed by migrants had been effective, participants would 
respond that migrants have a negative impact on the aspect of Australian society that 
was described in the manipulation. For example, participants in the realistic threat
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condition would rate that there were more negative effects of migrants on the 
economy than participants in the symbolic threat condition.
To evaluate the extent to which the manipulation was successful, I first created a 
variable of whether the national nature and threat type conditions were “matched” or 
“unmatched”. Then I conducted a 2 (condition: matched/unmatched) x 2(manipulation 
check type: symbolic/realistic) x 2(manipulation check valence: positive/negative) with 
condition between subjects and manipulation check valence and manipulation check 
type as within subjects. The full three-way interaction would have indicated that the 
matched conditions differed from the unmatched condition on their ratings of the 
manipulation check. This interaction was not significant F( 1 ,209)=2.14, p=. 1. From 
this I concluded that the manipulations of threat salience were largely not effective. I 
chose not to eliminate participants on the basis of failure on the manipulation checks as 
this would have cut out a majority of the sample and left too little statistical power for 
meaningful analyses.
Emotion variables. I examined the hypotheses using a five-way mixed 
ANOVA, with national nature, threat type, and group rated as between-subjects 
variables and level of emotion and valence of emotion as within-subjects variables. I 
created variables for four categories of emotion words, grouping them by their level and 
valence. Following procedures in the published literature (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 
2006; Cehajic, et al., 2009; Cuddy, et al., 2007b; Demoulin, et al., 2008; Vaes & 
Paladino, 2010b), I calculated means for each participant for the ratings of primary 
positive (happiness, surprise, pleasure), primary negative (pain, anger, fear), secondary 
positive (optimism, hope, nostalgia), and secondary negative emotions (guilt, shame, 
remorse). So, each participant had a single mean rating for each of the four emotion 
categories. These four dependent variables were within participants.
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Level. There was a significant main effect for level of emotion. Overall, 
participants rated targets, in general, as experiencing more primary emotions (M=4.27, 
SD=0.72) than secondary emotions (M= 4.07, ££>=0.87), F(1, 203) = 11.87,/?<.001. 
There was also an interaction effect for emotion level and valence, F(l, 203) = 123.50, 
pc.001. Whereas targets, in general, were rated as experiencing higher levels of positive 
secondary emotions (M= 5.12, SD=1.30) than positive primary emotions (M=4.59,
SD=.87), they were rated as experiencing lower levels of negative secondary emotions 
(M=3.01,5D=1.16) than negative primary emotions (M= 3.95, 5D=1.30).
Valence. There was a main effect for valence of emotion. Participants 
attributed more positive emotions to targets (M= 4.85, SD=0.87) than negative emotions 
(M=3.48, S!D=1.02), F(\, 203) = 289.40, p<.001. This was qualified by a two-way 
interaction between valence of emotion and group rated, F(l,203)=4.12,/?<.05.
Whereas migrant targets were rated as experiencing more positive emotions (A/=4.91, 
S£)=.09) than Australian targets (M= 4.79, S£)=.08), they were rated as experiencing less 
negative emotions (A/=3.38, SZ)=.10) than Australian targets (A/=3.58, SD=.09).
This was further qualified by a three-way interaction between the group rated, 
valence, and migrant threat type, F( 1, 203)=5.65,p<.05. The two-way interaction of 
valence of emotion by group rated was only significant in the condition in which 
realistic threat was salient, F (l, 203) = 7.56, p<.001. In the realistic threat salience 
conditions, the difference in positive and negative emotion ratings was larger for 
migrants (Mdif=l .75, SD=2.10) than for Australians (Mdjf=l .04, SD=2.10). The 
differences between positive and negative emotion ratings for migrants (Mdif=1.32, 
S£)=2.10) and Australians (Mdjf=1.37, SD=2.10) were not different in the culture threat 
salience condition.
Infrahumanization. The measure of infrahumanization (an interaction between 
group rated and level of emotion) was non-significant, F( 1,203) = 0.28,/?>.05.
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However, there was a three-way interaction between group rated, valence and level 
of emotion, F( 1,203) = 5.63,/?<.05. This interaction is shown in Figure 6.1. On the left 
side of the graph, we see similar ratings of primary positive emotions for migrants 
(M= 4.58, ££>=0.80) and Australians (M= 4.59, ££>=0.84) and for primary negative 
emotions for migrants (M= 3.94, ££>= 1.2) and Australians (M= 3.96, ££>=1.26). On the 
right side of the graph, we see an interaction between valence and group rated with a 
different pattern between positive and negative emotions. For negative secondary 
emotions, participants rated Australians higher (M= 3.21, £D= 1.54) than migrants 
(M= 2.81, ££>= 1.1) on negative secondary emotions. But for positive secondary 
emotions there was actually greater attribution to migrants (M= 5.24, ££>=1.3) than to 
Australians (A/=5.00, ££>=1.26).
In-group
— “  Out-group
Positive Negative Positive Negative
SecondaryPrimary
Figure 6.1. Three-way group rated, by level, by valence interaction showing 
infrahumanization qualified by valence.
This finding does not fully support the first hypothesis, that migrants would be 
infrahumanized on ratings of secondary emotions compared to Australians. According 
to the definition established in the literature and Chapter 2 of this thesis, it is only denial 
of both positive and negative secondary emotions that is operationally defined as
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infrahumanization. To foreshadow, this effect will be replicated in other studies 
throughout the thesis.
Threat Salience. There were no significant effects between ratings of level of 
emotion, group rated, and the manipulations of national nature (symbolic/realistic) and 
migrant threat type (symbolic/realistic). Therefore, the second hypothesis was not 
supported and threat type salience or non-salience did not impact upon the expression of 
infrahumanization.
No other main or interaction effects were significant.
Discussion
Hypothesis 1.1. The results found for the first hypothesis do not replicate those 
found in previous studies (Cortes, et al., 2005; Cuddy, et al., 2007b; Leyens, et al.,
2001; Viki et al., 2006). This past research has found that, as evidence of 
infrahumanization, group members rated the in-group as higher on both positive and 
negative secondary emotions than out-group members. However, in the present study, 
the out-group was only rated as significantly lower on negative secondary emotions and 
not on positive secondary emotions. Does this mean that they were at once 
infrahumanized and humanized or perceived as of equal status as the in-group? Not 
necessarily.
It is possible that the effect of rating the out-group equally to the in-group on 
positive secondary emotions, instead of lower, as expected, was a function of the 
particular emotions used and the particular out-group specified. The out-group selected 
for this study was migrants with the in-group of Australians. The emotions selected as 
“positive secondary” (the emotion category with the unexpected result pattern) were 
hope, nostalgia and optimism. Participants may have rated the out-group of migrants 
as superior to Australians on these emotions because migrants’ goals and life 
circumstances are perceived to make them particularly disposed to these three emotions.
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In making the decision to leave their home country, migrants may be perceived to 
feel hopeful and optimistic about the opportunities that await them overseas. Yet at the 
same time, migrants (as opposed to another out-group) may be perceived to have 
particular reason to feel nostalgia for the place and people they have left behind as 
compared to Australians9.
Therefore, a potential explanation for the findings pertinent to the first 
hypothesis is related to theory on stereotype content. Indeed, research has shown that 
stereotypes can include positive content, such as ideas about a group having good 
listening skills and high levels of optimism and compassion (Madon, 1997). In 
addition, stereotype content has been shown to vary as a function of context and 
comparison group (van Rijswijk & Ellemers, 2002). In the case of this study, the 
comparison groups were Australians and migrants, and the context was Australian 
immigration. It could be the case that when participants were attributing secondary 
emotions, they were doing so based on group stereotypes and not based on how much 
humanness they perceived in the migrant out-group. In the context of migrating to 
Australia, the migrant out-group experience may reflect more optimism, hope and 
nostalgia than the Australian in-group.
Hypothesis 1.2. The second hypothesis was not supported. There are several 
possible explanations for this finding. The most obvious is that the manipulations failed 
to adequately create a salient threat context. This is exhibited by the finding that threat 
condition did not affect the manipulation check measure of views on migrants. That is, 
participants in the high threat salience conditions did not rate migrants as having any
1 This association between the out-group and the words selected was not foreseen at the beginning of the 
study. The words included in Study 1 were selected on the basis of their valence and level values 
according to the ratings in Demoulin et al. (2004a). The two primary and two secondary word groups 
averaged similar level values as did the two positive and two negative groups on valence values. In 
future studies, more care was taken in selecting words that were less likely to be stereotypical o f the in­
group or out-group.
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more significant negative impact on Australia than did participants in the low threat 
salience conditions.
One reason for this could be because of information contained in the 
manipulation that pointed out that migrants are increasingly from the Asia-Pacific 
region. This detail may have led participants to view the migrant group as specifically 
“Asians.” The content of the stereotype for the group “Asians” might have precluded 
participants from internalizing the specific details of the manipulation of “migrants”.
The stereotype content of the group “Asians” may, in fact, not be threatening, but rather 
seen as potential assets to enhance the value of the group. Indeed, after the present 
study was conducted, Bain et al. (2009) found that Chinese, Indonesian, and 
Singaporean out-groups (some of the major Asian populations in Australia) were not 
infrahumanized by an Australian sample. While these groups were not posed as 
migrant out-groups in the Bain et al. (2009) study, it is possible that these groups are not 
denied human uniqueness (secondary emotions) by Australians.
It is also possible that in society in general, there are norms inhibiting the 
expression of discrimination against immigrants. In fact, after participating, some 
participants expressed discomfort and reluctance to make emotion attributions on such a 
broad scale. This anecdotal observation is supported by research which shows that 
when reminded of a socially disadvantaged group, meta-stereotypes are activated for 
participants from the advantaged majority creating a desire to disprove such stereotypes 
(Shelton, et al., 2006, p. 325). Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje (2002, p. 179) write:
[...] responses should not be considered in isolation or taken at face value as 
necessarily reflecting privately held views. Responses may often be strategic, 
addressing identity-expressive concerns and instrumental concerns directed by 
goals attuned to the dominant level of self which take into account the 
constraints and possibilities present in context.
In the present study, I asked participants how they themselves view 
immigrants and Australians. This may have activated meta-stereotypes of Australians 
as prejudiced towards immigrants, and may have been threatening to the participants’ 
identity. A potential way around this problem in the future would be to ask how 
“people” view the parties in the relevant inter-group relationship. In this way, the 
participant would not be expressing an individual opinion and potentially admitting 
personal bias, but would be recognizing bias in society as an observer.
After obtaining these results, I searched the literature for other studies measuring 
attitudes other than infrahumanization towards “threatening” immigrants. One study 
reports that attitudes towards immigrants in the US were negative only when 
participants were faced with both realistic and symbolic threat (Stephan, Renfro, Esses, 
Stephan, & Martin, 2005). While the authors did not measure infrahumanization 
specifically, infrahumanization is a type of inter-group judgement and it is reasonable to 
expect that it may require presentation of both realistic and symbolic threat to elicit 
infrahumanization of migrants.
Another study, published after Study 1 was conducted, sheds light on the present 
findings (Costello & Hodson, 2011). It is very similar in that it assessed the effect of 
realistic and symbolic threat on attitudes towards immigrants. Their specific outcome 
measure was willingness to help the immigrant out-group. In their model, participants 
higher in social dominance orientation (SDO)10 had reduced support for out-group help 
when presented with either realistic or symbolic threat or a combination of the two. 
There are several interesting aspects of Costello and Hodson’s (2011) study that shed 
light on Study 1.
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10 Social dominance orientation (SDO) is an individual difference in the degree to which a person prefers 
hierarchical or egalitarian intergroup relations. Compared to people low in SDO, people high in SDO 
have been found to prefer unequal distribution of goods and services and agree more with discriminatory 
policies Tausch, N., & Hewstone, M. (2010). Social dominance orientation attenuates stereotype change 
in the face of disconfirming information. Social Psychology, 41(3), 169-176..
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Firstly, the threat manipulations used were short written descriptions, similar 
to those in Study 1. Realistic threat addressed higher competition for employment and 
immigrants requiring government assistance. Symbolic threat manipulations addressed 
change to the national language and expansion of “non-western religious beliefs and 
practices” (p. 222). Another similarity was that Experiment 1 of Costello and Hodson 
(2011) found that there was no main effect of threat on support for immigrant help.
This result is similar to that of the present Study 1 in that threat did not produce 
negative reactions to immigrants for participants in general. In the Costello and Hodson 
(2011) study, it was only through increased SDO that threat affected attitudes toward 
immigrant help.
Infrahumanization was measured in the Costello and Hodson (2011) study as a 
mediator between SDO and helping in Experiment 2, rather than an outcome variable as 
in Study 1 of this thesis. The authors tested the prediction that increased symbolic (but 
not realistic) threat would increase infrahumanization and that this would be particularly 
the case among participants high in SDO. The results supported this prediction with 
SDO predicting infrahumanization under symbolic threat conditions only. In contrast to 
my predictions, they specifically predicted that symbolic threat would be more related 
to infrahumanization than realistic threat because while symbolic threat (language and 
religion) lead to a view of the out-group as “other,” realistic threats highlight inter­
group commonality in needs for resources.
Methodological Issues. Before moving on to the second study, it is useful to 
note several methodological suggestions from the present research for the future studies 
in this thesis. First, in this study, although the out-group was made salient in the second 
manipulation, there was no specific creation of a salient in-group. The first 
manipulation asked participants to consider traits of Australians, but not necessarily to 
think of themselves as part of that nationality. Also, there was no measure of
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identification as an Australian, which also creates in-group salience. While it is not 
possible to make causal explanations between a lack of in-group salience and not 
detecting the infrahumanization effect, it may be valuable for future work to include a 
measure of in-group identification.
Second, there is the issue of stereotype content of the emotions chosen for the 
particular inter-group context created. One solution is to carefully assess the primary 
and secondary emotions chosen for rating and possibly to measure stereotype content of 
the emotion list as a pilot test to each study. Another is to use a longer list of emotions 
(than the 12 used in this study) so that the effect of each single emotion is muted. Both 
of these methods are used in Study 2.
When designing Study 1 ,1 assumed that I would replicate the infrahumanization 
effect, and the aim was to analyse the variation in the effect based on threat context. 
However, I was not able to replicate this basic effect. Rather than conclude that 
Australians do not infrahumanize migrants to Australia and begin to study a different 
inter-group context, I decided to further investigate the suggested explanation for not 
obtaining results to support Hypothesis 1.1. As described, I reasoned that it was 
potentially stereotype content that interfered with the replication of infrahumanization. 
Therefore, I conducted a second study to tease apart the stereotype content of emotion 
attribution from the specific humanness dimension.
Study 2
Study 1 results suggest the possibility that infrahumanization may not be 
observed if there is stereotype content of the relevant groups contained within the 
primary and secondary emotions being rated. Study 2 was designed to test if Study 1 
results were affected by stereotype content. If so, it would provide a way forward to 
finding an inter-group context in which infrahumanization would be expressed.
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First, a pilot study was designed in which participants were asked to rate two 
separate out-groups (immigrants and the gay community) as well as an in-group 
member (university student) on primary and secondary emotions to establish any 
emotion related stereotype content. Based on this information, a scale of emotion 
attribution was created that could account for existing stereotyped secondary emotions 
and non-stereotyped primary and secondary emotions.11 High ratings for out-groups on 
secondary stereotyped emotions would therefore not necessarily indicate that the in­
group was granting greater humanness to the out-group. It is possible that an out-group 
would be rated high on stereotyped secondary emotions but low on other secondary 
emotions.
In the main study, participants were asked to attribute emotions to one of the 
three groups from the pilot study: a student in-group and an immigrant or a homosexual 
out-group. Participants rated both stereotyped and non-stereotyped emotions. It was in 
the analysis that two groups of emotions were assessed, those with stereotype content 
included and those with stereotype content excluded. The comparison between 
attribution of non-stereotyped secondary emotions to the in-group compared to the two 
out-groups was the measure of infrahumanization. Taking the information from the 
pilot study, it would then be possible to eliminate stereotyped emotions from the 
analysis, and assess infrahumanization after accounting for stereotype content.
One possible outcome was that I would detect infrahumanization with both 
stereotyped and non-stereotyped emotions included in the analysis. This would be a 
strong infrahumanization effect. Another was that I would see infrahumanization with 
only the non-stereotyped secondary emotions analysed. Finally, it was possible that I
11 While both primary and secondary emotions were measured in the pilot test assessing stereotyped 
emotions, it was only secondary emotions that were found to be significantly stereotypical o f the social 
groups presented.
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would not detect infrahumanization with either set of emotions. This would be a 
similar result found to that of Study 1.
The main study included one additional measure, an altruism scale. The 
altruism scale had two purposes. In the case of the third possible outcome, described 
above, the absence of infrahumanization, the altruism scale would provide a second 
measure of inter-group attitudes and behavioural intentions. Finding in-group 
favouritism in altruism, in the absence of infrahumanization, would be informative. It 
would provide evidence of the methodological efficacy of the creation of the inter-group 
context. It would demonstrate that the inter-group context was sufficiently salient to 
cause some inter-group differentiation. Second, if there was infrahumanization, the 
altruism scale would provide a way to measure the effect of infrahumanization on 
altruism, similar to previous studies that analyzed the effect of infrahumanization on 
helping.
The main study was a 3 (group context: student/immigrant/gay community) x 2 
(stereotype content: included/excluded) x 2 (level of emotion: primary/secondary) x 2 
(valence of emotion: positive/negative) mixed design. The group context variable was a 
between-subjects variable and the level and valence and stereotype content were within- 
subjects variables. Two separate ANOVAs were run to analyze the stereotype content 
variable. I hypothesized (H.2.1) that there would be infrahumanization in the stereotype 
excluded ANOVA, but not for the analysis of the full set of emotions. I expected that 
when stereotyped emotions were excluded from the analysis, there would be lower 
ratings of the two out-groups on secondary emotions compared to the in-group (more 
infrahumanization), but that this difference would not be present when the stereotyped 
emotions were included in the analysis.
In regards to the altruism scale, I made two predictions. The altruism scale 
included items about intent to engage in helping behaviours and intent to engage in
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behaviours oppositional to the goals of the target group. First, I predicted that there 
would be main effect of group context on altruism with higher altruism towards the in­
group than the out-groups (H.2.2). Secondly, if H.2.1 was supported, I predicted that 
there would be a negative relationship between infrahumanization and altruism (H.2.3). 
Methods
Pilot Study. A pilot study was conducted to determine the stereotype content of 
emotions for the three group categorizations to be used in the main study. Forty-four 
participants (17 male, 27 female, mean age 20.70) were asked to rate a member of one 
of three groups (students, immigrants, or the gay community) using a list of 20 
secondary emotions. The study was a 3 (group rated: student/immigrant/gay 
community) x 2 (level of emotion: primary/secondary) x 2 (valence of emotion: 
positive/negative) mixed design, with group rated between-subjects and level of 
emotion and valence of emotion within-subjects.
In Part 1, participants were given a brief “self description” of a third year university 
student. It included details about the person’s background, current activities, and future 
plans. This description was held constant across conditions except in one detail: the 
description of being active in one of three on-campus groups. In the student condition, 
the target was in the Student Association. In the immigrant condition, the target 
reported being an immigrant who was active in the International Students Department.
In the gay condition, the target was active in the Sexuality Department and Queer 
Collective. All groups are real on-campus organizations and this detail determined 
whether the target represented the group of students, immigrants, or the gay community.
In Part 2, participants were asked to rank 20 emotions on the degree to which the 
target felt them, with a rating of 1 for the emotion “felt most” and a rating of 20 for the 
emotion “felt least”. In Part 3, participants were then given an opportunity to record 
any additional emotions the target would feel that were not mentioned in Part 2. Part 4
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was a manipulation check of the group of the target. It asked participants “In the 
study situation described above, what community group is making an appeal to the ACT 
government?” and then gave three answer choices of “the student community,” “the gay 
community,” or “the immigrant community.” Part 5 asked for demographic 
information, including sexual orientation, nationality, and student status.
All participants correctly identified the group membership of the target in the 
manipulation checks in Part 4. Participants who did not identify as heterosexual 
domestic students in Part 5 were removed from the study. This left 42 participants (16 
male, 26 female, mean age 20.02). Therefore, all remaining participants correctly 
identified the target and were part of the assumed in-group of the study.
To analyse the rank order data, I performed a Kruskal-Wallis test, which is 
effectively a one-way ANOVA for rank order data. The independent variable was the 
condition of the participant (rating students, immigrants or members of the gay 
community). The dependent variables were the participant’s rankings of the emotion 
words. Results showed that there were three emotions that were ranked as significantly 
different by participants in one condition versus the other two. A closer look showed 
that there was one emotion with a significantly higher rank by participants in each 
condition. Therefore, there was one stereotyped emotion for each of the three social 
categories.
In rankings, numbers closer to 1 were “felt most.” Remorse was ranked 
marginally “higher” (closer to 1) for the student than for the other two targets 
(Mtud=13.0, SD=3.0; Mgay=15.46, SD=3.28; Mimmi=16.30, SZ)=3.20), F(2, 39)=3.16, 
p=.057. As expected from Study 1, nostalgia was ranked significantly higher for the 
immigrant target than the other two targets (A/stUd= l 1 -73, SD=.3.88; Mgay=13.46,
SD=4.24; Mjmmj=8.73, 5D=3.80), F(2,39)=4.24,/?<.05. Shame was ranked significantly 
higher for the gay target than the other two targets (A/Stud= 19.09, 579=4.32; Mgay=14.50,
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SD=4.62; M\mm\=\6.36, SD=3.53), F(2,39)=4.10, p< .05. Therefore, I concluded 
that nostalgia was a stereotyped emotion for immigrants, and shame was a stereotyped 
emotion for the gay community. As remorse was only marginally significant, it was not 
considered a stereotyped emotion for the student group and therefore there were only 
two stereotyped emotions, nostalgia for the immigrant condition and shame for the gay 
community condition.
Main Study. One hundred, eighty participants (51 men, 125 women, 4 missing 
data, mean age 19.17) were recruited from a first-year psychology participant pool, 
completing the study for partial course credit. For the purposes of the group salience 
manipulation, in which nationality needed to be held constant, the advertisement for 
participants stipulated that participants should be Australian citizens.
Materials. The study was a mixed design with three levels of a between- 
subjects condition variable (group context: student/immigrant/gay community). The 
other variables were made up of the emotion attribution task and were within-subjects. 
The study comprised five parts. The first part introduced the group context. The first 
item asked the participant if he or she identified with one of three groups: students, 
immigrants, or members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgendered community, 
according to the group context condition. This was followed by an identification 
measure that assessed identification as a student, identification with his or her 
nationality, or identification with his or her sexuality. The identification measure had 
five items (a =.81), including, “1 see myself as a student/as an Australian/in terms of my 
sexual orientation,” and “I am pleased to be a student/to be Australian/with my sexual 
orientation” (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995).
Part 2 was the emotion attribution measure. Participants were told that 
“Research shows that people often correctly guess the emotions of other people, even if 
they don’t know much information about them.” They were then asked to consider a
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list of emotions and rate how either students, immigrants, or members of the gay 
community (according to their condition) experience them on a scale ranging from 1 
“not at all” to 7 “extremely.” The list of emotions included those 12 used in the first 
study plus four additional emotions. Importantly, it included the two stereotyped 
emotions of nostalgia and shame. The emotion words were part of one of four emotion 
categories. The emotion categories included four primary positive (pleasure, surprise, 
excitement, and happiness), four primary negative (pain, anger, fear, and sadness), four 
secondary positive (love, optimism, hope and nostalgia), and four secondary negative 
(guilt, remorse, shame, and embarrassment) emotions. The categorization was again 
based on Demoulin et al. (2004a).
To create a context for the altruism scale, Part 3 told a story of the relevant 
group (students, immigrants, or members of the gay community, according to the group 
rated condition) being in conflict with the local government. The short description read 
as follows:
“The (student, immigrant, gay) community feels that they are being 
institutionally disadvantaged in comparison to (non-students, citizens, 
heterosexuals) and are pursuing changes in ACT government policy. Their goal 
is not to earn special privileges, but rather to achieve what they see as equity 
with (non-students, citizens, heterosexuals).”
It then stated that supporters of the community described would be organizing activities 
to raise awareness for their rights and for making an appeal to the local government.
Part 4 was an eight-item altruism scale of willingness to engage in five 
behaviours to help the community’s movement, and three behaviours to detract from the 
community’s movement (a = .80). Helping behaviours included items such as, “I am 
willing to sign a petition” and “I am willing to wear a button in support of the 
movement.” Detracting behaviours included items such as, “I am willing to attend a
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counter rally to oppose the movement” and “I am willing to take down fliers to 
show discontent with the movement.” Participants rated their agreement on a scale 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The final part, Part 5, included 
demographic questions of age and sex and a multiple-choice manipulation check of the 
participant’s knowledge of the group context of the study, asking, “In the study situation 
described above, what community group is making an appeal to the ACT government?” 
and provided the choices, “the student community,” “the immigrant community,” and 
“the gay community.”
Results
Participants. Six participants were excluded because they were not members of 
the in-group relevant to their condition (student, Australian, heterosexual). Eleven 
participants were excluded because they failed the manipulation check. Therefore in the 
final analysis, there were 163 participants (47 men, 116 women, mean age 19.06). Data 
were analysed with two ANOVAs; one 3 (group context: student/nationality/sexuality) 
x 2 (level of emotion: primary/secondary) x 2 (valence of emotion: positive/negative) 
mixed ANOVA for the full set of emotions (stereotype content included) and another 
ANOVA with the limited set of emotions (stereotype content excluded).12 The group 
context variable was a between-subjects variable and level and valence were within- 
subjects variables.
I created two groups of variables for emotion ratings. I found the mean for each 
participant for each of four emotions for the “full sets” with categories primary positive 
(happiness, surprise, pleasure, excitement), primary negative (pain, anger, fear,
121 also analyzed the same set o f data as a single 3 (group context: student/nationality/sexuality) x 2 
(level o f emotion: primary/secondary) x 2 (valence of emotion: positive/negative) x2 (stereotype content: 
included/excluded) ANOVA. That analysis was unusual in that there is redundancy in the data that is 
likely to artificially reduce the error variance. For this reason, the two ANOVAs were preferable. 
However, it is worth noting as it was useful in assessing the interaction o f the stereotype content variable. 
There was a significant three way interaction o f stereotype content by condition by level F(2,160) = 5.38, 
/?<.01), but the results differed from the hypotheses in the same direction.
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sadness), secondary positive (optimism, hope, nostalgia, love), and secondary 
negative emotions (guilt, shame, remorse, embarrassment). For the stereotype content 
absent emotion variables, the secondary positive category was averaged without 
nostalgia and the secondary negative category was averaged without shame.
Main Effects. In analysing the emotion attribution measures, there were main 
effects for level and valence in each of the ANOVAs. For the full set of emotions 
ANOVA, there were more primary emotions (M= 5.18, SD =.08) attributed to the target 
group than secondary emotions (M= 4.79, SD =.08), F(l,160) = 67.24,/? < .001).
There were more positive emotions (M= 5.35, SD = 0.07) attributed than negative 
emotions (M= 4.63, SD = 0.10), F(l,160) = 68.69,/? < .001. For the stereotype 
excluded set of emotions ANOVA, the patterns were the same. There were more 
primary emotions (M= 5.18, SD =.08) attributed to the target group than secondary 
emotions (M  = 4.98, SD =.08), F( 1,160) = 15.97,/? < .001). There were more positive 
emotions (M= 5.43, SD =0.08) attributed than negative emotions (M= 4.74, SD =
0.10), F( 1,160) = 56.33,/? < .001.
Infrahumanization. There were no two-way level of emotion by group context 
interactions that would have indicated infrahumanization in either the full set of 
emotions ANOVA F(2,160) = 0.45,/? =0.64, or the stereotype excluded ANOVA 
F(2,160) = 1.64,/? =0.20. This result does not support H.2.1 that infrahumanization 
would be evident when the participants were considering non-stereotyped emotions.
Not only were results not significant, but the pattem of attribution was not what 
was expected. The expected pattem was for secondary emotion ratings for the student 
condition in the stereotype excluded ANOVA to be higher than for the immigrant 
condition and gay condition. As shown in Table 6.1, this was not the case. The 
difference between student and migrant condition was non-significant (t[318]=.44,
p=. 11) and the gay condition was higher than for the student condition, 
t(318)= 17.20, p>.05).
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Table 6.1
Condition x Level for each emotion set ANOVA
Level Condition
Full Set ANOVA
Stereotype 
Excluded ANOVA
Mean SD Mean SD
Primary Student 5.03 0.12 5.03 0.12
Migrant 4.94 0.14 4.94 0.14
Gay Community 5.58 0.14 5.58 0.14
Secondary Student 4.67 0.12 4.95 0.12
Migrant 4.60 0.14 4.68 0.14
Gay Community 5.12 0.14 5.33 0.14
Two additional 4-way mixed ANOVAs were run including the same variables as 
previously with the addition of the between-subjects variable of identification 
(high/low). Identification was calculated with participants scoring above the median 
considered high identifiers and participants scoring below the median considered low 
identifiers. Identification did not qualify any of the above interactions.
In-group favouritism: Helping behaviour. Despite the absence of 
infrahumanization, there was evidence of in-group favouritism in terms of altruistic 
behaviour. I ran a 2-way mixed ANOVA between group context 
(students/immigrants/gay community) and level of identification (high/low) on 
participants’ altruism scores. Altruism scores were calculated by taking the mean for 
each participant of the helping behaviours and the oppositional behaviours (reverse 
scored). There was a significant two-way interaction, F(2,157)=l0.37, p<.001 that is 
shown in Figure 6.2. On altruism, participants with low identification as a student, 
Australian, or heterosexual person were more willing to engage in altruistic behaviour 
for immigrants (Af=4.24, SD=.22) and the gay community (M= 4.16, SD=.22) than for 
the student community (A/=3.51, SD=.29). On the other hand, participants with high
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identification as a student, Australian, or heterosexual person were more willing to 
be altruistic for the student group (A/=4.80, 573=. 19) than the immigrant (M= 3.52, 
SD=.2A) or gay community (M= 3.67, SD=.32). Therefore, there was more altruism for 
out-groups among low identifiers, and less altruism for out-groups among high- 
identifiers. I describe this result as an in-group-favouritism effect.
Figure 6.2. Shows the two-way interaction between altruism and group context with 
more help for the out-groups by low identifiers and more help for the in-groups by high 
identifiers.
Discussion
There was no infrahumanization effect with either the stereotyped or the non- 
stereotyped emotions. Contrary to expectation, the non-stereotyped emotions were 
attributed more to the groups than to the stereotyped emotions. Also unexpectedly, out­
groups were not rated as having significantly less secondary emotions compared to the 
in-group even when considering non-stereotypical emotions.
In fact, the gay community out-group was rated as having more secondary 
emotions than the in-group, even when stereotyped emotions were omitted. One 
possible explanation is that the gay community has an overall stereotype of being more 
emotional than the heterosexual community and measuring infrahumanization by 
emotion attribution is not suitable for this particular group. Another explanation for the
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overall results in the study is that the out-groups were simply not being 
infrahumanized or discriminated against in humanness. This result persisted even when 
identification was taken into account, even though published literature has shown that 
high identifiers have higher levels of infrahumanization (Demoulin et al., 2004b).
At the same time, there was in-group favouritism of a different type at work in 
the inter-group contexts created. High identifiers were more willing to help their in­
group than either of the out-groups and low identifiers were more willing to help the 
two out-groups than the in-group. This suggests that the non-significant effects on the 
infrahumanization measures was not due to non-salient inter-group contexts. Rather, 
the particular inter-group contexts created did not elicit infrahumanization in the given 
sample.
General Discussion
Studies 1 and 2
I have chosen to present Studies 1 and 2 together as Study 2 was designed to 
help explain the results of Study 1. The initial aim of Study 1 was to analyse the effect 
of symbolic and realistic threats on infrahumanization in a group context of citizenship. 
With the effect of infrahumanization being only partially replicated, a clear analysis of 
threat context was not possible. The analysis, therefore, turned to an attempt simply to 
replicate the effect of infrahumanization in an Australian sample, a population about 
which few infrahumanization studies have been published. To do this, in Study 2 ,1 
tested the effects of stereotype content on infrahumanization measurement to see if, in 
Study 1, infrahumanization was not observed because of stereotype content. I proposed 
that the failure to replicate an infrahumanization effect in Study 1 was due to the 
specific combination of the groups being studied (immigrants and Australians) and the 
positive secondary emotions used for analysis (hope, optimism, nostalgia). Study 2 was 
designed to examine whether, after controlling for stereotype content of the groups’
139
emotions, an infrahumanization effect could then be detected. However, again, I did 
not find the effect of infrahumanization, either for out-groups of immigrants or the gay 
community.
One possible interpretation of these findings is that the groups were not 
significantly meaningful, an aspect of the inter-group context that has been theorized to 
be essential for infrahumanization (Leyens, et al., 2003). However, it is important to 
note that the groups were sufficiently meaningful for in-group favouritism to be 
exhibited, particularly for the highly identified group members (i.e., the people for 
whom it was meaningful).
The question remains why infrahumanization was not detected in these 
particular inter-group contexts within an Australian sample in Study 1 or Study 2. The 
explanation that stereotype content of emotions used in the analysis was masking the 
effect was controlled for in Study 2, and the effect was still not present. Another issue 
could be that infrahumanization by emotion attribution is simply not universal and is not 
going to occur with an Australian sample. However, this seems unlikely with the 
abundant amount of data collected in various countries throughout Europe (Delgado, et 
al., 2009; Demoulin, et al., 2004b; Gaunt, et al., 2002; Leyens, et al., 2003; Leyens, et 
al., 2000a; Paladino, et al., 2002). The published studies in Australia demonstrate 
dehumanization by trait attribution (more HN traits to the in-group than the out-group) 
but not infrahumanization by trait attribution (more HU traits to the in-group than the 
out-group) and no measure of infrahumanization by emotion attribution (Bain, et al., 
2009; Loughnan & Haslam, 2007).
A third possibility could be that the inter-group contexts did not have qualities 
sufficient to induce infrahumanization. The sample did demonstrate one example of the 
inter-group processes of in-group favouritism in the altruism measure. These results 
indicate that there was at least some degree of inter-group differentiation. However, it
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is possible that the conditions needed for infrahumanization are distinct from those 
required to induce other examples of in-group favouritism. Following Studies 1 and 2, 
this seemed the most likely explanation, and so the next studies were planned with the 
understanding that they would require different inter-group contexts for 
infrahumanization to be observed.
Planning the Next Studies
As was addressed in previous chapters, the necessary and sufficient conditions 
required to induce infrahumanization have not been isolated. The initial goal of this 
thesis is to contribute to that analysis. However, in order to test variables that have not 
been addressed, it is necessary to find an inter-group context in which 
infrahumanization can be elicited, and then introduce additional variables. Studies 1 
and 2 were unsuccessful in finding such an inter-group context.
In Chapter 5, in the broad theoretical hypotheses, I hypothesized that I would 
replicate the infrahumanization by emotion attribution effect in an Australian sample. 
Following the null findings of Studies 1 and 2 ,1 was not yet ready to conclude that this 
hypothesis was not supported. To test that overarching hypothesis, and to be able to 
proceed with investigating the necessary and sufficient conditions, Studies 3, 4, and 5 
focused on replicating the infrahumanization effect.
I moved forward with the net three studies under the working assumption that 
the inter-group contexts in Studies 1 and 2 did not have the necessary qualities 
sufficient to induce infrahumanization. In Studies 3-5 ,1 tried to overcome this problem 
in several ways. First, I introduced groups outside of nationality, the group context on 
which most of the research has been done and that I had used unsuccessfully in Studies 
1 and 2. Secondly, one variable that has been shown to increase infrahumanization, 
though it is not necessary, is conflict (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006). Therefore, one
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variable that Studies 3, 4 and 5 used to intensify the inter-group relations was that of 
direct competition or conflict between groups.
The following chapter describes Studies 3, 4, and 5. The studies are similar in that they 
had the shared goals described above. They tested novel inter-group contexts and tested 
for different inter-group variables that might affect infrahumanization.
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Chapter 7 : Studies 3, 4, and 5 
Introduction
Studies 1 and 2 used contexts of nationality and sexual orientation without being 
able to replicate published infrahumanization findings for emotion attribution. This was 
unexpected, particularly for the nationality context, considering that much of the work 
done previously had focused on inter-group contexts of ethnicity or nationality (Castano 
& Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Cehajic, et al., 2009; Costello & Hodson, 2011; Cuddy, et al., 
2007b; Delgado, et al., 2009; DeLuca-McLean & Castano, 2009; Demoulin, et al.,
2005; Gaunt, 2009; Paladino, et al., 2002; Paladino, et al., 2004; Vaes, Heflick, & 
Goldenberg, 2010a; Vaes & Paladino, 2010b; Wohl, et al., 2011). Still, it was not 
possible to make any firm conclusions about the processes that give rise to 
infrahumanization within an Australian sample, or others, with data from only two 
studies. Therefore, continuing on from Studies 1 and 2, the next step was to continue to 
try to replicate the published findings of infrahumanization in an Australian sample 
while still including additional variables to test the parameters of infrahumanization. A 
second aim was also to expand the types of inter-group contexts studied beyond 
nationality groups in order to further contribute to the existing literature.
The following three studies were designed to try to increase the intensity of the 
inter-group context in terms of identification, competition, contact, and conflict, as these 
elements, although not necessary to cause infrahumanization, have been proposed to 
increase the likelihood of infrahumanization being expressed. Identification has been 
found to have a positive relationship to infrahumanization in several studies (Demoulin, 
et al., 2004b; Leyens, et al., 2001; Rohmann, et al., 2009). Conflict is yet to be found as 
a sufficient condition to cause infrahumanization, but it has only been examined as a 
moderating variable in one study (Gaunt, 2009). Still, it can be inferred that conflict 
affects infrahumanization, as knowledge of inter-group killing (a type of conflict) has
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been found to increase infrahumanization (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006). Also, 
as conflict has been shown to have a positive relationship with other similar processes, 
such as moral exclusion, it is reasonable to hypothesize that increasing the conflictual 
relationship between groups should create conditions in which infrahumanization is 
expressed (Opotow, 1995). Therefore, I hypothesized that the conditions created in 
Studies 3, 4, and 5 (confict, identification and competition) should evoke 
infrahumanization.
Study 3 used an Australian Rugby Union context with fans from a local team 
(Brumbies) as an in-group, assessing their fellow Brumbies fans and fans of an 
opposing team (Waratahs) from a different state as an out-group. Study 4 used a 
context of Olympic athletes from different countries and of different moral standing as 
targets for infrahumanization. Study 5 used participants of a university residence 
college assessing students from their rival college. All studies assessed 
infrahumanization by emotion attribution. Study 5 also assessed human nature and 
human uniqueness by trait attribution. Additional variables included social 
identification, nationality, morality, and in-group favouritism by point allocation. The 
rationale for these additional variables will be described in each study.
Study 3
Study 3 had two goals. The first was to look for infrahumanization by emotion 
attribution in a different group context from Studies 1 and 2. The second was to begin 
to look at other potential measures of infrahumanization aside from emotion attribution, 
as there are theoretical arguments in the literature that emotion is only one of three 
aspects of what makes humans unique from animals. As I observed earlier, Leyens et 
al. (2000b) found that the lay conception of humanness comprises three parts: language, 
intelligence, and secondary emotion. They theorized that all are necessary and none is 
sufficient to perceive the full humanity of an out-group. Therefore, I thought it was
important to begin experimenting with measurement of language and intelligence, in 
addition to secondary emotions, which are the subject of focus in all other 
infrahumanization studies.
Sporting Context
I chose to use sports teams as an inter-group context in Study 3 because I 
expected sports affiliation to be a particularly strong social identity in which the inter­
group context is particularly salient. Also, it is possible that participants were conscious 
of an anti-discrimination norm in their responses in Studies 1 and 2 due to the explicit 
nature of the out-group evaluations made towards disadvantaged groups. However, in 
the world of sport, the expression of derogatory statements against the out-group is 
quite common, and there is even a certain degree of acceptance of intergroup aggression 
among fans (Rookwood & Pearson, 2010). It is with this in mind that I chose to use 
sports team fans as a context for Study 3.
Previous research has shown that participants will show out-group derogation 
against fans of a rival sports team in terms of secondary emotions (Gaunt, et al., 2005; 
Martin, Bennett, & Murray, 2008). That is, fans will infrahumanize the fans of an 
opposing team. Belgian soccer fan participants, for example, were found to predict a 
more extended length of experiencing uniquely human secondary emotions for their in­
group fans than for out-group fans (Gaunt, et al., 2005). In a developmentally focused 
study, Scottish children aged 6-7 and 10-11 attributed greater secondary emotions than 
primary emotions to their own team, while attributing secondary and primary emotions 
equally to the opposing team (Martin, et al., 2008). These studies show that sports team 
affiliation can be a rich inter-group context for studying infrahumanization. 13
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13 It was only later that I realized that while both of the studies found infrahumanizing attitudes using a 
sport context, they also were using a nationality context with in-group and out-group fans being different 
nationalities. This will be more fully elaborated upon in the Discussion section of this study.
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Finding an Australian inter-group context in which infrahumanization by 
emotion attribution is exhibited was one of the goals of Study 3. With that 
accomplished, it would be possible to include additional variables besides inter-group 
context to further contribute to the theoretical understanding of infrahumanization. The 
second goal of this study had to do with the measurement of infrahumanization. 
Infrahumanization and Language
Three essences of humanness. With the exception of some work using human 
and animal-related words and vocabulary (Viki, et al., 2006), previous research on 
infrahumanization has focused almost exclusively on studying infrahumanization along 
the emotional aspect of humanity. Studies measure to what extent participants believe 
that in-groups and out-groups experience uniquely and non-uniquely human emotions. 
But a person’s understanding of what makes a group human is not only made up of 
ideas about primary and secondary emotions. Rather, the conception of humanness is 
made up of three “essences”: secondary emotion, intelligence, and language (Vaes, et 
al., 2003). As lay observers, people believe these three elements make us unique from 
other beings. Therefore, the presence or absence of these three elements influences the 
degree to which a person is attributed with “humanity”.
There is yet to be a clear link expanding the measurement of infrahumanization 
to the language and intelligence aspects of humanity. Theoretically, to more accurately 
define infrahumanization as the attribution of some people as “less human” than others, 
infrahumanization does not need to be exhibited in all three aspects of humanity. If 
humanness is thought of as a continuum, as it is in infrahumanization research, in which 
groups are attributed varying degrees of humanness, to deny any aspect of humanity to 
an out-group is to place it towards the non-human end of the continuum. Failure to 
observe the infrahumanization effect in emotion terms does not eliminate the possibility 
that a group is being infrahumanized, as the group may be thought less human in one or
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both of the other two dimensions. Therefore, it is useful to have additional 
measures of humanness that assess intelligence and language as other domains in which 
a group may be infrahumanized.
Previous work provides evidence that infrahumanization in emotion terms will 
generalize to the intelligence aspect of humanity. Leyens et al. (2000) found that in 
addition to denying secondary emotions to an out-group, while in-group participants 
attributed higher “competence” to the out-group, they denied the out-group superior 
“intelligence.” Subsequent work has shown that animals are rated as lacking in 
secondary emotions as well as lacking in higher cognitive powers, such as thinking, 
reasoning, planning, and deciding (N. Haslam, et al., 2008a). If infrahumanization by 
human uniqueness is likening an out-group to animals, then it is likely that likening the 
out-group to animals would also be expressed as attributing them with lower cognitive 
ability. So there is evidence that denial of humanness can be exhibited in both emotion 
and intelligence aspects of infrahumanization. However, no studies to date have 
analyzed the expression of infrahumanization in terms of language proficiency. Study 3 
measured humanness attribution by both secondary emotions and by high level 
language use.
Language and discrimination. Much research has observed the correlation of 
non-standard language use and discrimination (Aroian, Norris, Patsdaughter, & Tran, 
1998; Chen-Hayes, Chen, & Athar, 2000; Gouvier & Coon, 2002; Lippi-Green, 1997; 
Ng, 2007; Ramirez-Esparza, Gosling, Benet-Martinez, Potter, & Pennebaker, 2006; 
Yoo, Gee, & Takeuchi, 2009). This type of discrimination is called linguicism or 
linguistic prejudice (Lippi-Green, 1997). Discrimination based on linguistic 
competence is a type of discrimination that can be legally justified, (e.g., in job hiring 
where it can be conflated with low intelligence) but that can facilitate discrimination by
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nation of origin, urbanization, culture, disability, and age (Gouvier & Coon, 2002; 
Lippi-Green, 1997; Ng, 2007).
A related term to linguicism is standard language ideology (Ramirez-Esparza, et 
al.), or bias toward an “idealized, homogenous spoken language” that is based on the 
spoken language of the upper middle class (Lippi-Green, 1997, p. 64). Deviations from 
standard language, such as accents, non-fluency and non-standard grammar are often 
associated with attributions of low intelligence, impropriety, illegality, social 
unacceptability, identification as “other,” and marginalized humanness (Chen-Hayes, et 
al., 2000; Lippi-Green, 1997; Ng, 2007; Rahman, 2009). It is the identification as 
“other” and marginalized humanness that are particularly important for the present 
work.
As Lippi-Green (1997) argues, the value put on a form of “standard” language 
usage that contributes to the above perceptions is heavily reinforced in the social sphere 
in education, the media, and the corporate world. Findings regarding language 
discrimination are also significant because the process has been correlated with poor 
physical health outcomes for immigrants in the US (over and above outcomes caused by 
racial discrimination) (Yoo, et al., 2009) as well as poor mental health outcomes for 
soviet immigrants (Aroian, et al., 1998).
Research also shows that language is a way to define the group identity and that 
discrimination based on language may be facilitated by identification with a particular 
language group (Barker & Giles, 2004; Miller, 2010; Yzerbyt, Provost, & Corneille, 
2005). According to the Ethnolinguistic Identity Theory, identity groups are created 
around standard vs. non-standard speakers. The standard speakers are granted a higher 
status than non-standard speakers (Giles & Coupland, 1991). Barker and Giles (2004) 
found that among English speaking Americans, group identity based on language had a 
positive relationship with support for policies excluding Spanish from official public
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use. Yzerbyt et al. (2005) found that group categorizations translated into linguistic 
stereotypes which then elicited discrimination on warmth and competence. Importantly, 
these linguistic stereotypes and warmth and competence judgements were not held by a 
third party group. This suggests that groups with meaningful inter-group relationships 
perceive linguistic differences that may not objectively exist.
Taken together, the above published research suggests that language ability and 
use of standard language is grounds for social identification and social labeling in 
identity terms. Like any social identity, identification on the basis of language can 
result in discrimination. In fact, self-identification as a person with low-level language 
proficiency has been correlated with perceived discrimination (Aroian, et al., 1998). To 
the extent that perceived discrimination is a sign of discriminatory behavior or attitudes, 
the Aroian et al. (1998) study suggests that identification based on language can lead to 
discriminatory behavior towards an out-group. Study 3 involves the attribution of 
examples of both high and low language proficiency to in-group and out-group 
members. Following Leyens (2000b), Study 3 hypothesized that one way 
infrahumanization might be exhibited would be in attribution of low level language 
proficiency to the out-group and high level language proficiency to the in-group.
Study 3 Hypotheses
In Studies 1 and 2, infrahumanization was not observed using an emotion 
attribution measure. This is despite the fact that the studies assessed an inter-group 
context in which infrahumanization has been exhibited in countries outside of Australia. 
But it cannot be concluded definitively that infrahumanization was not occurring, only 
that it was not observed. The infrahumanization measure in Studies 1 and 2 was an 
explicit measure of primary and secondary emotion attribution used in much of the 
previous work in Europe. It could be the case that in Australia, and/or when dealing 
with certain groups, language and intelligence are the domains in which groups are
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infrahumanized. Therefore, Study 3 includes a measure of language attribution, as 
well as of emotion attribution, to see if infrahumanization would be exhibited in either 
of these two domains of humanness. It is possible that perceptions of language 
proficiency may also include an element of perceived intelligence, the third uniquely 
human attribute, but Study 3 will only explicitly test language and emotion attribution.
Study 3 asked group members to read several brief statements of varying 
language competency (two high-level and two low-level) and attribute them to an in­
group or out-group author. Participants then completed a section on primary and 
secondary emotion attribution for in-group or out-group members. As in previous 
studies, greater secondary emotions attributed to the in-group than the out-group would 
indicate infrahumanization of the out-group. With the new measure, attribution of high 
language proficiency to the in-group and low language proficiency to the out-group 
would also exhibit infrahumanization. According to the claim that humanness can be 
denied in any or all of the three domains (language, intelligence, secondary emotions), 
finding the infrahumanization pattern in either or both measures would indicate 
infrahumanization.
The first hypothesis was that participants identifying themselves as Brumbies 
(local rugby team) fans would infrahumanize the Waratahs (out-of-state team) fans on 
the emotion measure (H.3.1). Secondly, Brumbies fans were expected to infrahumanize 
Waratahs fans on the language measure by attributing to them less gifted language 
ability than the Brumbies fans (H.3.2). I specifically chose the sporting inter-group 
context in order to test the language attribution hypothesis. Many inter-group contexts 
(e.g., social class, nationality, disability, gender, race) have implicit stereotypes of 
language and intelligence (Chang & Demyan, 2007; Kanazawa & Kovar, 2004; 
Kleinfeld, 1973; Martens, Johns, Greenber, & Schimel, 2006; May, 2002; Petrasso, 
2010; Spencer & Castano, 2007). Therefore, language based discrimination between
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the two groups in those contexts could be either infrahumanization or stereotyping.
It would not be possible to separate the two. I could not find published studies 
describing stereotypes based on language or intelligence for sports fans. Therefore, it is 
more likely that detecting differences in attribution of language competency between 
the sports fan groups would be indicating infrahumanization in particular, and not a 
general literacy stereotype.
Finally, I did not make a prediction regarding the correlation between the two 
measures. With no precedent in the previous literature, it was unclear whether to expect 
positive correlation between infrahumanization on the emotion attribution measure and 
infrahumanization on the language proficiency measure. If the measures were 
positively correlated, this would indicate that infrahumanization is generalized, and 
denial of humanness in one domain carries over to other domains. If the measures were 
not correlated, this would indicate that infrahumanization can occur in a single domain 
of humanness, and that infrahumanization cannot be fully assessed without measuring 
all three domains.
Methods
Fan Reviews Pilot
To create the language attribution section of the study, I conducted a pilot test of 
four reviews of a Brumbies vs. Waratahs match. Four researchers, not otherwise 
involved with this thesis, were asked to write a brief review of a two-minute clip of a 
Brumbies vs. Waratahs game. Two were asked to write at a high language proficiency 
level and two were asked to write at a low language proficiency level. All were asked 
to write the review to be as neutral and unbiased as possible between the two teams. 
These reviews were then pilot tested with a sample of 20 people. Participants were 
asked to rate each of the four reviews on language proficiency on a scale from 1 (low 
proficiency) to 7 (high proficiency). Language proficiency was defined in the
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instructions of the pilot as “level of vocabulary, grammar, expression, figurative 
language, etc.” Participants were also asked to “Please indicate on the scale if you think 
the writer was a fan of the Brumbies (1), neither team (4) or Waratahs (7).” This 
measure would indicate the extent to which the researchers were successful in writing 
unbiased reviews. It was essential that the reviews be unbiased so the attribution of 
reviews to fans of either team in the main study would be based on language, not bias in 
the review.
In the pilot, I needed to evaluate the level of language proficiency and the 
presence of bias of each review. I first evaluated level of language proficiency by t-tests 
between proficiency measures and the scale midpoint. I took the mean of the language 
proficiency ratings of the two high-level reviews (A/=5.22, 5!D=1.13) and it was found 
to be significantly higher than the scale midpoint of four (7[19]=2.49,/?<.05). I took the 
mean of the ratings of the two low-level reviews (A/=2.42, SD=.86) and found them to 
be significantly lower than the scale midpoint (/[19]=3.23,/?<.05). T-tests were 
conducted between the mean rating of each review and the overall mean of the bias 
measure (A/=3.40) as a measure of whether the review was biased for either team. This 
was to test if any of the reviews were perceived as biased towards the Waratahs or the 
Brumbies. No significant differences were found for either of the two high level 
reviews (Mhighi=3.00, /highi[ 19]=.816,/?>.05; Mhigh2=3.50, /high2[ 19]=.204,/?>.05) and the 
overall mean, or the two low level reviews (M/ovv/=3.33, //ovv/[19]=.143,p>.05; 
M«w2=3.78, r/OM2[19]=.776,/?>.05) and the overall mean. The variance for the high level 
reviews was .74. The variance for the low level reviews was .42. Therefore, I 
concluded that all four reviews were rated at their intended level of language 
proficiency and as not favouring either team.
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Participants
Data were collected from 232 participants (103 male, 127 female, 2 missing, 
average age 27.16). Data were gathered in two settings. One hundred, fifty participants 
were undergraduate students at Australian National University. These participants were 
recruited through an advertisement on their course website and they took part in the 
study for partial course credit. Eighty-two participants were spectators at a rugby match 
at Canberra Stadium in Canberra, ACT. Participants from this second sample were 
approached while waiting in their seats before the game and asked to fill out a 10 
minute questionnaire in which they would rate game reviews written by rugby fans. 
Participation at the match was voluntary and participants in the spectator sample were 
not compensated.
Materials and Design
To analyze the data, a 2 (level of emotion: primary/secondary) x 2 (valence of 
emotion: primary/secondary) x 2 (language proficiency: high/low) x 2 (team rated: 
BrumbiesAVaratahs) x 2(sample: student/game fan) ANOVA was run. Each participant 
was assigned to one of two between-participants conditions rating either the Brumbies 
or Waratahs on emotion scales. This and the sample were the two between-subjects 
variables. The remaining three variables of level of emotion, valence of emotion, and 
language proficiency were within-subjects. There were no effects based on the sample 
variable, so it was removed from the analysis and a new analysis was run.
The questionnaire contained six parts. Part 1 was a measure of identification 
with the Australian Capital Territory (ACT). The ACT is the territory represented by 
the Brumbies rugby team and residency in the territory would be a major factor in 
deciding to be a fan of the Brumbies as opposed to another team. The measure 
contained five items asking details of the participants’ duration of residence, family 
history, and opinions of the ACT including, “Do you live in the ACT?” and “If yes,
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how many years have you lived in Canberra?” While the set of questions was a 
measure of identification, I hoped that it would also act as a manipulation of 
identification with the ACT. The questions asked were designed to elicit identification. 
For example, I asked, “To what extent do you consider the ACT/Canberra to be 
“home?” as opposed to, “Where do you consider home to be?” The aim was that, even 
if participants did not follow rugby closely, they would be reminded that, as residents of 
the ACT, the Brumbies are “their” team, and this would enhance identification with the 
Brumbies.
Part 2 was the second identification measure, this time of identification as a fan 
of the Brumbies rugby team. Again the aim was to use the items to measure 
identification but also to enhance identification with the Brumbies. It asked participants 
questions on their game attendance, television viewing, enjoyment of the sport, and 
team allegiance. Questions included items such as, “How often do you watch rugby 
union on television?” and “If you had to choose a favourite rugby union team, would it 
be the ACT Brumbies?” Again, the aim was to enhance identification with the team 
through directive questioning.
Part 3 began with a short description of the Brumbies’ successful history as a 
club. This was designed to evoke pride in the team and increase identification. At this 
point, the methods between the two samples varied slightly. Participants from the 
university sample watched a short video clip of highlights of a rugby game between 
their home team, the Brumbies, and a rival team, the Waratahs. The clip showed the 
home team (Brumbies) scoring several tries. The video was used to make salient the 
sport context and again, enhance identification as a fan. In the stadium sample, 
participants were not shown the clip. However, their attendance at the Brumbies match 
(awaiting the match to begin, often dressed in Brumbies team colours) was expected to
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create equally (if not greater) salient fan identification as the ANU sample who 
watched the video clip.
Part 4 presented the four fan reviews described above, and questions for the 
language attribution variable. Participants were told that fans of both the Brumbies and 
the Waratahs were asked to write unbiased, impartial reviews of a game between the 
Brumbies and the Waratahs. University sample fans were told the game was 
specifically the portion of the match they had just viewed. All participants were then 
told that it was their job to see if they could detect of which team the writer was a fan 
through any implicit bias in the reviews. Participants were then asked to read what was 
ostensibly a selection of four of these reviews. After each review, they were asked to 
answer two questions concerning the authorship of the review. The first question asked 
them to rate “Which team did the writer prefer?” on a 7 point scale from 1 (a Brumbies 
fan), to 7 (a Waratahs fan). Participants were then given a forced-choice question that 
asked, “If you had to choose, would you say the writer was a fan of?” and then they 
were asked to circle if the author was a Brumbies or Waratahs fan. This forced choice 
question was included in case participants chose the scale midpoint of four in the first 
question. In this section, the order of presentation of the four reviews were 
counterbalanced in a 4-way Latin square design.
Part 5 contained the measures for the between-subjects (team rated: 
Brumbies/Waratahs) emotion attribution variable. Fans were asked to picture a fan of 
the Brumbies (Waratahs). They were given a list of two sets (one positive and one 
negative) of 10 emotions. Emotions were selected for valence and level based upon the 
work of Demoulin et al. (2004a). There were five primary positive, five primary 
negative, five secondary positive and five secondary negative emotions. For the 10 
positive emotions, participants were asked to rate the extent to which they believed the 
emotions would be felt by a fan of the Brumbies (Waratahs) when their team wins a
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match, on a scale from 1 (just a little) through 7 (quite a lot). For the 10 negative 
emotions, participants were asked to rate the extent to which they believed the emotions 
would be felt by a fan of the Brumbies (Waratahs) when their team loses a match, also 
on a scale of 1 (just a little) through 7 (quite a lot). Presentation of the positive and 
negative emotion sets were counterbalanced. Finally, in Part 6, each participant was 
asked several demographic questions including sex and age. When they had finished 
the questionnaire, participants were thanked and debriefed on the purpose of the study.
Table 7.1
Study 3, 20 emotion words used in questionnaire with mean valence 
(MV)_________________________
Positive Negative
Primary Secondary Primary Secondary
pleasure optimism pain humiliation
affection hope suffering shame
enjoyment passion anger resentment
excitement elation irritation disgust
happiness joy sadness disenchantment
MV- 6.54 MV- 6.1 M V-2.21 MV- 2.23
Results
One hundred forty participants (71 male, 69 female, mean age 29.09) from both 
samples nominated their favourite team as “Brumbies” when asked in Part 2 of the 
study. Only these participants were included in the analysis so that all participants 
included were identifying with the Brumby fan in-group. Of these, 69 rated emotions 
for Brumbies fans and 71 rated emotions for Waratahs fans.
Emotion Ratings
I first created a variable of fan identification that would separate the sample into 
high identifiers and low identifiers with the Brumbies team. I chose to base this on the 
ratings on the question “Compared with other teams, how much do you like the ACT 
Brumbies?” I did a median split, with scores above the median considered high
identifiers and scores below the median considered low identifiers.
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A 5-way mixed ANOVA was conducted with team rated, sample, and 
identification as the between-subjects variables and level of emotion and valence of 
emotion as within-subjects variables. There were no significant effects of the sample 
variable so it was removed and the 4-way mixed ANOVA was run.
There was a main effect for emotion level, with primary emotions (M= 5.02,
SD=0.99) attributed more overall to both groups than secondary emotions (M= 4.59, 
STK094), F(l,136)=64.38, /?<.001. There was a main effect for valence, with positive 
emotions (M=5.83, SD=0.94) being ascribed more to both groups than negative 
emotions (M=3.78, S!D=1.41), F(l,136)=225.78, /?<.001. There was also a two-way 
interaction effect for emotion valence by emotion level F(l,136)=12.36, p=.001. There 
was a very small difference between positive primary (M=5.95, SD= 1.06) and positive 
secondary emotions (M= 5.71, SD=\ .06), but higher ratings of negative primary 
(M= 4.09, SD=\ .42) than negative secondary emotions (M=3.48, SD=\.54).
In the emotion measure, there was no support for the hypothesis that Brumbies 
fans would infrahumanize Waratahs fans. There was a significant two-way interaction 
between level of emotion and team rated, but the pattern was opposite to what would 
have indicated infrahumanization, F(l,136)= 4.18,/?<.05. Figure 7.1 shows this 
interaction pattern. Whereas Waratahs fans were attributed slightly less primary 
emotions (M=4.99, SD=1.42) than Brumbies fans (M=5.04, SD=1.42), they were 
attributed more secondary emotions (M= 4.68, SD=1.30) than Brumbies fans (M=4.51, 
SD=1.30). There were no further effects for emotion ratings, including the
identification variable.
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Brumbies
Waratahs
SecondaryPrimary
Figure 7.1. Two-way group by level interaction that is opposite of infrahumanization 
with less secondary emotions attributed to the in-group than the out-group.
Language Ratings
To analyse the ratings of the high and low language proficiency fan reviews, I 
created a variable for language proficiency that reflected to which team participants 
attributed the combined two high level reviews and to which team they attributed the 
combined two low level reviews. To do this, I took the mean ratings for the two high 
level reviews as ratings of high proficiency and the mean for the two low level reviews 
as low proficiency. As a reminder, ratings of 1 were attributions of the review to a 
Brumbies fan and ratings of 7 were attributions to a Waratahs fan. Correlations 
between the high level reviews were significant (r= .18,/?<.01), however, correlations 
for the two low level reviews were not (r=. 11,/?>.05). Certainly the lack of correlation 
between the two low level reviews is problematic, and the analysis of the data must take 
this into consideration. Importantly, neither of the low-level reviews correlated with 
either of the high-level reviews. Therefore, I went ahead with the data we had gathered, 
and conducted a 2 (fan identification: high/low) x 2 (language proficiency: high/low) 
mixed ANOVA with fan identification as between-subjects and language proficiency 
reviews as within-subjects.
There was a main effect for language proficiency, with low level proficiency 
(A/=3.67, S!D=1.18) being rated higher (Waratahs) than high level proficiency reviews 
(M= 2.93, SZ)=1.18), F (l, 138) = 28.83,p<.001. This means that, overall, low level 
reviews were attributed more towards the Waratahs and high level reviews were 
attributed more towards the Brumbies. This overall finding indicates that the sample 
(who all rated the Brumbies as their favourite team) attributed high level language to in­
group fans and low level language to out-group fans. As this is effect shows 
differentiation between the in-group and out-group on a humanness dimension 
(language), I consider this effect to be infrahumanization based on language 
proficiency.
The two-way interaction of fan identification and language proficiency was 
marginally significant, F(l,138)=3.03,/?=.08. The level of fan identification marginally 
interacted with language proficiency attributions in a way that would suggest high 
identifiers exhibited more infrahumanization. There was no difference in the low level 
reviews between high-identifiers (M= 3.69, SD=1.65) and low identifiers (A/=3.65,
SD=\.77). But for high language proficiency reviews, high identifiers rated high level 
reviews lower (more towards the Brumbies) (M=2.72, SZ)=1.65) than low identifiers
159
(M=3.15,S£>=1.65).
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Low identifiers
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Low level reviews High level reviews
Figure 7.2. Identification by proficiency attribution interaction showing low identifiers 
attributing high-level reviews more to the out-group and high identifiers attributing high 
level reviews more to the in-group.
Discussion
Infrahumanization by Emotion Attribution
As in Studies 1 and 2, in Study 3 there was not an infrahumanization effect 
between the in-group and the out-group in the emotion dimension of humanness. 
Instead, the pattern observed was lower levels of attributions of secondary (uniquely 
human) emotions to the in-group than to the out-group. Therefore H.3.1 was not 
supported. There are several possibilities of why this was the case.
While two previously published studies have observed infrahumanization in a 
sporting fan context, in both cases, the team contexts were also international. Gaunt et 
al. (2005) sampled Belgian fans in which the in-group was Belgian fans and the out­
group was Turkish fans. Martin et al. (2008) sampled Scottish children in which 
Scottish fans as the in-group and English fans as the out-group. It may be that results in 
these studies were picking up more on the inter-group context of ethnicity and 
nationality, rather than competing sports teams. In that sense, these studies did not use 
a different inter-group context than those in the bulk of the literature, which, as I have 
observed, mostly find infrahumanization in an inter-group context of nationality or
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ethnicity. Therefore, in those two studies, infrahumanization may not have been 
observed in a sporting context, but rather in another international context. In retrospect, 
I may not have been really replicating the inter-group context used in the above two 
sports studies as I had intended.
Another possibility comes from the work of Gaunt et al. (2005). In that study, 
the researchers first measured Belgians’ ratings of Turkish and Belgian fans 
immediately after a match, and then three days later. Immediately after the game, the 
ratings of the two sets of fans did not differ on secondary emotions. Therefore, they did 
not observe infrahumanization in the sampling directly after the emotional event.
An infrahumanization pattern did emerge when participants were asked to rate 
the emotions that in-group and out-group fans would experience three days after the 
game. Therefore, infrahumanization was observed when there was distance from the 
key emotional event. Participants were thus likely to be able to imagine that an out­
group would experience secondary emotion immediately after an important event. 
However, they did not attribute those uniquely human emotions to the out-group under 
less emotional circumstances. The instructions in the present study were to imagine the 
emotions of the in-group or out-group “when their team wins(loses) a match.” It is 
possible that participants in Study 3 could imagine out-group members experiencing 
secondary emotions in the context of an emotion generating match. It is unknown if 
their ratings of the out-group outside of the context of an emotional event would 
indicate infrahumanization.
Another possible explanation for the results observed in Studies 1 -3 is that, 
while I believe that infrahumanization is likely to be common to most, if not all 
cultures, perhaps the mechanisms by which it is experienced are not. That is, maybe in 
Australia, infrahumanization is not exhibited in the implicit attribution of primary and
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secondary emotions. Perhaps it is exhibited in other ways such as attribution of 
language and competence.
The final possibility, which was mentioned in Studies 1 and 2, is that the inter­
group contexts used in Studies 1 -3 did not have the necessary conditions for 
infrahumanization to occur. However, this explanation cannot be verified as the exact 
conditions that are necessary to elicit infrahumanization have yet to be identified in the 
literature.
Infrahumanization by Language Attribution
As this is the first time that language has been measured as an indicator of 
infrahumanization, there was no precedent for an operational definition of 
infrahumanization with this measure. For this study, I defined infrahumanization as a 
greater attribution of high level language ability to the in-group than the out-group. 
According to this definition, analysis of participants’ ratings of the fan reviews show 
that infrahumanization was occurring in terms of language attribution. There was an 
overall main effect in which the in-group was attributed higher language skills than the 
out-group. There was also a marginal interaction effect in which participants 
identifying highly as Brumbies fans attributed higher language skills to the in-group 
relative to the out-group to a greater extent than did lower identifying participants. To 
the extent that language is considered an aspect that makes humans unique from 
animals, these findings suggest denial of the Waratah fans out-group equal humanness 
relative to in-group Brumbies fans by in-group members. Therefore, H.3.2 was 
supported.
However, because other studies have not measured infrahumanization in more 
than one domain of humanness (secondary emotions, language, and competence) there 
is not a precedent for when there is greater attribution of humanness to the in-group in 
only one domain but not another. Should this also be considered infrahumanization?
Again, I would argue that infrahumanization in any domain of humanness is an 
indicator that infrahumanization is occurring, as it has been described as the subtle 
denial of humanness to an out-group compared with an in-group (Vaes, et al., 2003).
However, this poses a methodological challenge. If the measures of humanness 
by emotion and language arc not necessarily correlated, this indicates that 
infrahumanization can occur in a single domain of humanness. In Study 3, this was 
observed in that infrahumanization occurred in one domain of humanness (language) 
and not another (emotion). It could be argued, then, that in measuring 
infrahumanization, it cannot be concluded that infrahumanization is not occurring 
without measuring all three domains of humanness. Indeed, the point has been made 
that all aspects of humanness are necessary and none is sufficient to grant full 
humanness to a human group (Vaes, et al., 2003). If this is the case, then the results of 
Studies 1 and 2 cannot rule out the possible expression of infrahumanization because 
they only measured infrahumanization in one dimension. This issue has not been 
addressed in the literature because nearly all of the published work has found the effect 
with the emotion attribution measure. Therefore, the denial of humanness in one 
dimension was sufficient to claim infrahumanization had occurred.
But the present study raises the question, if three measures are required to 
eliminate the possibility that infrahumanization is being expressed, to what extent is 
either of those three measures meaningful or informative? Instead, as 
infrahumanization has only been measured thus far in terms of uniquely human 
emotions, perhaps it cannot be claimed as a measure of humanness more generally. I 
see this as a relevant question for the field, but not one that could reasonably be 
addressed in this thesis. Therefore, in Study 4 ,1 returned to measuring
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infrahumanization in emotion attribution and did not continue with measurement of
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language attribution. I focused on trying to find the infrahumanization effect by 
emotion attribution in an Australian sample.
Conclusion
After gathering data from the first three studies, I had the opportunity to present 
this work at an international conference with Jacques-Philippe Leyens and other 
infrahumanization researchers as attendees. I presented possible reasons why I had not 
been able to find infrahumanization in the three contexts in Australia including those 
mentioned above.
It was pointed out by the audience at that conference that the measures used in 
my studies were similar to those used in some of the previous studies but different to 
others. While this research had participants rate emotions with continuous data on a 
scale from 1 to 7, some of the previous work had asked participants to select emotions 
from a list. That is, the data were categorical and, rather than being rated on a scale, 
emotion words were either selected or not selected. It was recommended to try altering 
my measurement techniques to include selection techniques before making any 
conclusions about the reasons for the lack of finding the effect.
I considered this suggestion in designing my next study. I returned to the 
literature and confirmed that I had chosen the rating task based on previous work that 
had used rating scales of emotions to measure infrahumanization (Castano & Giner- 
Sorolla, 2006; Cehajic, et al., 2009; Costello & Hodson, 2010; Cuddy, et al., 2007b; 
DeLuca-McLean & Castano, 2009; Demoulin, et al., 2008; Gaunt, et al., 2005; Martin, 
et al., 2008; Vaes & Paladino, 2010b). Still, I took the suggestion on measurement 
issues into Study 4.
Study 4 again tests the infrahumanization effect with emotion attribution, but 
this time using both rating and selection measures. I did not expect to find differences 
between the two measures because the literature had found the effect with both
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measures. But I included both measures for two reasons. Firstly, I thought it would 
help my research to be received better by an international audience and reviewers. 
Secondly, I thought it important to evaluate the potential outcome that the two measures 
would yield different results. If the effect was so sensitive as to only be detected by one 
measure and not another, it would not reflect well on the robustness of the effect or on 
the measurement tools most commonly used.
Study 4
Previously published research on infrahumanization has consistently detected 
infrahumanization by secondary emotion attribution, both in explicit and implicit 
measures. The work of this thesis began with a goal of expanding the understanding of 
the necessary and sufficient conditions needed to evoke infrahumanization. The aim 
was to measure infrahumanization with inter-group contexts including, but not limited 
to, nationality and ethnicity, which have been the focus of most published studies 
(Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Cortes, et al., 2005; Demoulin, et al., 2004b; Leyens, 
et al., 2001; Vaes, et al., 2003). I expected that infrahumanization would be observed in 
similar inter-group contexts in an Australian sample, and that this might help to 
distinguish conditions necessary for infrahumanization to occur. However, the first 
three studies of this thesis, that used similar and novel group contexts, and similar 
methods, did not detect infrahumanization.
While the findings of these studies were not anticipated, the consistency of this 
finding across three studies with three different inter-group contexts is an interesting 
effect in itself. At this point, there are three questions to be answered in the thesis. The 
first is whether infrahumanization by secondary emotion attribution occurs with an 
Australian sample. The second is whether infrahumanization by emotion attribution 
occurs outside of nationality and ethnicity in any country. This had support in
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Demoulin et al. (2009a) but it should be replicated. Finally, the third was, what are 
the necessary and sufficient conditions needed to induce infrahumanization?
It is clear that the inter-group contexts used in Studies 1 -3 were lacking the 
necessary and sufficient conditions to elicit infrahumanization by emotion attribution. 
But there was still the question of what the inter-group contexts were lacking, despite 
being seemingly similar to those used in past research. It was apparent that it was not 
merely the inter-group categories that were influencing infrahumanization. If that were 
the case then at least Study 1 or 2, which replicated the category of nationality used in 
previous research, should have revealed infrahumanization. Therefore, I hypothesize 
that it is the specific characteristics or meanings attached to the group that influence 
infrahumanization. That is, group members do not infrahumanize an out-group based 
on the category alone. If that were true, I would have observed infrahumanization in a 
nationality context. Rather, they infrahumanize on the basis of the meaning of the 
category in context.
So, infrahumanization could be based on the characteristics of the inter-group 
relationship such as identity and conflict, as has been hypothesized. But there has not 
been much success in analyzing these necessary and sufficient conditions in past 
published research. A third possibility is that it is the meanings made of the inter-group 
relationship that elicit an infrahumanization response to the out-group. That is, a 
complex interplay of the history, the current status of the inter-group relationship, and 
also the interplay of the characteristics of the nature of the relationship affect 
infrahumanization. So, for one group it might be a position of low power mixed with 
high economic threat that causes infrahumanization. For another group it might be a 
high status position, low threat, low conflict but a history of high prejudice. The picture 
that is, thus, beginning to form of infrahumanization is that there is a complex interplay
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of inter-group characteristics that affect a group’s view of the humanness of a 
relevant out-group.
Study 4 continued to look for an inter-group context that would evoke 
infrahumanization by secondary emotion attribution in an Australian sample. While it 
was somewhat informative to find inter-group contexts that do not induce 
infrahumanization, as in Studies 1 -3, it was unclear in these studies exactly what 
element of the meanings made out of the inter-group context which was lacking. The 
goal in Study 4 was still to find an inter-group context in which infrahumanization 
would occur, so that this context and the meanings attached to it could be further 
analysed for what aspects were necessary for infrahumanization to occur.
Study 4 manipulated two inter-group characteristics: the nationality and morality 
of the target. It also used a context in which the in-group and out-group were in 
competition with each other. The study was conducted during the week following the 
closing ceremony of the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, China. The two targets who 
were being rated were either an Australian or Russian Olympic swimmer who had either 
competed morally or immorally by using or abstaining from use of performance 
enhancing drugs. The timing of the study was chosen to be synchronized with the 
completion of the Olympics. This was an attempt to make the inter-group context of 
competing athletes from the participant’s own nation and another nation particularly 
salient. The study was also conducted during the 2008 conflict between Georgia and 
Russia, where the Australian government and many Western foreign powers were 
sympathetic to Georgia. For this reason, Russia was picked for the out-group 
nationality, again to increase a sense of inter-group conflict.
Nationality had provided the basis of an inter-group context in Studies 1 and 2. 
The characteristic of the inter-group context which was unique to this study was the 
element of morality of the target. Both theoretical and experimental evidence suggest
168
that the lack of perceived morality of an out-group results in reduced perception of 
that out-group’s humanness. Theoretically, as was previously described in the section 
on moral exclusion, placing an out-group outside of one’s moral community results in 
the ability to discriminate against, and in other ways mistreat, the out-group (Opotow, 
1990, 1995,2001b). Infrahumanization has been shown to excuse such mistreatment 
(Castano, 2008; Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006). And according to Haslam (2006), 
those who commit immoral acts are placed outside of our moral circle and 
dehumanized.
Experimentally, Esses, Veenvliet, Hodson and Mihic (2008) find that to the 
degree to which a group is described as immoral by violating proper procedures, 
members are more likely to be seen as less human. In a study of the morality of 
animals, it was only those animals that are used for food that were placed outside the 
realm of moral concern (Loughnan, Haslam, & Bastian, 2010) This further shows that 
groups that are not in people’s larger moral group are those that can be mistreated 
compared to groups that are inside the moral group. Based on this research, morality or 
lack of morality can be seen as one particular characteristic of the inter-group context 
that might affect the way an out-group would be treated, specifically due to its 
humanness. I hypothesized that perceived immorality of the out-group might be one 
factor that determines whether an out-group is infrahumanized or not. Therefore, Study 
4 created a group context that highlighted morality as a distinguishing factor by 
providing details of an athlete’s moral or immoral behaviour relating to use of illegal 
performance enhancing drugs.
While, in the first two studies of this thesis, nationality as an inter-group context 
had not provided sufficient conditions to cause infrahumanization of the out-group in 
the Australian context, it was again included in Study 4 for two reasons. First, the 
nationality context has been used in much of the previous work on infrahumanization.
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The fact that nationality, as an inter-group context, did not result in 
infrahumanization in Studies 1 and 2 suggests that the particular inter-group contexts I 
had chosen do not cause infrahumanization. But while any form of nationality itself 
may not be a sufficient inter-group relationship, there are many specific inter-group 
relationships based on nationality, and I had only tested one -  Australians and 
immigrants. Indeed, there is incredible variability between the ways the histories 
between nations have shaped their current relationships. It is likely that there is some 
element(s) of the meaning of some specific nationality inter-group contexts that cause 
infrahumanization including implied morality, ethnocentrism, history of violence, 
current and past conflicts, degree of similarity of language or culture and others.
The second reason for using a nationality-based inter-group context was that 
previous research has shown that high in-group identification increases 
infrahumanization of an out-group (Demoulin, et al., 2004b). Because Study 4 used an 
Olympic context at a time when the Olympics had just finished, I suspected that, in this 
particular case, participants would highly identify with their nationality, perhaps more 
than at other times. Then, this increased identification might create conditions in that 
would evoke infrahumanization
The study employed a 2 (nationality: Australian/Russian) x 2 (morality: moral/ 
immoral) x 2 (emotion level: secondary/primary) x 2 (emotion valence: 
positive/negative) mixed design. Nationality and morality were between-subjects 
variables and emotion level and valence were within-subjects variables. The design was 
intended to create four (two by two) group contexts. Nationality is clearly a variable 
that creates an inter-group context. Based on the above research of Esses et al. (2008) 
and Loughnan et al. (2010), morality of the target was used as another inter-group 
context. That is, it was expected that a participant would perceive morality as a group
variable and identify with a moral “in-group” and see the target as either a fellow in­
group member of an out-group member depending on his moral or immoral behaviour.
Hypotheses
The infrahumanization hypothesis for this study was informed by the Crossed- 
Categorization Model (Crisp, Hewstone, & Cairns, 2001; Crisp, Walsh, & Hewstone, 
2006). The Crossed-Categorization Model gives insight into what patterns of inter­
group behaviour will occur when a target is both an in-group member by one 
categorization and an out-group member by another. In Study 4, participants were 
presented with two inter-group contexts of nationality and morality. In the vocabulary 
of the Crossed Categorization Model, participants either read about a double in-group 
member, one of two “mixed” group members, or a double out-group member. The 
double in-group member was the moral Australian. The mixed group members were 
the immoral Australian and the moral Russian athlete. The double out-group member 
was the immoral Russian athlete.
Research is unclear on whether crossed-categorization of an out-group member 
(out-group by a single categorization, out-group by two categorizations, or an out-group 
by one and not another categorization) affects in-group bias. Indeed studies have been 
inconsistent in showing that multiple categorization reduces discrimination (Crisp, 
Hewstone, & Rubin, 2001). One study that claims to overcome the methodological 
problems of previous studies found that there was bias against all three types of out­
groups described above, but the strongest bias against the double out-group (Crisp, 
Hewstone, & Rubin, 2001). This suggests that crossed-categorization does not reduce 
intergroup bias relative to simple categorization. In regards to Study 4, these findings 
suggest that the double out-group (immoral Russian) has the greatest chance of being
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infrahumanized.
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Regarding how crossed categorized group members will be seen, according 
to the model, positive affect, common categorization, and low perceived importance of 
the groups can moderate out-group bias and lead to mixed category members being 
judged in the same way as double in-group members (Crisp, et al., 2006). This informs 
Study 4 in that if participants were experiencing positive affect and/or low perceived 
importance of the out-groups, I would expect no infrahumanization of the mixed group.
Another aspect of the crossed categorization research that is informative to 
Study 4 is that categorizations can be either superordinate (e.g., race, gender, ethnicity, 
nationality) or subordinate (e.g., occupation, age, hobbies, personal tastes). In the case 
that there is a superordinate and a subordinate identity, superordinate categorizations 
have been found to be more likely to influence attitudes towards crossed categorized 
targets (Crisp, Hewstone, & Cairns, 2001). In the case of crossed categorizations of two 
superordinate categorizations, Crisp et al. (2001) found that only double out-group 
members were treated as out-group members. Mixed members were treated as in-group 
members.
As is evident in the above research, cross-categorization creates complex 
intergroup relationships. Based on the findings of Crisp et al. (2001), I hypothesized 
that in conditions in which a participant was rating the target who was an out-group 
member by both nationality and morality, the target would be infrahumanized 
(attributed with the least secondary emotions) (H.4.1). Making a hypothesis for the two 
conditions in which the target could be classified as an in-group member in one sense 
and an out-group member in another was more difficult. These groups were the Russian 
moral athlete and the Australian immoral athlete. For these conditions, it was unclear 
whether a cross-categorized group member would be infrahumanized. I could not 
predict affect or importance of the two social categories, two factors that have been 
shown to reduce intergroup bias for cross-categorized targets. For this reason, I made
172
no prediction for the crossed-categories. I predicted that the double-in-group 
member would not be infrahumanized (H.4.2)
Methods
Participants
Two hundred, twenty-three participants were sampled (76 men, 143 women), 
with a mean age of 19.61. Participants were first year students at Australian National 
University who completed the questionnaire as part of an in-class laboratory lesson. 
Completing the questionnaire was part of class activity, but returning the survey to the 
researcher was voluntary. The questionnaire took approximately 15 minutes to 
complete. Afterwards, the participants were fully debriefed and the study was discussed 
in detail as part of the lesson.
Materials
Participants were given a questionnaire containing six parts. Part 1 included two 
measures, one of Australian identity and one of identification with moral values. The 
Australian identification measure included five items and was adapted from Doosje et 
al. (1995) (a = .95). Example items are: “I see myself as an Australian” and “I am 
pleased to be an Australian.” Participants responded on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The identification with moral values measure 
had six items and measured participants’ beliefs about cheating, specifically in reference 
to the Olympics (a = .83). It included measures such as, “Players who seek unfair 
advantage are violating the spirit of the games” and “Cheating is just another way of 
trying one’s best” (reverse coded). Responses were also indicated on a 7-point Likert 
scale with responses from 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree).
Part 2 provided the manipulation for the study. Information was presented as a 
screen capture of a CNN.com article about a 2004 Olympic athlete. Participants read 
that an Olympic swimmer from the 2004 games had recently come forward to tell the
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International Olympic Committee (IOC) about his experience with performance 
enhancing drugs. The content had been manipulated for four conditions for the 2 
(athlete’s nationality: Russian, Australian) x 2 (morality: moral, immoral) design. Half 
of participants in each of the country conditions read about a Russian swimmer, half 
read about an Australian swimmer. Half of participants read about an athlete who made 
a moral decision, half read about an athlete who made an immoral decision. In the 
immoral condition, the athlete said he knew taking performance enhancing drugs was a 
violation of IOC rules, but that winning was more important than fairness, and that he 
took the drugs. He was quoted as saying, “I knew it would be a violation [of IOC rules] 
but what was most important to me was winning. I place that above everything else.”
In the moral condition, the athlete reported that playing a fair game was most important, 
and he did not take the drugs. He was quoted as saying, “I knew it was a violation [of 
IOC rules] and what was most important to me was playing a fair game. I place that 
above everything else.” Part 3 was a free-response manipulation check that asked 
students to describe the article, specifically the nationality of the swimmer and the 
decision he had made regarding performance enhancing drugs.
Part 4 included two measures of emotion attribution to the Olympic athlete 
described after he made his decision to use/not use performance enhancing drugs. Two 
separate emotion measures were included at the suggestion of other researchers (in 
conversation) as previously described. So, Part 4 was divided into two sub-parts, each 
one with a different measure of emotions. Level and valence classification of the 
emotions was based on Demoulin et al. (2004a) as in previous studies. In this study, I 
used 40 emotion words, more than in previous studies. This methodological change 
was made to increase the opportunity to measure infrahumanization by providing more 
emotion words on which to make judgment. I took the 20 most primary and 20 most 
secondary emotions from the list provided by Demoulin et al. (2004a). Part A of the
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present study gave a list of 40 emotions, and asked participants to circle emotions 
that they thought best described the feelings of the athlete. According to instructions 
used in previous research, participants were instructed to choose as many emotions as 
they liked, but to “try not to pick too many” (Leyens, et al., 2001). Part B again 
presented the list of 40 emotions and asked participants to rate on a 7-point scale the 
degree to which the athlete felt each from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). The emotion 
rating task in Part A was recommended by infrahumanization colleagues and replicated 
methods in some published work (Paladino, et ah, 2004). The emotion rating task of 
Part B was the measure used in Studies 1-3 and in some other experiments that had 
found infrahumanization (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Cehajic, et ah, 2009; Costello 
& Hodson, 2010; Cuddy, et ah, 2007b; DeLuca-McLean & Castano, 2009; Demoulin, et 
ah, 2008; Gaunt, et ah, 2005; Martin, et ah, 2008; Tam, et ah, 2007; Vaes & Paladino, 
2010b).
Part 5 included items measuring demographics, attitudes towards the Olympics, 
and another set of manipulation checks. The attitudes towards the Olympics measure 
included three items (a = .93) and asked participants to rate on a scale from 1 (none at 
all) to 7 (very much), “How much interest do you have in the Olympics,” “How much 
to you enjoy watching the Olympics?” and “During the two weeks of the Olympics, 
how often do you watch the games?”
The manipulation checks assessed participants’ understanding of the key 
variables. The first question asked, “What country is the Athlete from?” with the 
possible responses “Australia” and “Russia”. The second question asked, “Did the 
athlete decide to take performance enhancing drugs?” with the possible responses of 
“yes” and “no.” The final manipulation check was, “Is the use of performance 
enhancing drugs cheating?” with the possible responses “yes” and “no.”
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Demographie questions included country of birth, citizenship, and country 
supported in the Olympics. These questions were asked because they were crucial 
components of the inter-group context. Participants not supporting Australia in the 
Olympics needed to be removed from the analysis because the study assumed the 
participants would be part of the Australian in-group. It was assumed that, in an 
Olympic context, participants that did not support Australia in the Olympics would not 
see Australians as their in-group.
Results
Three participants were excluded from analysis because they failed one of two 
manipulation checks of the details of the experiment. Sixty participants were excluded 
on the basis that they did not support Australia in the Olympic games and therefore 
would not see the Austalian in-group target as an in-group member. Therefore, there 
was a total of 160 participants (52 men, 108 women, mean age of 19.47).
Emotion Ratings
To analyze the emotion attribution and rating tasks, I took the mean of ratings 
for the emotions in each emotion category. Emotions contained within the four within 
subjects factors were primary positive (surprise, pleasure, affection, attraction, 
excitement, enjoyment, caring, calmness), primary negative (pain, fear, panic, fright, 
scariness, suffering, anger, fury, irritation, affliction, sadness, distress), secondary 
positive (love, elation, passion, sympathy, admiration, repentance, hope, nostalgia, 
optimism), and secondary negative (melancholy, disconsolate, disenchantment, gloomy, 
disgust, resentment, shame, remorse, embarrassment, guilt, humiliation).
The first analysis was a 2 (nationality: Australian/Russian) x 2 (morality: moral/ 
immoral) x 2 (emotion level: secondary/primary) x 2 (emotion valence: 
positive/negative) mixed ANOVA, with nationality and morality as between-subjects
176
factors and emotion level and emotion valence as within-subjects factors. Emotion 
variables were created by grouping emotions as described above.
There was a main effect for level of emotion rated, F( 1,156) = 54.21, p < .001. 
More secondary emotions (M = 3.17, SD = .65) were attributed to targets in general than 
primary emotions (M = 2.89, SD = .62). There was also a main effect for valence of 
emotion rated (F(l,156) = 35.77, p < .001), with participants attributing more negative 
emotions (M = 3.35, SD = .09) than positive emotions (M = 2.71, SD = .07) overall. 
These patterns are different from Study 3, which had the opposite effects. This is 
probably the result of the situational context being more serious and concerning legal 
issues rather than playing rugby.
There was an interaction between valence of emotion and morality of the target, 
F(l,156) = 32.38,/? < .001. Negative emotions (M=  3.80, SD = .125) were attributed to 
a greater degree, and positive (M= 2.57, SD = .10) emotions were attributed to a lesser 
degree to the immoral target. For the moral target, positive (M= 2.89, SD = .13) 
emotions were attributed to a slightly greater degree than negative (M = 2.86, SD = .10) 
emotions. I think, again, the effect was probably based on the circumstances in which 
the target was placed. The immoral target was publicly confessing to a crime and, 
therefore, was circumstantially likely to experience negative emotions to a greater 
extent than the target publicly denying having committed a crime. Likewise, the target 
who admitted to having committed a crime would experience positive emotions to a 
lesser extent than the target who publicly denied having committed a crime.
There was also a three-way interaction of level of emotions, valence of 
emotions, and morality of the target, F(l,156) = 5.46,/? < .05 shown in Figure 7.3. This 
pattern is infrahumanization qualified by valence. While the moral target was attributed 
positive secondary emotions (M = 2.95, SD =.09) to a slightly greater degree than the 
immoral target (M=2.71, SD =.09), the immoral target was attributed negative
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secondary emotions (M = 3.83, SD =.12) to a greater degree than the moral target (M  
=2.77, SD =.12). For the primary emotions, the immoral target was also attributed 
negative emotions (M= 3.49, SD =. 11) to a greater degree than the moral target (M
=2.65, SD =. 11) and the moral target (M =2.66, SD =. 10) to a greater degree than the 
immoral target (M=2.44, SD =.10) for positive emotions.
4
3.5 
3
2.5 
2
1.5 
1
Moral
“  “  “  Immoral
Positive Negative Positive Negative
Primary Secondary
Figure 7.3. Three-way interaction of morality, level and valence of emotion showing 
humanization of the out-group in negative secondary emotions.
As with previous studies in this thesis, the level of emotion by inter-group 
context interactions were non-significant. There was no level by morality of target 
interaction that would show infrahumanization in emotion rating measures for the 
immoral targets compared to the moral targets. (H.4.1).
There were no significant effects based on the nationality of the target (H.4.1).
Additional analyses were conducted including level of Australian identity of the 
participant, and level of identity as moral to see if an infrahumanization effect would 
emerge with identification taken into account. Identification as an Australian was 
calculated with participants scoring above the median on the five national identification 
measures considered high identifiers and participants scoring below the median 
considered low identifiers. Identification with morality was calculated with participants
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scoring above the median on the six morality measures considered high identifiers 
and participants scoring below the median considered low identifiers.
I wanted to see if level of identification would have an effect on 
infrahumanization. I analyzed the emotion variables in a 2 (Australian identity: 
high/low) x 2 (moral identity: high/low) x 2 (nationality: Australian/Russian) x 2 
(morality: moral/ immoral) x 2 (emotion level: secondary/primary) x 2 (emotion 
valence: positive/negative) mixed ANOVA with Australian identity, moral identity, 
nationality and morality as between-subjects factors and emotion level and valence as 
within-subjects factors. Results showed that there were no effects of infrahumanization 
for the emotion ratings measure with level of moral identity or nationality identity 
included in the analysis.
Emotion Selection
For assessing the emotion selection task, the analysis was again a 2 (nationality: 
Australian/Russian) x 2 (morality: moral/ immoral) x 2 (emotion level: 
secondary/primary) x 2 (emotion valence: positive/negative) mixed ANOVA, with 
nationality and morality as between-subjects factors and emotion level and valence as 
within-subjects factors. I first created four variables for the emotion selection variables. 
Emotion variables were scored as selection = 1 and non-selection = 0. I took the mean 
of the emotion selection values for emotions in each of the four categories described 
above. Emotion category values were the mean of each category and values were 
between 0 and 1. This was the process used by Paladino et al. (2004).
For the emotion selection task, there were both similarities and differences with 
the results of the emotion rating task. There was a main effect for emotion level in 
which more secondary emotions (M= .18, SD = .01) were attributed than primary 
emotions (M  = . 13, SD = .01), F( 1,156) = 13.94, p < .001. However, there was not a 
main effect for emotion valence as there was in the emotion rating task.
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There was the same interaction between emotion valence and morality,
F( 1,156) =5.77 p  <.05, as with the emotion rating task. Similar numbers of emotions 
were attributed to the moral target for positive (M=. 17 , SD =.02) and negative 
emotions (M=.16, SD =.02) and to the immoral targets for negative emotions (M=. 17, 
SD =.01). However, the immoral target was attributed significantly less positive 
emotions (M=.10 , SD = .01). This could, again, be the result of the circumstance of 
the immoral target having just confessed to a crime.
Finally, there was, again, a three-way interaction between level of emotion, 
valence of emotion, and morality of the target, F(l,156) =16.04,p  < .001, shown in 
Figure 7.4. The above valence by morality effect was being driven by the secondary 
emotions for the immoral target. The immoral target was attributed slightly more 
positive and negative (Mp0&=. 18, SD=.03; Mneg=.\ 1, SD=.01) primary emotions than the 
moral target (Mpos=.15, SD=.03; A/neg=.08, SZ)=.01). For secondary emotions, the moral 
in-group was attributed more positive emotions (A/pos=.20, SZ)=.02) than the immoral 
out-group (Mpos=.14, SD=.02) but the immoral out-group was attributed more negative 
secondary emotions (Mneg=.24, SD=.02) than the moral in-group (A/neg=.13, SD=.02). 
This is the opposite of the infrahumanization effect.
Moral
— — — Immoral
PositivePositive Negative Negative
SecondaryPrimary
Figure 7.4. Three way morality by level by valence interaction for emotion selection 
showing humanization of the immoral out-group in negative secondary emotions.
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As with the emotion rating task, there was no morality by level of emotion 
interaction. With the emotion selection task, there were, again, no significant effects 
based on the nationality of the target.
Again, levels of identification with nationality and morality were included in an 
analysis. Identification variables were the same as before, calculated with participants 
scoring above the median on the nationality and morality scales considered high 
identifiers and participants scoring below the median considered low identifiers. This 
analysis was a 2 (Australian identity: high/low) x 2 (moral identity: high/low) x 2 
(nationality: Australian/Russian) x 2 (morality: moral/ immoral) x 2 (emotion level: 
secondary/primary) x 2 (emotion valence: positive/negative) mixed ANOVA with 
Australian identity, moral identity, nationality and morality as between-subjects factors 
and emotion level and valence as within-subjects factors.
There was one interaction of level of moral identification (as indicated by the 
averaged six-item measure of moral identification) with valence and morality of the 
target, F(l,156) =5.76,/? <.05. This interaction shows that the valence by morality 
interaction was driven by high moral identifiers. In this interaction, low moral 
identifiers attributed more positive emotions to both the moral (Mpos=. 14, SD=.03; 
Mneg=.10, SD=.02) and the immoral (Mvos=A7, SD=.03; Mneg=.14, SD=.02) target. Only 
the high moral identifiers differentiated the immoral target on valence of emotion, 
attributing more negative emotion to the immoral target (Mpos=A5, SD=.03; Mneg=.21, 
SD=.02) and attributing more positive than negative emotions to the moral target 
(MPos=.21, SD=.03; Mneg=.l 1, SD=.02). This shows more in-group favouritism by the 
high identifiers.
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Figure 7.5. Moral identification by morality of target by valence of emotion for 
emotion selection. High identifiers attribute more positive emotions to the in-group and 
more negative emotions to the out-group, whereas low identifiers do not differentiate.
Discussion
Infrahumanization
The study included two types of emotion attribution tasks that have been used in 
the literature: ratings and selection. In both of these tasks, I obtained results that did not 
indicate infrahumanization for either of the two group identities: nationality or morality. 
Neither nationality of the target nor morality of the target interacted with level of 
emotion attributed to the target in either of the two emotion measures. Therefore, 
neither the immoral nor the Russian targets were infrahumanized by emotion 
attribution.
It is unclear why this was the case. One possibility is that the results were due to 
the way the manipulation and the emotion attribution tasks were phrased. The 
manipulation was that the target had committed a moral or immoral act and was 
admitting to it in a public forum. The task asked participants to select emotions that 
they believed the target felt after making the decision to use or not use the performance 
enhancing drugs. It could be that, like in Study 3, the target could be attributed
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secondary emotions after an emotional event, but would not be attributed them in 
general.
The other possible explanation of the results is that they suggest that immorality 
attributed to an out-group is not a facet of the inter-group relationship that would be 
sufficient to cause infrahumanization. I cannot argue from the current data that 
enhanced immorality of the out-group may increase infrahumanization. It is possible 
that the morality manipulation in this study was not sufficient, or that there were other 
factors of the inter-group context that precluded infrahumanization such as admiration 
for Olympians. But there were two manipulation checks asking “Did the athlete use 
performance enhancing drugs?” and “Is the use of performance enhancing drugs 
cheating?” and all participants included in the analysis responded in the affirmative to 
these questions. So I can argue from the current data that knowledge of out-group 
immorality alone is not always a sufficient element of the inter-group relationship to 
cause the in-group to infrahumanize the out-group14.
I, also, did not observe infrahumanization in the nationality inter-group context. 
The mean of the identification as an Australian was 5.89, which is well above the scale 
midpoint of 4, suggesting that national identity was salient for the Australian 
participants in an Olympic context. Therefore, the data from this study, as well as 
Studies 1 and 2, suggest that difference in nationality in itself is also not a sufficient 
inter-group context for causing infrahumanization. Although infrahumanization has 
been frequently observed in contexts of differences in nationality, it seems that it is not
14 In a re-analysis of the study, a methodological error becomes apparent. The morality variable was 
manipulated on an inter-personal level, rather than inter-group. The literature clearly characterizes 
infrahumanization as an intergroup process rather than interpersonal, and what is true of 
interpersonal processes often does not hold true for intergroup processes and vice versa. Haslam, 
Bain, Douge, Lee, and Bastian (2005) have found interpersonal denial of human nature traits, but 
not human uniqueness traits. Indeed, if the participants in Study 4 had denied humanness qualities 
to the immoral target, there would not have been sufficient evidence to claim that an immoral out­
group had been infrahumanized. However, as there was no significant interaction between 
attribution of emotions and the manipulation of morality or nationality, no such claims were made. 
So while this is a weakness of Study 4, the results of the study are not problematic for the overall 
message of the thesis.
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nationality in itself that is the key variable. Rather it is likely to be the meaning 
made of that inter-group context which causes infrahumanization. That is, it is likely to 
be the particular inter-group characteristics that coincide with nationality that are 
driving the observed nationality group with infrahumanization interaction. It may be 
that given crossed categorization, morality was a more relevant inter-group context for 
discrimination as it was one in which the desire to positively differentiate (though not 
with infrahumanization, but with in-group favouritism) was higher than for the 
nationality inter-group context.
In-group Favouritism
There was an interaction of valence and the morality identity of the target for 
both measures. When all 40 emotions were rated, there were more negative emotions 
attributed to the immoral (out-group) target than the moral (in-group) target and more 
positive emotions attributed to the moral target than the immoral target. Likewise, 
when emotions were selected from a list, there were more positive emotions attributed 
to the moral (in-group) target than the immoral (out-group) target. This result can be 
interpreted as in-group favouritism, with positive emotions being attributed to the in­
group and negative emotions being attributed to the out-group.
At the same time, the result could also be attributed to the circumstances of the 
article written about the immoral target and the moral target and the differences in their 
experiences. The immoral target was admitting to having committed a crime, while the 
moral target was publicly revealing an honourable decision. Attributing negative 
emotions to the athlete who may be feeling ashamed and positive emotions to the 
athlete who may be feeling proud does not necessarily indicate in-group favouritism. 
However, there was some indication of in-group favouritism when the moral 
identification measure was taken into account. High identifiers showed a pattern of in­
group favouritism whereas the low identifiers did not. Therefore, while the results of
the valence by morality interactions are not necessarily in-group favouritism, the 
results can still support a claim that, despite not observing infrahumanization, some 
inter-group processes were at work.
Emotion Measures
In this study, two measures of emotion attribution were used to assess the extent 
to which primary and secondary emotions were attributed to the in-group and the out­
group. They have both been used in previous research that found an infrahumanization 
pattern of emotion attribution. Theoretically, these measures are measuring the same 
dimensions of in-group and out-group emotions. However, the effects found for each of 
these measures did not completely map on to each other. The results were the same for 
a main effect for emotion level, an interaction of emotion valence and morality, and a 
three-way interaction of emotion valence, morality, and emotion level. There were also 
no effects found on either measure for nationality. However, one effect (main effect for 
emotion valence) was found in the rating task and not in the selection task, and one 
effect (identification by emotion valence by morality) was found in the selection task 
and not the rating task. Overall, the measures were very similar in their descriptions of 
emotion attribution between the groups. Importantly, the results were the same for the 
infrahumanization interaction.
There was not a level by group rated interaction in either measure that would 
indicate infrahumanization in this study (i.e., morality of target by level of emotion or 
nationality of target by level of emotion). So in this study, both measures found no 
infrahumanization. However, the differences in other effects for the two measures (i.e., 
no main effect for emotion valence and no morality by level of emotion interaction) 
suggest that the measures are not always equivalent. It is possible that a study using 
both measures of emotion attribution would find infrahumanization for one measure and
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not the other. What would that result indicate for infrahumanization? If an effect is not
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sufficiently robust to be apparent in two similar measures, does it exist? Are the 
measures able to be used interchangeably? To attempt to investigate these questions 
further, Study 5 used both emotion rating and emotion selection tasks again.
Study 5
In previous studies, I have not seen a consistent pattern of emotion attribution 
indicating infrahumanization on both positive and negative secondary emotions with 
various inter-group contexts. Studies 3 and 4 particularly used inter-group contexts in 
which competition and conflict were elements, as inter-group conflict has been 
suspected to increase infrahumanization (Castano, Paladino, Coull, & Yzerbyt, 2002). 
However, infrahumanization was not found in these inter-group contexts. Study 5 had 
several important goals for the thesis. First, in Study 5 ,1 made one more attempt at 
creating an inter-group context that would elicit infrahumanization in an Australian 
context. I, again, increased the conflictual nature and strength of identification of the 
inter-group relationship. I believed that the lack of observation of infrahumanization in 
Studies 1-4 was not due to infrahumanization not being present in an Australian sample, 
but rather not being present in the particular inter-group contexts created within the 
study. I still did not feel that I could make any conclusions regarding the nature of 
infrahumanization, other than that it is dependent on the meanings made of the inter­
group context rather than the type of context itself. Still, the meanings and conditions 
necessary were unclear.
Study 5 used a group context that is known to have both high levels of group 
identification and high levels of inter-group competition. Participants were members of 
a residential college or “hall” (i.e. dorm) on the Australian National University campus 
called Bruce Hall. The out-group invoked was members of a different ANU campus 
college, John’s College. The two colleges have a history of rivalry in both official
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interhall activities such as sports and arts competitions as well as unofficial 
interactions that will be described below.
Each year, the halls compete in several sports competitions, such as distance 
running and orienteering, rugby, soccer, and softball. Arts competitions include choral 
and instrumental concerts, art shows, and theatre. With such a varied set of skills 
needed, a large portion of the residents are involved in these competitions. Throughout 
the academic year, points are allocated to each hall and at the end of the year one hall is 
awarded the winner of the interhall “shield.”
Off the sports field, there is little contact between the halls. Students mostly 
create friendship groups within their own hall, eat meals within their hall, and have 
holiday celebrations and events within the hall. Around campus, students wear shirts, 
pullovers, and other identifying clothing to show that they represent their university 
hall. Members of opposing halls even engage in antagonistic “drive by” behaviour in 
which students will honk their car horns and yell insults in front of the opposing hall’s 
building. It is evident from this behaviour that many students identify highly with their 
hall and feel competition or even conflict with the opposing hall. Though there are 
other halls on campus, the most predominant rivalry is between John’s College and 
Bruce Hall.
Similar to previous studies, Study 5 investigates perceptions of members of an 
out-group (Johns College residents) and an in-group by members of the in-group (Bruce 
Hall residents) in primary and secondary emotions in order to detect infrahumanization 
of the out-group. Using this inter-group context was important to the program of 
research in that it provided a different type of inter-group context. In Studies 1, 2, and 
4, the groups were not ones that are necessarily relevant to participants in their daily 
lives as university students. This inter-hall group was one with which they are faced on 
a daily basis. It was less abstract than those in previous studies of the thesis. It was a
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final attempt to analyze infrahumanization in the same way as previous published 
studies, with the assumption that it was possible to measure infrahumanization in an 
Australian sample with uniquely human emotions.
While I still was testing the same hypotheses as Studies 1-4,1 was less confident 
that I would find infrahumanization (based on previous results). For this reason, I 
included an additional element in Study 5. In this study, human nature traits and human 
uniqueness traits were also assessed as indicators of humanness attribution.
As described in the chapter on topics related to infrahumanization (Chapter 4), it 
has been found that human nature (HN) and human uniqueness (HU) traits are two 
additional indicators of the perceived humanness of an out-group (N. Haslam & Bain, 
2007; N. Haslam, et al., 2005; N. Haslam & Loughnan, 2008b; N. Haslam, et al.,
2008c). While HU traits indicate perceived likeness to animals, HN traits indicate 
perceived likeness to automata (Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). It has also been found that 
HN traits and HU traits are often not both attributed in the same pattern to a group.
That is, a group may not be granted or denied both HN and HU. Rather, the two types 
of traits can be attributed in a strategic or complimentary pattern, acknowledging certain 
strengths of the out-group while denying other traits (Bain, et al., 2009; Loughnan & 
Haslam, 2007). This demonstrates that the two are, indeed, separate constructs. For this 
reason, denial of HU is infrahumanization (comparison of humans with animals) and 
denial of HN is mechanistic dehumanization (comparison of humans with automata.)
While previous studies in the literature and this thesis have assessed 
infrahumanization by emotion attribution, measurement of HN and HU are not a 
complete departure. There are similarities between HN and HU measures and the 
secondary emotion attribution measures. Secondary emotions are an element of HU. 
Therefore, HU, but not HN, was being assessed in Studies 1 -4. Study 5 assessed HU 
with emotion attribution and trait attribution as well as HN by trait attribution. Using
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the HN trait measures was important in this study because of the particular 
characteristics of the groups involved. Johns College is a formidable competitor with 
Bruce Hall, often winning inter-hall competitions. For this reason, I expected that while 
Bruce Hall residents may not liken their out-group competitor to animals, with inferior 
mental capacity, moral sensibility, rationality, logic, and maturity. They may, instead, 
liken them to automata, with inferior emotional responsiveness, individuality, depth, 
and interpersonal warmth (N. Haslam, 2006). Hypothesis 1 (H.5.1) was that Bruce Hall 
residents would infrahumanize or dehumanize Johns College residents by one or a 
combination of humanness dimensions including secondary emotions, HU traits, and/or 
HN traits.
As with previous studies, Study 5 measured identification with the in-group. 
Identification is hypothesized to have a positive relationship with infrahumanization 
(Demoulin, et al., 2009b; Demoulin, et al., 2004b). Study 5 also attempted a quasi­
manipulation of identification within a longitudinal design. Participants included only 
first year residents. The questionnaire was first administered in orientation week to first 
year students who had only just arrived at Bruce Hall. This was intended to be a point 
of low identification. The second data collection period was seven weeks later when the 
students had had the opportunity to engage in interhall activities and become 
familiarized with inter-hall and intra-hall culture. Hypothesis 2 (H.5.2) was that 
participants would infrahumanize the out-group more at Time 2 than at Time 1 because 
of a positive correlation between identification and infrahumanization (Demoulin, et al., 
2004b; Leyens, et al., 2001; Rohmann, et al., 2009) and the prediction that identification 
would be greater at time two.
Additional variables measured were perceived competition and point allocation.
I included point allocation as an additional measure of in-group favouritism. As in
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Study 2 ,1 wanted to show that, in the absence of infrahumanization, other inter­
group processes may still occur.
Hypothesis 3 (H.5.3) was that infrahumanization would correlate positively with 
in-group bias by point allocation, and with competition. Regarding competition, it is 
yet unclear whether conflict is a factor contributing to infrahumanization, but there is 
some evidence that it is, and I suspect competition contains a conflict of interest.
Methods
Participants
Participants were 84 residents of Bruce Hall, a residential college on Australian 
National University campus. Thirty students participated at both Time 1 and Time 2. 
Participants were all first year residents of the hall. The majority of students had only 
been living in hall for one week at Time 1, but some had lived in hall for a semester. 
Their mean time in hall at Time 1 was less than one month (M = 3.83 weeks, SD =
6.65).
Design and Procedure
The study was a 2 (hall rated: Bruce -in-group/Johns-out-group) x 2 (emotion 
level: primary/secondary) x 2 (emotion valence: positive/negative) x 2 (time: 1 / 2) 
mixed design. Hall rated, emotion level, and emotion valence were within-participants. 
This was the first study in this thesis in which the group rated was a within subjects 
variable. Theoretically, a within participants design is preferable, as detecting 
infrahumanization would indicate that, on average, individuals were attributing more 
secondary emotions to the in-group than the out-group. However, I initially thought 
that the demand characteristics of the study in a within-participants design would inhibit 
differentiation on the measures of in-group and out-group. That is, I thought that when 
faced with an in-group measure of emotion followed by an out-group measure of the 
same emotions (or vice versa) participants would be sensitive to prejudice and want to
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rate the groups equally. However when I went back to the literature, I realized that 
studies had used both between-subjects (Cuddy, et al., 2007b) (DeLuca-McLean & 
Castano, 2009; Leyens, et ah, 2001) and within-subjects (Demoulin, et ah, 2009b; 
Gaunt, 2009; Gaunt, et ah, 2002; Leyens, et ah, 2001; Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005) 
designs and had found infrahumanization in both types. Therefore, I decided to change 
to a within-participants design in Study 5.
The time variable was within participants for a subset of 30 participants and 
between participants for the remaining 54. Analyses were run once with time as a 
between -subjects and once as within-subjects, as the Results section will explain. 
Residents were first asked to participate (Time 1) during orientation week, before 
classes had started in the first semester of 2009. This week is a time when students 
have just arrived to campus, and the week is spent acquainting them with the hall and 
helping them meet fellow residents. Orientation week is before interhall activities such 
as sports and arts competitions have begun. Time 2 was in the 7th week of the semester. 
By this time, the halls had engaged in several competitions of sports and arts events, the 
most recent being a major orienteering and running race that had happened in the 
weekend just prior to data collection. At both times, participants were approached 
within the hall cafeteria at mealtimes. The questionnaire took approximately 30 
minutes to complete and participants were given $5 for their participation.
Materials
Participants first completed a 14-item identity measure to evaluate their 
identification with Bruce Hall (a = .90). Items were adapted from Leach et al. (2008), 
and included such items as “I think Bruce Hall residents have a lot to be proud o f ’ and 
“Being a Bruce Hall resident is an important part of how I see myself.” Participants 
responded by choosing a number from a 7-point Likert scale anchored with “strongly 
disagree” and “strongly agree”.
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Next, participants completed a 40-item emotion evaluation measure asking,
“To what extent do you think Bruce residents (or Johns residents) experience the 
following emotions?” on a scale from l(very little) to 7 (very much). The same 40 
emotion words were used as in Study 4.
The presentation of the emotion scales were counterbalanced so that half of 
participants were evaluating Bruce residents (in-group) first and half of participants 
were rating Johns residents (out-group) first. The order of emotions on the list was not 
counterbalanced, but the set order of the list was generated randomly.
After each emotion rating task, participants were asked to go back and “circle 
the emotions that you think best describe the feelings of Bruce (Johns) residents”. 
Similar to instructions given in previously published studies, participants were told 
“You may circle whatever number you like, but try not to pick too many” (Leyens, et 
al., 2001). Because of the slight differences in the results from the two emotion 
measures in Study 4,1 included both measures in Study 5.
Participants then completed a 40-item measure of HN and HU traits. They were 
asked to indicate on a 7-point Likert scale to what extent they agreed that Bruce (and 
Johns) residents had each of the 40 traits, anchored with “strongly disagree” to 
“strongly agree.” Twenty of the traits were high in HN and 20 of the traits were high in 
HU, according to work done by Haslam and Bain (2007) and Haslam, Bain, Douge,
Lee, and Bastian (2005). Based on this study, traits were categorized into eight within- 
subjects factors by high and low human uniqueness, high and low human nature, and 
rating of Bruce and Johns. High HU/high HN traits were ambitious, analytic, 
imaginative, passionate, sympathetic, frivolous, high strung, insecure, irresponsible, and 
reserved. High HU/ low HN traits were broadminded, conscientious, humble, polite, 
thorough, disorganized, hard-hearted, ignorant, rude, and stingy. Low HU/ high HN 
traits were active, curious, friendly, helpful, fun-loving, impatient, impulsive, jealous
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nervous and shy. Low HU/low HN traits were contented, comfortable, even- 
tempered, relaxed, selfless, passive, simple-minded, timid, uncooperative, and 
unemotional.
This was followed by a nine-item measure of feelings of competition between 
the two halls. It included such items as, “Deep down, I really like it when Bruce 
residents beat Johns residents at some activity” and “The fact is, any win by Johns is a 
loss for Bruce.”
The next measure was a 10-item point-allocation task as used in Bomstein et al. 
(1983). Each item presented participants with seven allocation options. In each item, 
the allocation options had different values, but points were structured according to each 
of three point structures. There were three options favouring the in-group, three options 
favouring the out-group, and one option of complete equality between the two groups. 
Scores were computed by taking an overall total for points allocated to the in-group and 
points allocated to the out-group. A last section asked participants for basic 
demographic information pertinent to the study, including first language, nationality, 
time spent living in hall, involvement in inter-hall competitions, and number of 
weeks/months/years spent attending university.
Results
Data were analysed in two ways because of the differences in participants at 
Times 1 and 2. The intention was to run the study as a longitudinal design with the 
same participants at Times 1 and 2. At Time 1 there were 54 participants and at Time 2 
there were 60 participants. However, there were only 30 participants who participated 
at both Times 1 and 2. Results were first analysed such that only the 30 participants 
who participated at Times 1 and 2 were included, and analysis was run as a longitudinal 
design. Data were analysed using a repeated measures mixed ANOVA, with emotion 
level, emotion valence, traits, hall rated and time as within-subjects variables.
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However, this analysis did not have sufficient power. Then the analysis was run 
with the full sample of 54 data points at Time 1 and 60 data points at Time 2. In this 
case, participants at Times 1 and 2 were treated as completely separate populations with 
time as a between-subjects variable15. Only the second analysis results will be reported 
below.
Emotion Ratings
To analyse the emotion rating tasks, emotions were grouped into eight 
categories to form within-subjects factors of primary positive (surprise, pleasure, 
affection, attraction, excitement, enjoyment, caring, calmness), primary negative (pain, 
fear, panic, fright, scariness, suffering, anger, fury, irritation, affliction, sadness, 
distress), secondary positive (love, elation, passion, sympathy, admiration, repentance, 
hope, nostalgia, optimism), and secondary negative (melancholy, disconsolate, 
disenchantment, gloomy, disgust, resentment, shame, remorse, embarrassment, guilt, 
humiliation) emotions. I calculated the mean ratings for each set of emotions. There 
were two sets of these four categorizations, one for ratings of Bruce residents and one 
for Johns residents. I then ran a four-way mixed ANOVA with level of emotion, 
valence of emotion, and hall rated as within-subjects variables and time as a between- 
subjects variable.
Main effects. In analysing the emotion rating task, there was a main effect for 
level of emotion (F (l,l 12) = 38.85, p < .001), with primary emotions (M= 3.94, SD = 
.06) being attributed to a greater extent than secondary emotions (M= 3.78, SD = .06)
15 In this analysis, the Time 1 and Time 2 samples are being analyzed as if they were independent, 
however, they are non-independent. Thirty people participated at both Time 1 and Time 2 and the 
remaining participants only participated at one time or the other. Conceptually, this means that some 
Time 2 participants had seen an identical survey 7 weeks earlier, and some had not. Statistically, this 
analysis adds error variance and in that way is conservative. This statistical complication would be a 
problem if the results were different to those of Studies 1-4 and infrahumanization was observed. 
However, this was not the case. Instead, the three-way group by level by valence interaction that was 
observed in Studies 1 and 4was observed again in Study 5. This suggests that the statistical concern is not 
a problem.
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overall. There was also a main effect for valence (F( 1,112) = 268.56, p < .001), 
with positive emotions (M= 4.57, SD = .06) being attributed to a greater extent than 
negative emotions (M= 3.17, SD = .08). The main effects for hall rated (F( 1,112) = 
7.32,/? < .01) showed that emotions were attributed to Johns residents (out-group) (M= 
3.94, SD = .06) to a greater extent overall than Bruce (in-group) residents (M=3.77, SD 
= .07).
Interactions. There was no interaction of level of emotions and hall rated, the 
effect that would have indicated infrahumanization (H.5.1).
The main effect for valence was moderated by time (F (l,l 12) = 5.74,/?<.05), 
such that there was a greater difference between attribution of positive and negative 
emotions at Time 2 (Mpos= 4.64, SD = .08; Mneg = 3.00, SD = .12) than Time 1 (Mpos= 
4.50, SD = 09; A/neg= 3.29, SD =12).
There was an interaction of emotion valence and emotion level (F (l,l 12) = 
25.42, p<.001), such that there was a greater difference in attribution of positive and 
negative primary emotions (A/pos= 4.75, SD =.06; Mneg= 3.14, SD = .09) than secondary 
emotions (Mpos= 4.42, SD = .07; Mneg= 3.12, SD = .09).
Valence of emotions and hall rated interacted (F (l,l 12) = 69.10,/?<.001), such 
that Bruce residents (in-group) were attributed with more positive (M= 4.83, SD =.07) 
emotions than Johns residents (A/=4.27, SD =.09), and Johns residents were attributed 
with more negative (M= 3.57, SD =.12) traits than Bruce residents (M= 2.63, SD =.10). 
This finding indicates in-group favouritism.
This last result was moderated by level of emotion (F( 1,112) = 7.69,/?<.01), 
again showing a group rated, by level of emotion by valence of emotion interaction, as 
seen in Figure 7.6. The two-way valence by hall rated interaction was stronger for 
primary (A/ßruce positive -  5.12, SD — .08, A/ Bruce negative — 2.65, SD — .1 1, ATj0hns positive— 
4.39, SD = .09; M]ohnsnegative = 3.63, SD = A3) than secondary emotions (A/Brucepositive =
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4.70, SD -  .08; M ßruce negative ~ 2.65, SD -.10; A/johns positive “ 4.15, SD -  .09; A/johns 
negative = 3.58, SD =.12).
Bruce Hall
— — Johns College
Positive Positive Negative 
Secondary
Negative
Primary
Figure 7.6. Hall rated by level by valence interaction for emotion ratings with a slightly 
larger in-group favouritism effect for primary than secondary emotions.
Emotion Selection
To analyse the emotion selection tasks, emotions were again grouped into eight 
categories to form within-subjects factors of primary positive, primary negative, 
secondary positive, and secondary negative emotions. Emotion variables were scored 
as selection = 1 and non-selection = 0. Emotion category values were the mean of each 
category and values were between 0 and 1. Again, there were two sets of these 
categorizations, one for ratings of Bruce residents and one for Johns residents. I, then, 
ran a four-way, mixed ANOVA with level of emotion, valence of emotion, and hall 
rated as within-subjects variables and time as a between-subjects variable. As in Study 
4, there were both similarities and differences between emotion rating and selection 
measure effects.
Main effects. There was again a main effect for emotion level (F (l,l 12) =
29.72, p<.001), with participants attributing more primary emotions (M=. 16, SD =.01) 
than secondary emotions (M=.12, SD =.01). The main effect for emotion valence
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(F(l,l 12) = 194.59,p<.001) again indicated that participants attributed more 
positive emotions (M=.24, SD =.02) than negative emotions (M=.04, SD =.01). In the 
main effect for hall rated (F(l,l 12) = 21.91,p<.001), the pattern was opposite to the 
emotion rating task. Participants attributed more emotions to Bruce residents ( M = . 15, 
SD =.01) than Johns residents (M=. 13, SD =.01).
Interactions. Unlike emotion rating results, there was a significant interaction in 
emotion attribution between emotion level and hall rated (the interaction which would 
show infrahumanization); however it was opposite to that of infrahumanization,
F (l,l 12) = 5.58,/?<.05. While there were differences between the in-group (M prjBruce=
. 18, SD = .01) (MsecBruce =  . 13, SD = .01) and out-group (M prjj0hns = • 14, SD = .01 ) ( M sec 
Johns = .12, SD = .01), the effect was being driven by primary and not secondary 
emotions. The effect is shown in Figure 7.7. To signify infrahumanization, the effect 
would need to be driven by secondary emotions (Cortes, et al., 2005; Leyens, et al., 
2007; Leyens, et al., 2000a). I looked to the three-way interaction for more information.
Bruce
— “  “  Johns
SecondaryPrimary
Figure 7.7. Two way hall rated by level interaction that does not follow the 
infrahumanization pattern.
There was again a three-way interaction between emotion level, emotion 
valence, and hall rated, F{ 1,112) = 7.01, p<.01. It showed that for, secondary emotions,
there was greater attribution to the in-group than the out-group for positive emotions 
(A^ Bruce = .25, SD = .02; M j 0 h n s = .17, SD = .02) but equal attribution for negative 
emotions (MBruce =.07, SD = .01; M}ohns = -07, SD = .01). For primary emotions there 
were more positive emotions attributed to the in-group (M= .32, SD = .02) than the out­
group (M= .21, SD = .02), but less negative emotions attributed to the in-group (M = 
.02, SD =.01) than the out-group (M= .07, SD = .01).
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Bruce
— — — Johns
PositiveNegativePositive Negative
SecondaryPrimary
Figure 7.8. Three way hall rated by level by valence interaction. No difference in 
secondary positive emotions is different from the infrahumanization pattern of emotion 
attribution.
While the pattern of positive emotion attribution suggests infrahumanization, 
there is no difference in negative secondary emotions and the effect is driven by 
secondary emotions, which makes this pattern of emotion attribution different from how 
infrahumanization has been defined in the thesis. I have defined the infrahumanization 
pattern according to Leyens et al. (2001), who say that infrahumanization occurs only 
when there is a significantly greater attribution of both positively and negatively 
valenced secondary emotions to the in-group compared to the out-group and a smaller 
difference in primary emotions than secondary. This is not the pattern in either the two 
or the three-way interaction. Therefore, I conclude that because it is only positive
secondary emotions that are driving the relationship, the effect is more akin to in­
group favouritism than infrahumanization.
There was again a two-way emotion level by emotion valence interaction 
(F(l,l 12) = 21.43,/7<.001) in which there was a larger disparity between positive (M = 
.27, SD =.02) and negative (M=.04, SD =.01) emotions at the primary level than at the 
secondary level (Mpos =.21, SD =.02; Mneg =.04, SD = .01).
There was also again, the same two-way, hall rated by emotion valence 
interaction (F (l,l 12) = 57.69,p<.001), with more positive emotions attributed to the in­
group (M  =.29, SD =.02) than the out-group (M=. 19, SD =.01), and more negative 
emotions attributed to the out-group (M =.07, SD =.01) than the in-group (M=.01, SD 
=.01). This pattern reveals in-group favouritism.
HU and HN Traits
Trait categorization. To analyse the trait attribution measures, traits were 
categorized into eight within-subjects factors by high and low human uniqueness, high 
and low HN, and rating of Bruce and Johns. Values were calculated by finding the 
mean of the trait ratings for each category. I, then, ran a five-way mixed ANOVA, with 
HN, HU, and hall rated as within-subjects variables and time and identification as 
between-subjects variables.
Main effects. There were main effects for HN traits (F( 1,110)= 178.81, /?<.001), 
and college rated (F( 1,110)= 10.81,/?=.001). More high HN traits (M= 4.34, SD = .04) 
were attributed than low (M= 3.89, SD = .04). There were overall more traits attributed 
to Bruce residents (in-group) (M= 4.17, SD = .04) than attributed to Johns residents 
(out-group) (M = 4.06, SD = .04).
Interactions. There was no interaction of HN by hall rated or HU by hall rated,
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which would have indicated infrahumanization.
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The main effect of hall rated was moderated by an effect of time, F (l,l 10)= 
5.61,p < .05. There was a greater difference in the overall degree of the traits attributed 
to the in-group and the out-group at Time 2 (MBruCe=4.20, £D=.05; Mj0hns=4.02, SD=.05) 
than Time 1 (A/ßmce  ^4.12 579=.06; Mj0hns=4 .10, SZ)=.06). This effect suggests that 
participants saw more pronounced inter-group differences when they had lived in hall 
for a longer period of time. There were no other effects from this analysis.
Additional Variables
The allocation variables were analyzed by creating an “allocation decision” 
variable by totaling the number of points allocated to the in-group and out-group over 
the seven items. I ran a two-way, mixed ANOVA on the dependent variable allocation 
decision with hall rated as a within-subjects variable and time as a between-subjects 
variable. There was a main effect for hall rated. Allocation decisions were in-group 
favouring overall (F(l,l 12) = 44.43,p<.001), with a Bruce resident (M= 392.09,
SD=.07) being allocated more points than a Johns resident (M= 347.23 SD=.06). These 
allocation decisions did not vary over time.
Additional variables measured included identification and competition. 
Identification did increase significantly (F( 1,112) = 8.32, p  < .01) from Time 1 (M = 
4.73, SD = .79) to Time 2 (M= 5.15, SD = .77). I predicted that identification would 
correlate positively with infrahumanization (H.5.2), but since there was no 
infrahumanization effect, I did not test this correlation. Competition also increased 
significantly (F (l,l 12) = 4.40, p < .05) between Time 1 (M= 3.97, SD = .97) and Time 
2 (M = 4.35, SD = .98). Again, there was no infrahumanization effect, so I did not 
assess the correlation (H.5.3).
Discussion
Study 5 included three measures of infrahumanization. For emotion ratings, 
there was no hall rated by emotion level interaction. For emotion selection, there was a
200
hall rated by emotion level interaction, but this was driven by primary, not 
secondary emotions. There were no HN by hall rated interactions nor HU by hall rated 
interactions, that would have indicated infrahumanization. Therefore, to summarize, 
results of the three measures of humanness attribution (emotion rating, emotion 
selection and trait rating) revealed no significant results for infrahumanization.
Regarding the measures, emotion rating, emotion selection and the attribution of 
HU are all theoretically measures of HU (or the likening of humans to animals). 
However, these measures did not correspond on all effects. Table 7.1 shows the 
comparison of effects between the three measures. To summarize, emotion rating and 
emotion selection showed the same results for main effects for valence and hall rated 
and interaction effects for valence by level, valence by hall rated, and valence by level 
by hall rated. There were differences between the emotion ratings measure and the 
emotion selection measure on the hall-rated main effect and the valence by time effect. 
Most importantly, there were differences between the three measures on the 
infrahumanization measure of level by hall rated for emotion ratings and emotion 
selection, and HU by hall rated for the HU measure. These results are troubling, as 
measures that are theoretically the same are showing different effects. The results call 
into question the reliability of the measures as indicators of infrahumanization.
Table 7.2
Effects o f uniquely human attribution on three measures - similarities and
differnces.
HU
Effect Emotion Ratings; Emotion Selection Rating
Level same n/a
Valence same n/a
Hall rated more to Johns more to Bruce none
Infrahumanization none driven by primary none
Valence by Time difference at T2 none n/a
Valence by Level same n/a
Valence by Hall Rated same n/a
Valence by Level by Hall same n/a
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As has been the case with the previous studies in this thesis, results indicated 
in-group favouritism in several measures. In the emotion selection task there were 
greater positive emotions and less negative emotions attributed to the in-group than out­
group at Time 2, compared to Time 1. In the emotion rating task, the negative emotions 
were attributed to the out-group to a greater degree and the positive emotions were 
attributed to the in-group to a greater degree. Results also showed in-group favouritism 
in allocation decisions in the point distribution task. These indicators of in-group 
favouritism suggest that the inter-group context was significant for the participants. 
Participants did see the differences between Bruce and Johns residents as meaningful 
and instrumental in making assessments and decisions. However, the inter-group 
context lacked the characteristic(s) necessary to cause the in-group to infrahumanize the 
out-group. While the inter-group context was adequate for discrimination between the 
groups, it was not sufficient to see the out-group as lacking humanity relative to the in­
group.
Studies 3-5 Conclusions
Overall, for studies 3 -5 ,1 could say that the inter-group contexts that I examined 
did not have the characteristics necessary to cause in-group members to infrahumanize 
the out-group by emotion attribution. The inter-group contexts were grouped by sports 
team, nationality, morality, and university hall of residence. The relationships were 
characterized by varying degrees of competition and identification. While the inter­
group contexts were not sufficient to cause infrahumanization, they were sufficient to 
cause in-group favouritism in each of the three studies. Therefore, there were some 
inter-group effects in the studies. This suggested that the absence of infrahumanization 
findings were not due to a failure to make meaningful and salient inter-group contexts. 
Studies 4 and 5 also raised issues calling into question the measurement techniques of
infrahumanization. In the next section, I will further analyse the results obtained
far and the pathway forward for the remaining studies.
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Chapter 8: Regrouping and Reanalysis
At this point, it is clear that there is a difference in the outcome of the current 
studies and those reported in the majority of the literature on infrahumanization.
Whereas previous literature had concluded that results were “unanimous” (Demoulin, et 
al., 2009a, p. 156) in finding that in-groups generally discriminate against an out-group 
on secondary emotions, the present work has not reached the same conclusion. In quite 
varied inter-group contexts, levels of conflict relations, and nature of inter-group 
differences, I have not seen the result of infrahumanization that would be expected 
based on much of the previous literature. This is despite careful methodological 
procedures in direct consultation with published authors, replicating three measurement 
procedures of the previous work.
To review, the inter-group contexts used so far were nationality, sexual 
orientation, sports team affiliation, moral standing, and university residence hall. The 
inter-group contexts introduced conditions of threat (both material and symbolic) and 
competition. Participants identified with their in-group. While infrahumanization by 
secondary emotion attribution was not found, infrahumanization by language attribution 
was found as well as in-group favouritism by emotion attribution, altruism, and resource 
distribution. While it is true that conflict is not necessary to finding infrahumanization 
(Leyens, 2009), the contexts created in the first five studies (sports teams, national 
groups, sexual orientation, differing moral ideologies) were similar to those of previous 
studies in which infrahumanization has been found (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; 
Cehajic, et al., 2009; Costello & Hodson, 2010; Cuddy, et al., 2007b; Demoulin, et al., 
2008; Gaunt, et al., 2005; Martin, et al., 2008; Tam, et al., 2007). It is relevant to point 
out, then, several anomalies in the published research that are more similar to the pattern 
of results described in the current five studies. Two were introduced in Chapter 2, and
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two were not published at the start of the thesis. They will be described in more 
detail below.
Infrahumanization Null Findings
Work by Marcu and Chryssochoou (2005) examined inter-group attitudes of the 
majority population towards Gypsies in Britain and Romania. The authors measured 
attribution of primary and secondary emotions of Gypsies by British and Romanian 
samples (Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005). The study also included a measure of 
“ontologization,” which is another measurement of the attribution of humanness. The 
authors describe ontologization as “an operation of classification by which one minority 
can be represented not only as an out-group, but can also be represented as outside the 
social map of human identity (2005, p. 44).” The authors hypothesized that they would 
see the infrahumanization effect in both inter-group contexts. Unexpectedly, the 
authors found that, while there was ontologization by both the British and Romanian 
samples, there was only infrahumanization by the British sample towards the Gypsies.
Firstly, they concluded from this that, perhaps, the distinction of in-group and 
out-group on the basis of primary and secondary emotions (infrahumanization) is not a 
good indicator of subtle dehumanization. This was because, although they observed 
ontologization (attribution of greater human culture to an in-group than an out-group), 
they did not observe infrahumanization by Romanians towards Gypsies. That is to say, 
infrahumanization, as it has been studied, may not be good indicator of subtle 
dehumanization. This was the first published study that I had read that reported not 
finding infrahumanization in an inter-group context, so it becomes important in 
interpreting the outcomes of my research. Indeed, it shows that I am not the only 
researcher to find that infrahumanization is not present in an inter-group relationship in 
which it was expected.
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In another study, published during my PhD studies, Vaes, Heflick and 
Goldenberg (2010a, p. 756) studied how thoughts of death (mortality salience) affect 
humanness ratings (infrahumanization). They measured infrahumanization after 
inducing mortality salience. In their third study, Vaes et al. used a comparison of an 
American in-group and a British out-group. They did not find infrahumanization of the 
British out-group. In their analysis, this is explained by two factors. First, the lack of 
infrahumanization is attributed to the ratings of the groups being between participants 
and not within-participants. Because participants were only asked to rate either 
Americans or British, they did not compare the groups directly. However, as I have 
cited in previous chapters, other studies using a between-participants design for the 
inter-group variable have found infrahumanization (Cuddy, et al., 2007b; DeLuca- 
McLean & Castano, 2009; Leyens, et al., 2001). The other explanation is that 
Americans perceived the British as a high status, high competence out-group, and these 
are the least infrahumanized groups.
A third study by Bain, Park, Kwok, and Haslam (2009), also published during 
my PhD studies, used measures of human nature (HN) and human uniqueness (HU) 
traits to measure the various forms of subtle dehumanization. Secondary and primary 
emotion measures are said to measure the same aspects of humanness as assessed by 
HU traits. With Australian and Chinese samples, Bain et al. found that Australians did 
not deny Chinese HU traits relative to Australians in any of their three studies. That is, 
they did not subtly dehumanize the Chinese by infrahumanization. This study is 
important as it finds similar results to the present work, also within an Australian 
nationality context. The explanation by Bain et al. was that the in-group “does not 
always represent the sole epitome or ideal of humanness, or at least not on every 
dimension” (2009, p. 794). The authors also speculated that culturally, Australians do 
not feel superior to other groups in terms of HU, but do in terms of HN.
Finally, an unpublished study by Bain, Halsam and Kashima (2010) again 
did not observe infrahumanization by HU attribution with several nationality-based 
inter-group comparisons in an Australian context. Specifically, participants rated 
Australians, Britons, Indonesians, and Americans. Participants did not discriminate 
against any out-group on HU, but did attribute less HN to some out-groups. This result 
is similar to my HU and HN findings in Study 5.
Together, these studies provide four examples of findings similar to the ones in 
the current Studies 1-5 in which salient out-groups were not infrahumanized. The 
authors of each of these studies provide different reasons for why the in-group did not 
infrahumanize the out-group. One attributes the lack of infrahumanization to the 
specific inter-group context and the image of the out-group as high competence and 
high status (Vaes, et al., 2010a). The second explanation is that not all groups feel 
superior on all domains of humanness, and perhaps Australians do not feel superior in 
terms of HU (Bain, et al., 2009). Finally, a third explanation is more critical of the 
infrahumanization concept in general (Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005). I will consider 
these explanations below.
The explanation that high status, high competence out-groups are not 
infrahumanized is not supported by previous research. For example, a study by Brown, 
Eller, Leeds, and Stace (2007) found that British state school students infrahumanized 
private school students, who are stereotyped as being both higher status and higher 
competence in relation to state school students. Furthermore, several authors have 
argued that status is not a necessary condition for creating infrahumanization, as they 
have also found infrahumanization of high status groups (Demoulin, et al., 2004b; 
Gaunt, 2009; Paladino, et al., 2002). Therefore, I agree with the comment that not all 
groups are infrahumanized, but not because of the status domain that the authors
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proposed.
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Bain et al. (2009) propose an interesting hypothesis, that Australians do not 
infrahumanize by HU. I find this hypothesis intriguing given the history of Australia 
and that of the European countries. Human uniqueness is the attribution of civility, 
cultural maturity, and refinedness. Given that non-Aboriginal Australian society is 
relatively new compared with those of Europe or other Asian countries such as China, 
Australians may not feel superior in HU compared to other nations. However, 
Australians do pride themselves on being “salt of the earth” and traits more akin to 
human nature. And, as Bain et al. (2009) found, Australians do deny HN to out-groups. 
This hypothesis will be explored in Chapter 10, Study 7.
The third explanation of Marcu and Chryssouchoou (2005) is more critical of 
the infrahumanization concept and its measurement. The analysis is interesting given 
the measurement issues I observed in Studies 4 and 5. It suggests that 
infrahumanization, or the differential attribution of uniquely human traits to the in­
group and out-group, are not a good measure of subtle dehumanization as they did not 
map onto an independent measure of humanness attribution, ontologization. This 
challenges the very foundations of research on infrahumanization. Like 
infrahumanization, ontologization is the distinction of groups on their basis of what 
constitutes humans (in this case, culture) and animals (nature). Therefore, the denial of 
culture to an out-group relative to an in-group is a type of subtle dehumanization. 
Therefore, the authors expected subtle dehumanization to be expressed on both or 
neither measure of infrahumanization and ontologization.
This hypothesis is similar to my hypothesis that measures of human uniqueness 
(HU traits and secondary emotions) should yield similar effects for infrahumanization. 
While, unlike Marcu and Chryssochoou, I do not think the measure of ontologization is 
necessarily a more “accurate” measure of subtle dehumanization, the results of both
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their study and Studies 4 and 5 of the thesis suggest that there are inconsistencies in 
the literature in what measures are suitable as indicators of dehumanization.
Final Studies
The results and conclusions of the above work (Bain, et al., 2010; Bain, et al., 
2009; Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005; Vaes, et al., 2010a) on infrahumanization provide 
empirical support for interpreting the first five studies in the thesis. Without that work, 
the finding of a lack of infrahumanization between meaningful social groups is 
surprising, given that the majority of work reports infrahumanization. But the studies of 
Bain et al. (2009), Bain et al. (2010), Marcu and Chryssouchoou (2005) and Vaes et al. 
(2010) actually document cases in which infrahumanization does not occur between 
meaningful groups. Therefore, from the view of the field, it can be valid to find groups 
that are salient, yet that are not infrahumanized.
Still, the reasons why the infrahumanization effect is not observed, as in Studies 
1 -5 of the thesis, must be explained. Thus far, I have reasoned that the conditions used 
in the studies did not create inter-group contexts sufficient for infrahumanization and 
that it is only a very distinct nature of the inter-group context that can illicit 
infrahumanization. Still, there are other possible explanations. The remaining two 
studies sought to test two possible alternative hypotheses.
The first hypothesis was that infrahumanization by secondary emotion 
attribution was not found because the Australian sample being used does not 
discriminate any group on secondary emotions. Indeed, there is no published work 
suggesting otherwise. Therefore, Study 6 assessed Australians’ secondary emotion 
discrimination of animals, the group that, by the existing theoretical understanding of 
emotions, should not be perceived as experiencing secondary emotions. If our 
Australian sample did not deny secondary emotions to animals, then it could be that the
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method of measurement of infrahumanization using primary and secondary 
emotions is not suitable for Australian samples.
While this hypothesis is supported by Studies 1-5 of the thesis, the support in the 
literature is mixed. It is unclear if it is a universal construct that humans differentiate 
between humans and animals on secondary emotions. On the one hand, according to 
Leyens et al. (2000), French and Spanish colloquial words for primary and secondary 
emotions (emotion!emotion and sentiment!sentimiento) exist in daily language. Yet, 
Leyens et al. (2000) acknowledge that there is not this clear lay distinction between 
primary and secondary emotions in English, leaving the possitibility that English 
speakers do not spontaneously perceive differences in primary and secondary emotions.
At the same time, while the difference between primary and secondary emotions 
does not exist in English colloquial vocabulary, Demoulin (2004a) found that when 
prompted, English speakers would differentiate between more basic and more complex 
emotions. Does that mean that English speakers necessarily apply that differentiation 
spontaneously to human social groups as is the case in infrahumanization?
Furthermore, does finding such a differentiation of emotions with a US sample of 
English speakers (Cuddy, et al., 2007b) mean that there will be the same outcome with 
an Australian English speaking sample? I do not think the answer is clear. Therefore, it 
was necessary, theoretically, to establish the denial of secondary emotions to the group 
most likely to be denied humanness (animals) in our Australian sample. This is the 
focus of Study 6.
A second possible hypothesis for why infrahumanization was not being found in 
Studies 1 -5 was that the previous five studies were not methodologically sound. One of 
the functions of Study 7 was to test this hypothesis. It was an international study using 
the same methods in four countries, Spain, Switzerland, Poland and Australia. The 
three European countries were selected because they were ones in which
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infrahumanization had already been observed. Finding infrahumanization in any of 
the countries surveyed using the same materials would eliminate the possibility that I 
had been employing inadequate methodology. Study 7 also had several other aspects, 
including the use of two novel inter-group contexts, the ability to compare 
infrahumanization cross-culturally (if it occurred), the use of multiple measures of 
humanness, and assessment of each country’s definitions of humanness.
Finding infrahumanization of animals in Study 6 would show that it is possible 
to have an outcome in which Australians deny secondary emotions to an out-group. 
Finding infrahumanization of human groups in Study 7 in any of the countries surveyed 
would help to eliminate the hypothesis that previous studies in this thesis were not 
methodologically sound. These findings would open the possibility of alternative 
hypotheses relating to infrahumanization. These will be explored further in the 
following chapters.
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Chapter 9: Study 6 - Infrahumanization and Animal Groups
In the previous five studies of this thesis, Australians have not attributed less 
secondary emotions to out-groups compared to in-groups. That is to say, on a measure 
of secondary and primary emotions, Australians have not displayed infrahumanization 
towards groups for which infrahumanization would be expected to occur if 
infrahumanization were as widespread as previous research has claimed (Demoulin, et 
al., 2009a, p. 202). However, Australians have differentiated the in-group and out­
group on the valence of emotions, on attribution of language, on altruism, and on 
allocation of points. Based on these results, it was possible that secondary emotion 
attribution is not a suitable humanness attribution variable to be used with an Australian 
sample. Therefore, the primary goal of Study 6 was to evaluate whether Australians 
would infrahumanize non-humans on what have been considered secondary emotions16, 
therefore granting greater attribution to humans than animals on secondary emotions.
It would come as no surprise that Australians would regard animals as less 
human than themselves. It is the very nature of the relationship between the groups. 
However, it was not clear from previous studies in this thesis whether differentiation of 
levels of emotions are a way in which Australians would differentiate humans and 
animals (i.e. primary to animals, primary and secondary to humans). If Australians did 
not deny animals secondary emotions, it could not be said that emotion level is a 
dimension on which humanness is discriminated by Australians. This would undermine 
the theoretical argument of much of the infrahumanization literature that attribution or 
denial of secondary emotion to an out-group is a universal dimension on which 
humanness is conceived. If animals are granted the same emotions as humans, it would
161 acknowledge that it may be unsuitable to describe denial o f human emotions to animals as 
infrahumanization. They are not human and to deny human attributes to them may be entirely 
appropriate. However, in the present work, the denial o f secondary emotions has already been established 
as infrahumanization. Therefore, for the sake of continuity o f terminology, I will continue to refer to 
denial o f secondary emotions as infrahumanization, regardless o f whether the target is human or animal.
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also mean that the finding that out-groups were being granted secondary emotions in 
Studies 1-5 meant that they were not necessarily being considered human. Therefore, 
attribution of emotions to animals by Australians needed to be examined in order to 
theoretically claim that denial of secondary emotions is an adequate measure of denial 
of humanness in an Australian context (Goal 1).
While crucial to the thesis, this was not the only goal of Study 6. It was also an 
opportunity to study the mechanisms through which infrahumanization may occur.
Some groups of humans have relationships with animals that are different from other 
groups of humans. There are clear differences in the relationship between omnivores 
and animals, and the relationship between vegetarians or vegans and animals. Certinly 
not all vegetarians are necessarily anthropomorphizing animal lovers. There are many 
reasons for choosing a vegetarian diet (e.g. morality, health, religion, taste, and 
sustainability). However, vegetarians do have in common a relationship with animals 
that restricts any use of violence or killing. While omnivores often do not have any 
direct contact with animals that they eat, they do have a general ethos that it is 
acceptable to kill animals for human consumption. The present study uses this 
difference in animal-human relationships as the basis for inter-group infrahumanization 
research. The second goal of the study was to further investigate the process by which 
infrahumanization occurs by evaluating the infrahumanization of animals by both 
omnivores and vegetarians.
I expect that vegetarians will humanize animals to a greater degree than 
omnivores by granting them more secondary emotions. This would suggest that the 
outcome of humanizing (as well as infrahumanizing) an out-group can also be related to 
significant consequences for the treatment of that out-group. Vegetarians’ 
humanization of animals would be co-occurring with better treatment of animals
relative to omnivores. This is especially the case for certain animals, such as cattle, 
as they are animals commonly used for human consumption by Australian omnivores.
The present study investigates the attribution of emotions to three types of 
animals: (1) apes, that are primates and believed to hold similarities with humans; (2) 
horses, that historically have a relationship to humans as pets and working animals in 
Australia; and (3) cattle, that are eaten by many societies, including Australia.17 
Varying the types of animals assessed would allow for differences to become evident in 
the way different relationships to an outgroup impact attribution of humanness to that 
group. While apes and horses have a similar relationship to omnivores as to 
vegetarians, cattle hold an essential difference for omnivores and vegetarians. For 
vegetarians, they are just another animal; for omnivores, they are distinct as food 
animals. As such, it is acceptable to omnivores to kill them for human consumption. 
The same would not be easily said for either of the other two classes of animals -  
primates or work animals. Indeed, in a study of factors associated with the attribution 
of human traits to non-humans, chipanzees and horses were among the top three 
animals rated highest on human traits (Hogan, 1980), while cows were ranked much 
lower.
I will now give an outline of the full design of the study as a way of introducing 
the hypotheses.
Participants were asked to complete emotion and psychological state ratings for 
humans, apes, horses and cattle. The emotion measure was similar to that used in
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17 It is important to point out that I began with a pilot test to select the animals that would be used in the 
study. 1 wanted to have an animal from each group including primates, pets, and eaten animals. It was 
important that these animals be similarly rated on size, intelligence, and average degree o f contact with 
humans so that those dimensions were not additional variables that would determine participants’ 
attributions on humanness, as those three dimensions inform peoples’ views o f the humanness of an 
animal. For example, we humanize dogs more than rabbits (both pets), perhaps because of their 
perceived superior intelligence. But 1 wanted to control for these variables and focus on the emotionality 
and psychological states of the animals and how these informed humanness ratings. This pilot test 
revealed that the representatives of each animal group most similar were apes, horses, and cattle.
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previous studies. One of the new measures in this study was drawn from the work 
of Haslam, Kashima, Loughnan, Shi and Suitner (2008a). This study measured various 
psychological states of both the human in-group an animal out-groups. I was curious as 
to how the different human groups would perceive the mental capacities of animal out­
groups, and how this might relate to their attributions of primary and secondary 
emotions. Halsam et al. (2008a) found subhumans, humans, and suprahumans to be 
rated differently on wishes (dreams, hopes, desires, prayers), thoughts (imagining, 
knowing, reasoning, thinking), and intentions (choosing, deciding, expecting, planning). 
They reasoned that these aspects of mental capacity are informative of the perceived 
humanness of groups. In addition, the Study 6 questionnaire included a measure of 
morality, described as including concepts such as honour, fairness, virtue, and 
principles. According to Haslam (2006), morality is one of the aspects of human 
uniqueness, in addition to secondary emotions. I wanted to include these measures of 
psychological states so that they would act as secondary measures of humanness 
attribution in the event that participants did not deny secondary emotions to the out­
groups as in previous studies. Also, the psychological state measures would provide a 
more nuanced picture of the assessment of the animal out-groups’ humanness. Finally, 
participants answered questions relating to demographics, vegetarianism, and their 
specific food preferences.
The hypotheses for the ratings of emotions and psychological states are outlined
below:
Emotion Attribution
H.6.1. In a two-way interaction between ratings of animal rated and level of 
emotion, all participants will rate each of the animals (apes, horses, and cattle) as lower 
in secondary emotions compared with humans. That is, animals will be infrahumanized 
on ratings of secondary emotions, as these emotions have been pilot tested by
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Demoulin, et al. (2004a) and found to be unique to humans. In contrast, participants 
will not differentiate humans and animals on primary emotions, as these emotions have 
been found to be non-unique to humans.
H.6.2. Vegetarians will attribute more secondary emotions to the traditionally 
eaten animal (cattle) compared to omnivores. That is, vegetarians will infrahumanize 
eaten animals less than omnivores, but have similar ratings on primary emotions. This 
is because I expect that, for a majority of vegetarians, their stance on violence towards 
animals coincides with a perceived humanization towards animals. By comparison, 
omnivores and vegetarians will rate animals similarly on primary emotions. I have no 
prediction of ratings of omnivores and vegetarians on non-eaten animals for secondary 
emotions.
Psychological States
H.6.3 Replicating effects seen in Haslam et al. (2008a), participants will rate 
humans as higher on wishes, thoughts, intentions, and morality than apes, horses and 
cattle.
H.6.4. Vegetarians will rate cattle higher than omnivores on psychological states 
(morality, wishes, thoughts, and intentions). I have no prediction of ratings of 
vegetarians and omnivores on psychological states for non-eaten animals.
Methods
Participants and Procedure
One hundred, seventy nine participants (140 women, 39 men), with a mean age 
of 29.28 took part in the study. Participants were recruited as part of one of two 
samples: primarily meat eating or primarily vegetarian. The meat-eating sample 
included 81 students of a third-year psychology course at Australian National 
University (ANU) who participated in the study as part of a laboratory exercise. 
Completion of the questionnaire was a course exercise, but return of the questionnaire
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was voluntary. These participants completed a pen and paper-based questionnaire 
described below. The vegetarian sample was contacted through the email lists of two 
vegetarian organizations: The Vegan Society of New South Wales and the Australian 
Capital Territory Vegetarian Society. These participants were contacted by the leader 
of their organization in an email and asked to participate in an online version of the 
questionnaire described below. Ninety eight members of these organizations completed 
the questionnaire voluntarily and without compensation.
Materials and Design
The study was a 2 (vegetarian status: omnivore/vegetarian or vegan) x 4 (animal 
rated: humans/apes/horses/cattle) mixed factorial design. Vegetarian status was a 
between-subjects variable. Animal rated, was a within-subjects variable.
The questionnaires in the paper based and online versions of the questionnaire 
were identical. Questionnaires comprised 2 parts. Part 1 introduced the main 
dependent measures of emotion and psychological state items for the four animal 
groups: humans, apes, horses, and cattle. Participants were asked to rate 40 emotions 
and four psychological states for each of four animal groups. The 40 emotion words 
were originally drawn from Demoulin et al. (2004a) and were the same as those used in 
Studies 4 and 5. Participants were asked to, “Please think about each of the emotions in 
the following list and rate how much you think humans (apes, horses, cattle) experience 
it by writing in a number from the scale.” The scale ranged from 1 (very little) to 7 
(very much).
The four psychological states that were assessed in the questionnaire included 
three used in Haslam et al. (2008a) (thoughts, intentions and wishes), with the 
additional state of morality. Participants were given the four psychological states and a 
definition of each. Morality was defined as honour, fairness, virtue, and principles. 
Thoughts were defined as imagining, knowing, reasoning, and thinking. Wishes were
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defined as dreams, hopes, desires, and prayers. Intentions were defined as choosing, 
deciding, expecting, and planning. Participants were asked to “write a number to 
indicate to what extent you think humans (apes, horses, cattle) possess the ability to 
experience the following four psychological states” using the same scale as the emotion 
measure ranging from 1 (very little) to 7 (very much).
Part 2 asked various demographic questions, including age, sex, first language, 
citizenship, and whether the participant identified as vegetarian or vegan. It also asked 
his or her reasons for being vegetarian or vegan, including options of moral, health 
related, religious, environmental, or other. The question of reasons for vegetarianism 
was asked because I initially made hypotheses based on this variable. However, 82.2% 
of the vegetarian sample reported “morality” as their reason for vegetarianism. Because 
of this inequality of participants in each vegetarian reason category, I could not validly 
compare the emotion ratings across the categories; this variable will not be discussed 
further.
Another question in Part 2 asked which specific animal-based products that 
participants eat. This was included to ensure that those who considered themselves to 
be vegetarian did not eat meat, particularly beef, as the categorization assumed.
Results
Manipulation Check
In total, five participants were removed from the data set. Three did not reveal 
their status as meat eating or vegetarian, and therefore could not be categorized on the 
vegetarian status variable. Of the remaining participants from the vegetarian sample, 
two participants indicated that they eat beef and could not be identified as either 
omnivores or vegetarians. This left a sample of 174 participants, 87 meat eating (26 
men, mean age 24.27) and 87 vegetarian or vegan (12 men, mean age 33.97).
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Emotion Ratings and Infrahumanization
To analyse the emotion rating task, emotions were grouped into four categories 
to form within-subjects factors of primary positive (surprise, pleasure, affection, 
attraction, excitement, enjoyment, caring, calmness), primary negative (pain, fear, 
panic, fright, scariness, suffering, anger, fury, irritation, affliction, sadness, distress), 
secondary positive (love, elation, passion, sympathy, admiration, repentance, hope, 
nostalgia, optimism), and secondary negative (melancholy, disconsolate, 
disenchantment, gloomy, disgust, resentment, shame, remorse, embarrassment, guilt, 
humiliation) emotions. Groupings were derived from testing done by Demoulin et al. 
(2004a). Values were found for each emotion category by taking the mean of ratings in 
that category. I examined the emotion attribution hypotheses using a 4-way ANOVA 
with vegetarian status as a between-subjccts variable, and animal rated, level of emotion 
and valence of emotion as within-subjects variables.
As expected in H.6.1, there was a two-way interaction between animal rated and 
emotion level, F(3,l 72)=328.97,/? < .001. The expected pattem was that there would 
be differences between the ratings for humans and each animal for secondary emotions 
(with humans rated significantly higher), but no differences between humans and each 
animal on primary emotions. To test for this, individual t-tests were run on each 
comparison between humans and each animal for both secondary and primary emotions. 
As expected, there were significant differences between ratings of humans (M = 6.27, 
579=1.05) and apes (M= 3.98, 579=1.58, /[173]=6.16,/?<.001), humans and horses (M= 
2.99, 579=1.58, /[173]=8.82,/?<.001), and humans and cattle (M= 2.68, 579=1.58, 
/[173]=9.65,/?<.001) on secondary emotions Also, as expected, there were no 
significant differences in the primary emotions rated between humans (M  =6.52, 
579=0.66) and apes (M= 6.33, 579=0.79, t[173]=0.51), humans and horses (M= 6.02,
579=1.19, t[ 173]= 1.34), or humans and cattle (M=5.68, 579=1.19, t[173]=2.26). When
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considering the full sample, humans, apes, horses, and cattle were essentially rated 
equally on emotions common to both humans and animals, but humans were rated 
higher on secondary emotions than each of the animal groups. That is, animals were 
infrahumanized compared to humans, supporting H.6.1.
There was a significant three-way interaction between vegetarian status, level of 
emotion rated, and animal rated, F(3,172) = 8.96, p < .001. Figures 9.1-9.4 show the 
pattern of effects for this three-way interaction. Overall, secondary emotions were rated 
lower than primary emotions for the animals, but not for humans. Vegetarians rated 
animals higher on primary and secondary emotions than omnivores, but this difference 
was not present for humans. The differences between ratings of vegetarians and 
omnivores for all targets was roughly equivalent between primary and secondary 
emotions.
Vegetarians Omnivores
-------- Primary
Humans
- - - •S e c o n d a r y
Humans
Figure 9.1. Ratings of primary and secondary emotions attributed to humans by 
vegetarians and omnivores. Shows relatively equal attribution of primary and 
secondary emotions to humans by vegetarians and omnivores.
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Figure 9.2. Ratings of primary and secondary emotions attributed to apes by 
vegetarians and omnivores. Shows greater attribution of primary than secondary 
emotions and greater attribution by vegetarians than omnivores.
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Vegetarians Omnivores
Figure 9.3. Ratings of primary and secondary emotions attributed to horses by 
vegetarians and omnivores. Shows greater attribution of primary than secondary 
emotions and greater attribution by vegetarians than omnivores.
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Vegetarians Omnivores
Figure 9.4. Ratings of primary and secondary emotions attributed to cattle by 
vegetarians and omnivores. Shows greater attribution of primary than secondary 
emotions and greater attribution by vegetarians than omnivores.
As predicted in Hypothesis 2 (H.6.2), in a pairwise comparison, vegetarians 
rated cattle significantly higher on secondary emotions than did omnivores 
(7[173]=2.97,/?<.05). Therefore, H.6.2 that predicted that vegetarians would attribute
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human emotions to the eaten animal (cattle) to a greater extent than omnivores was 
supported. While the patterns of ratings for apes, horses and cattle are similar 
(vegetarians rating animals higher on emotions than omnivores), the ratings for humans 
were different in that there were relatively equal ratings by vegetarians and omnivores 
for primary and secondary emotions. Therefore, while there were differences in ratings 
of animal out-groups, there was a similar assessment of the in-group by vegetarians and 
omnivores.
Psychological States
The psychological state variables were analyzed using a 3-way mixed ANOVA 
with vegetarian status as a between-subjects variable and psychological state and animal 
rated as within subjects variables.
This analysis showed a main effect of the animal rated variable, F(3,172)= 
445.57,/? < .001. Psychological states were attributed to each of the four animal groups 
in a consistent order. Humans (M=6.62, 5Z)=.05) are perceived to possess 
psychological states to a greater degree than all other animals. This supports 
Hypothesis 3 (H.6.3). Apes are attributed the second most psychological states 
(M= 4.54, SD=A 1), horses the third (M=3.50, SD=. 13), and cattle the least (Af=3.18, 
£D=.13) by both vegetarians and omnivores.
There was a two-way interaction between animal rated and psychological state, 
F(9,173) = 40.10,/? < .001. Data for this interaction are shown in Table 9.2. Overall, 
for morality, there were significant differences between humans and each of the other 
animals. Again, t-tests were used to analyze the pairwise comparisons. Humans were 
attributed significantly higher morality than apes (/[173]=5.37,/?<.001), horses 
(/[ 173]=7.84, /?<.001), and cattle (/[ 173]=8.46, /?<.001). For wishes, humans were 
rated higher than each of the other animals, including apes (/[172]=7.10,/?<.001), horses 
(/[ 173]=8.62, /?<.001), and cattle (/[ 173]=9.29, /?<.001). For thoughts, humans were
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rated higher than each of the other animals, including apes (/[ 173]=3.55, /?<.01), 
horses (/[ 173]=6.13, /K .001), and cattle (/[ 173]=9.00, p<.001). For intentions, humans 
were rated higher than horses (/[173]=5.02,/?<.001) and cattle (/[173]=6.06,/?<.001), 
but not apes (/[ 173]=2.51, /?>.05). These pairwise comparisons broadly support 
Hypothesis 3 (H.6.3) that animals would be denied psychological states relative to 
humans. The finding for humans and apes on intentions is an interesting exception.
An additional un-hypothesized result is that for morality, thoughts and 
intentions, apes (our closest animal relative) are seen as distinct from cattle, an animal 
that is eaten. Apes were attributed significantly greater morality than cattle,
(/[l73]=3.10,/7<.05) greater thoughts than cattle (/[173]=5.45,/?<.001) and greater 
intentions than cattle (/[172]=3.55,/?<.01).
Table 9.1
Means for Psychological States
Morality Wishes Thoughts Intentions
Animal Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Human 6.37 0.08 6.71 0.05 6.68 0.06 6.59 0.06
Ape 3.9 0.04 3.43 0.14 5.04 0.12 5.44 0.12
Horse 2.75 0.14 2.73 0.14 3.85 0.15 4.27 0.15
Cattle 2.46 0.13 2.52 0.14 3.48 0.15 3.79 0.15
There was a two-way interaction between animal rated and vegetarian status, 
F(3,172)= 24.69, p<.001, that supports Hypothesis 4 (H.6.4). Vegetarians rated animals 
(apes, horses, and cattle) higher on psychological states than did omnivores while 
omnivores rated humans higher on psychological states than did vegetarians. Figure 9.5
shows this interaction.
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Figure 9.5. Two way vegetarian status by animal rated interaction. Shows higher 
ratings by vegetarians for apes, horses, and cattle, but a reverse pattern for humans.
The three-way interaction between animal rated, psychological state and 
vegetarian status was not significant, F(9,172) = 1.48,p >.05.
Discussion
Overall, I found that Australian participants tended to deny animals both 
secondary emotions and psychological states. This alone is an important finding as 
some previous research, both in this thesis and in the published literature (Bain, et al., 
2009), has not found infrahumanization in the domain of human uniqueness between 
human groups. The present study shows that the human uniqueness dimension by 
secondary emotions is meaningful to Australians and they do deny human uniqueness 
traits to non-human groups (H.6.1).
The present study also found that vegetarians humanized apes, cattle, and horses 
to a greater degree than did omnivores on emotion measures. This was particularly the 
case for cattle, the only animal traditionally used for food. Vegetarians rated cattle and 
horses higher than omnivores on emotions overall, but also humanized cattle and horses
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in their ratings of secondary emotions (i.e., those thought exclusive to humans), 
more than omnivores. This finding shows that people’s perceptions of the similarity of 
animal groups to humans and their relationship to them are aligned (H.6.2). That is, for 
animal out-groups, humanness attributions are dependent on the particular inter-group 
relationship (or the relationship changes to reflect a belief about humanness).
Omnivores and vegetarians have the same relationship to humans and rated them 
essentially equally on humanness dimensions (Figure 9.1). Omnivores and vegetarians 
have a different relationship to cattle, and rate them differently on humanness 
dimensions (Figure 9.4). If a comparison can be made inter-group relationships 
between humans and animals and inter-group relationships between human groups, I 
can hypothesize that for human groups as well, humanness attribution is dependent on 
the particular inter-group relationship. Therefore, humans will perceive human groups’ 
secondary emotions (and, therefore, their humanness) differently based on the nature of 
the inter-group relationship. In this way, an overarching hypothesis of the thesis 
(Hypothesis B) has found support and will be further investigated in the analysis of 
human inter-group contexts in Study 7.
In the attribution of psychological states, apes were set apart by both vegetarians 
and omnivores as experiencing more morality, thoughts, and intentions than cattle. For 
both vegetarians and omnivores, there is a clear perceptual difference between the 
human/ape relationship, and the human/cattle relationship. Apes are our closest animal 
cousins and, as such, we seem to consider their psychological experiences as being 
similar to our own. However, vegetarians differed from omnivores in the way that they 
attributed psychological states to the non-primate animals (H.6.4).
Omnivores set apes apart from horses and cattle in their experiences of thoughts 
and intentions while vegetarians saw all animals as relatively equal in their abilities to 
experience thoughts and intentions. This further shows that omnivores categorize some
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animals as distinct from others in their humanness depending on humans’ 
relationship to them. Vegetarians’ similar relationship to all animals is evident in their 
equivalent attributions of thoughts and intentions. It may be that the meat-eaters’ 
special regard for apes is based on a perception of greater similarity than between 
humans and other animals.
As expected, there are marked variations in the attitudes of vegetarians and 
omnivores towards the eaten animal group, cattle. In part of the anticipated finding for 
H.6.4, cattle were rated higher on morality by vegetarians compared to omnivores. The 
combined finding of differences in ratings of secondary emotions and of morality 
between vegetarians and omnivores makes relevant the concept of moral exclusion in 
infrahumanization. According to theory on moral exclusion, infrahumanization is 
considered to be a form of moral disengagement (Haney, 1997). It may be this moral 
disengagement that is one of the mechanisms that allows for the process of 
infrahumanization to occur. When members of a group no longer see a target group as 
possessing morality, they are no longer obligated to treat them according to the moral 
standards granted to other groups. This is evident in the fact that there is only a 
significant difference between the ratings by omnivores and vegetarians in the ratings of 
morality for cattle (H.6.4). The relationship between omnivores and cattle is one of 
consumption which is not the case for vegetarians. For horses and apes, the 
relationships are more similar between the animals and the two human groups.
In the time since this study was run, a study has been published looking at a 
similar interaction between vegetarianism and human uniqueness ratings (Bilewicz, 
Imhoff, & Drogosz, 2011). The authors find attribution of higher secondary (but not 
primary) emotions to animals overall by vegetarians than omnivores. They make the 
case that denial of human uniqueness traits of secondary emotions are “strategies of 
moral disengagement’’ (Bilewicz, et al., 2011, p. 201).
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They draw this conclusion based on a result that vegetarians and omnivores 
did not differ on their attributions of humanness of one non-human category (machines) 
but did differ in their attribution of humanness to animals. From these results, they 
conclude that there is not an overall difference between the groups in perceptions of 
humans as superior beings. Rather, they argue that the difference between vegetarians 
and omnivores specifically relates to a moral disengagement with animals as a group to 
whom violence is perpetrated.
In addition, they found that omnivores ascribe significantly less secondary 
emotions to traditionally eaten animals (pigs) than vegetarians. Vegetarians did not 
differ in their attribution of secondary emotions to the non-eaten and the eaten animals, 
while omnivores did. Bilewicz et al. assert that vegetarians perceive “unjust superiority 
in the situation of animal consumption” (Bilewicz, et al., 2011, p. 202) and this is a 
consequence of including animals in the scope of justice, as described by Opotow 
(1995). They conclude that it is this inclusion of animals in the scope of justice that 
results in attributing them with human uniqueness traits of secondary emotions. The 
findings of Bilewicz et al. are echoed in the findings of Study 6 in that vegetarians 
perceived more morality in the animal groups. Perception of morality of an out-group 
may be a key component in determining the humanness of an out-group.
Conclusion
The present study examined the concept of infrahumanization using human and 
non-human groups. I found two important results. First, the results of Study 6 support 
the assumption that secondary emotion attribution is a meaningful inter-group 
dimension for Australian participants and can be used as a functional tool in assessing 
infrahumanization. Therefore, in looking back at Studies 1-5, if infrahumanization was 
occurring, it could have been observed with emotion measures.
227
Secondly, the results showed how the nature of different inter-group 
relationships engender different perspectives on the humanity of an out-group. 
Participants rated four animal groups (humans apes, horses and cattle) on primary and 
secondary emotions and psychological states. The relationships between the human and 
animal groups generally varied in three ways and there were broad differences in 
attributions based on these relationships. For example, apes were rated as having more 
humanness attributes than the other two types of animals. However, all animals were 
infrahumanized, reflecting the nature of the human/animal inter-group relationship 
based on an understanding that the two groups fundamentally differ.
But the nature of the relationships differed on another level. Half of participants 
were vegetarians and half were omnivores. I expected that this would mean that the 
inter-group relationship would differ between vegetarians and omnivores and the animal 
group cattle, and be expressed in the humanness ratings. This was indeed the case, 
showing that the complexities of the nature of the intergroup relationship directly affect 
the perceptions of humanness.
Study 7, assesses infrahumanization in human groups in a cross-cultural context 
that compares equivalent methods in samples in four different countries. In this way, 
any remaining methodological issues can be assessed while exploring the possibility of 
cross-cultural differences in the expression of infrahumanization and, again, the great 
variability in the attribution of humanness based on complex inter-group relationships.
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C h a p t e r  10: S t u d y  7 -  A C r o s s - C u l t u r a l  S t u d y  o f  I n f r a h u m a n i z a t i o n
Introduction
The seventh and final study of the thesis was a cross-cultural design that used 
two different inter-group contexts and three measures of humanness. It is a large 
design, but in designing the study, I had three goals for being able to bring together the 
theory and results of the previous studies of the thesis.
At this point, it was clear that it is possible that an Australian sample will 
infrahumanize an out-group by secondary emotions, given the right inter-group context. 
Specifically, it was evident in Study 6 that Australians do differentiate humans and 
animals on secondary emotions. Therefore, there is strong evidence that previous 
studies in this thesis had the potential to observe infrahumanization by Australian 
participants. To the extent that Study 6 replicated the methodology of Studies 1-5, 
measuring emotion attribution to in-group and out-group targets, the measurement of 
the infrahumanization effect in Study 6 supports the claim that Studies 1-5 were 
methodologically sound for measuring infrahumanization. Still, one goal of Study 7 
was to use identical methodology in sampling groups from four countries, Australia, 
Spain, Switzerland, and Poland.18 Finding infrahumanization in any of these countries 
with similar methods to those used in Studies 1-6 would show that it was the nature of 
the inter-group context within Australia and not inadequate methodology that was the 
cause of not detecting the infrahumanization effect in the Australian sample with human 
inter-group contexts.
In addition to the country between-subjects variable, there was another between- 
subjects variable of inter-group context. There were two inter-group context conditions
ls The countries used in this study were selected for both theoretical and practical reasons. Theoretically, I 
selected countries that were as culturally diverse as possible, to support a cross-cultural design.
Practically, I selected countries from which 1 had made contacts who were willing to become 
collaborators. Also, these collaborators and their colleagues had already conducted infrahumanization 
research in their home countries and had detected the infrahumanization effect, increasing the potential to 
detect infrahumanization results in my study.
in the study. In designing the study, it was important to find inter-group contexts 
that would have, as closely as possible, equivalent meaning in each country. As 
observed above, much of the work on infrahumanization has used nationality as an 
inter-group context (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Cehajic, et al., 2009; Costello & 
Hodson, 2011; Cuddy, et al., 2007b; Delgado, et al., 2009; DeLuca-McLean & Castano, 
2009; Demoulin, et al., 2005; Gaunt, 2009; Paladino, et al., 2002; Paladino, et al., 2004; 
Vaes & Paladino, 2010b; Wohl, et al., 2011). This would, obviously, not be a suitable 
inter-group context as the relationship between any two countries is quite unique. The 
same would be true for other inter-group contexts that had been used previously such as 
language groups (Cortes, et al., 2005), ethnic groups (Cuddy, et al., 2007b), sports 
teams, and religious groups (Tam, et al., 2007; Tam, et al., 2008). Even using many 
generic terms such as “immigrants” or “students” proved to be unsuitable due to the 
differences in the connotations of these groups in the different countries. In the end, the 
collaborators19 in each country agreed on two inter-group contexts: people who obey the 
law and criminals (N. Haslam, 2006), and young-adults and aged-adults (Iversen, 
Larsen, & Solem, 2009). Of course, even these groups are not completely equivalent in 
each country context, but they are less affected by political and historical influences 
than many group contexts used previously. As the study was using inter-group contexts 
that had not previously been tested in the infrahumanization literature, two inter-group 
contexts were used to enhance the likelihood of finding infrahumanization in at least 
one group. This methodological issue provided an additional benefit to the study, an 
ability to assess infrahumanization of two novel groups on which there is no published 
infrahumanization work.
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|y My collaborators on this study were Monika Tamowska, Chiara Storari, Soledad de Lemus Martin and 
Steve Loughnan. My deep appreciation goes to them for data collection and consultation in the design of 
the study.
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Another goal of Study 7 was to assess attribution of humanness using the 
three different measures of humanness. The work of Leyens et al. (2009; Leyens, et al., 
2003; Leyens, et al., 2007; Leyens, et al., 2000a; Leyens, et al., 2001) concentrates 
mainly on using human uniqueness (secondary) emotion attribution to indicate 
infrahumanization. This is because secondary emotions are thought to be uniquely 
human traits, yet are characteristics that are not affected by status or power. As 
addressed in the Chapter 4 analysis of related concepts, Haslam et al. (N. Haslam, 2006; 
N. Haslam & Bain, 2007; N. Haslam, et al., 2005; N. Haslam, et al., 2008a; N. Haslam 
& Loughnan, 2008b; N. Haslam, et al., 2008c) have expanded on the concept of 
humanness by referring to two separate aspects, human uniqueness (HU), and human 
nature (HN). Haslam et al. (2005) have identified a list of traits that represent each of 
these concepts. Study 7 measured all three indicators of humanness: attribution of 
primary and secondary emotions, HU traits and HN traits. In theory, primary and 
secondary emotions and human uniqueness traits are both measuring animalistic 
infrahumanization. Human nature traits are measuring what Loughnan and Halsam 
(2007) call mechanistic dehumanization. Measuring all three of these dependent 
variables would enable me to have a more complete picture of any denial of humanness 
in the four countries.
The third goal of the cross-cultural study design was to explore a hypothesis 
introduced by Bain, Haslam and Kashima (2010; 2009) and Bain, Park, Kwok and 
Haslam (2009). Bain et al. (2009) reported findings of a study involving Chinese and 
Australian participants. Australian participants denied a Chinese out-group HN while 
granting them superior HU. Chinese participants denied an Australian out-group HU 
but granted them HN on certain measures. Bain et al. describe this as a 
“complimentary” pattern of humanness attribution.
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In explaining these results, the Bain et al. (2010) cite work that describes the 
Australian self-stereotype as being high in HN characteristics and low in HU 
characteristics while the Chinese self-stereotype is one of high HU but low HN. Bain et 
al. (2010) conclude that groups do not necessarily attribute both types of humanness to 
their own group. Rather, they may attribute more importance to the traits with which 
they feel their group is more endowed and discriminate in favour of their own group 
only on those important traits. In a similar manner, Leyens et al. (2007) also previously 
suggested that different cultures may perceive humanness differently and that research 
should investigate this possibility. But Leyens et al. do not hypothesize about how to 
predict on which humanness dimensions a particular group will discriminate. Bain et 
al.’s explanation of which humanness dimension a group will discriminate on suggests 
that the self-stereotype of the in-group is the domain in which the in-group will be 
judged superior.
I agree with this line of reasoning that not all groups find all dimensions of 
humanness meaningful and use them to differentiate in-groups and out-groups. At the 
same time, while the self-stereotyping explanation seems to be a valid argument for the 
Bain et al. work, it cannot be applied directly to the present study. The present study 
does not use nationality as the basis for inter-group comparison. Therefore, national 
self-stereotypes are not relevant here. However, in the Bain et al. line of reasoning, the 
characteristics that make up the self-stereotype of a social psychological group are those 
that are considered informative about a group’s humanness. In that way, characteristics 
that the group does not possess are not considered informative, and are therefore not 
suitable to disprove the group’s humanness. The first measure included in Study 7 was 
an assessment of the extent to which participants find HU and HN traits informative 
about determining the humanness of a social psychological group. Participants rated 
each of the 40 HU and HN traits on the degree to which they are informative of whether
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a being is “human” rather than animal or robotic. By establishing whether HU or 
HN characteristics were judged more informative about the humanness of a being, I 
could compare the infrahumanization of groups on HU and HN with which type of 
humanness was most informative. If groups denied traits that they found informative of 
humanness (HU or HN) to the out-group and attributed other, non-informative traits to 
the out-group, then this would be infrahumanizing in traits informative of humanness 
(i.e. the traits that have more relevance in indicating infrahumanization). This pattern 
of trait attribution would support Bain et al.’s claim that groups reserve traits that are 
informative of humanness for their own group. The attribution of traits that a group 
finds uninformative about humannesss does not necessarily indicate an absence of 
infrahumanization or what could also be called a humanizing effect. Based on this 
reasoning, I make predictions in Hypothesis 7.3.
Hypotheses
H. 7.1a
On the emotion selection task, I hypothesized that the infrahumanization pattern 
of emotion attribution would be exhibited differently in different countries, even with 
identical measures and an equivalent group context. Specifically, I expected a 
significant three-way interaction between the country sampled, the group rated, and 
degree to which level of emotion ratings were attributed in each country. I could not 
make a prediction for precisely which country(ies) would exhibit infrahumanization 
because the precipitating conditions of infrahumanization are unclear.
H. 7.1b
I expected the four-way interaction between country, inter-group context, group 
rated (i.e. in-group vs. out-group), and level of emotion to be significant. This is 
because I expected the pattern of infrahumanization (group by level interaction) to differ 
between countries and between the particular inter-group context that the participants
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were rating. Stated differently, I expected the three-way group rated, by level of 
emotion by inter-group context, interaction to be significant in some of the countries. I 
expected that people in different countries would not necessarily rate the humanness of 
both inter-group contexts similarly. That is, while people in one country may 
infrahumanize an out-group, people in another may not. This is because the meanings 
made of the particular inter-group contexts will likely be different in each country. 
However, I had no predictions on precisely how countries would differ on the inter­
group context variable.
H.7.2
I hypothesized that there would be a two-way interaction between country and 
humanness dimension (HU/HN) ratings for the informativeness variable. I expected 
that participants in different countries would find different dimensions of humanness 
informative about the humanness of a being, but I did not have specific expectations for 
which country would find which humanness dimension more informative.
H. 7.3
I hypothesized that there would also be differences in the infrahumanization and 
mechanistic dehumanization by human uniqueness and human nature traits between 
countries and between inter-group context. This would be exhibited as a four-way 
country by inter-group context by group rated by humanness dimension interaction.
H. 7.3 a
I made a more specific hypothesis based on the actual informativeness ratings of 
the measure of HU/HN informativeness. I expected to see either infrahumanization 
(denial of HU) or mechanistic dehumanization (denial of HN) on characteristics (HU or 
HN) that were rated as more informative (H.7.2) for having insight into a person’s 
humanness. I did not predict whether or not they will display infrahumanization or 
dehumanization on the domain they find less informative about the salient in-group’s
humanness; this is because, while they may find one dimension more informative, 
the other may be informative as well and provide grounds for inter-group 
discrimination.20
Methods
Pilot 1 -  Emotions
Research collaborators in each country conducted a pilot study on the level and 
valence of 40 emotion words taken from Demoulin et al. (2004). The purpose of this 
study was to establish which words in each country are considered positive and negative 
and which are considered primary and secondary. I had based emotion categories in 
Studies 1 -6 (primary positive, primary negative, secondary positive and secondary 
negative) on the data gathered by Demoulin et al. (2004a). Recognizing that the 
Demoulin et al. study was administered in English, I wanted to measure the level and 
valence of emotions within each country to establish each country’s unique emotion 
categories.
Pilot studies were administered in Spanish in Spain, in Polish in Poland, in 
English in Australia, and in French in Switzerland. The emotion word lists were 
translated and backtranslated by the collaborators and one of their colleagues. Pilot 1 
had two tasks. In the first part, participants were asked, for each of 40 emotions, to 
“please tick a box to indicate the ‘valence’ of that emotion. That is, when you use, hear, 
or feel this emotion, what degree of negative or positive feelings do you think it 
expresses?” The rating scale ranged from 1 ("extremely negative") to 7 ("extremely 
positive"), with the midpoint of 4 indicating "neutral.” In the second part, participants 
were told, “Some emotions you might use to describe the feelings of both people and
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20 What is o f theoretical importance is not the absolute importance ratings o f HU and HN, but the relative 
importance o f HU and HN. Based on the measure, participants may rate both HU and HN highly on 
importance. This is not o f theoretical importance. The hypothesis is based on the assumption that 
participants finds either HU or HN more informative than the other and will base their humanness ratings 
on that.
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animals. However, other emotions you would ONLY use to describe the feelings of 
people. In fact, these emotions might sound silly if used to describe feelings of an 
animal.” Participants were then asked to “indicate the extent to which each emotion 
expresses a feeling that is exclusive to humans by ticking a box along the scale.” A 
rating of 1 was “not at all exclusive to humans” and a rating of 7 is "very exclusive to 
humans.”
The Australian sample included 47 volunteer participants (23 women, 20 men, 
mean age 22.22) from a psychology research participation pool. The Spanish sample 
included 29 student participants (19 women, 8 men, mean age 21.03). The Swiss 
sample included 28 student participants (20 women, 7 men, mean age 21.67). The 
Polish sample included 30 student participants (21 women, 9 men, 20.83 mean age).
For each country, I made a list of four words from each of the four emotion categories 
(primary positive, primary negative, secondary positive, and secondary negative). I 
created these groupings by first taking the mean of valence and level ratings, and rank 
ordering the mean ratings of lowest to highest. I considered ratings above 4 on the 
valence ratings to be positively valenced and below 4 to be negatively valenced. I 
considered ratings above 4 on the level ratings to be secondary and below 4 on the level 
ratings to be primary. I selected four emotion words from the most extreme ends of the 
scale for both valence and level ratings to create groupings of emotions of primary 
positive, primary negative, secondary positive and secondary negative emotions. 
English translations of the words in their categories are in Table 10.1.
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Table 10.1
Emotion Level and Valence Categories for the Four Countries.
Primary Secondary
Country Positive Negative Positive Negative
Australia Excitement Pain Passion Humiliation
Enjoyment Fear Admiration Disgust
Affection Suffering Optimism Embarrassment
Pleasure Scared Nostalgia Shame
Spain Pleasure Scariness Love Embarrassment
Enjoyment Fury Passion Gloomy
Affection Suffering Hope Remorse
Surprise Pain Optimism Guilt
Switzerland Calmness Fright Admiration Shame
Affection Pain Hope Embarrassment
Pleasure Scariness Passion Disenchantment
Enjoyment Panic Optimism Repentance
Poland Affection Pain Optimism Humiliation
Pleasure Fright Hope Disgust
Calmness Suffering Sympathy Shame
Enjoyment Fury Passion Embarrassment
After assessing the humanness of the emotion words in the four countries, I 
noticed both similarities and differences between the emotion word categories that 
emerged. Enjoyment and pleasure were common primary positive words in all 
countries. Pain was a common primary negative word in all countries, and fear was 
common to all countries except Spain. Passion and optimism were common secondary 
positive words in all countries. Embarrassment was a common secondary negative 
word in all countries, and the secondary negative words were identical in Australia and 
Poland. While this was a slight methodological variation from the earlier studies in the 
thesis, the words identified in the four categories in the Australian sample were a subset 
of the words used in other studies in the thesis. In Study 7, there were 16 total words, 
with four in each category. Previous studies used between 12 and the full set of 40 
emotion words. For this reason, I would not consider the emotion measure in Study 7 
as a significant methodological change, Rather it reinforces the emotion categorization
of Studies 1-6.
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Pilot 2 -  Human Uniqueness and Human Nature
Researchers also conducted a second pilot study on the 40 trait terms used to 
assess human uniqueness and human nature. The study was based on the work of 
Haslam and Bain (2007) and Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee and Bastian (2005) which 
yielded a list of 40 traits rated high and low on desirability, human uniqueness, and 
human nature. The aim of Pilot 2 was similar to that of Pilot 1 in assessing a unique set 
of measures relative to each country’s cultural understanding but this time with the 
human uniqueness and human nature qualities of the HN and HU traits. I could not 
assume that the HN and HU trait categories found within the Australian samples of 
Haslam et al.’s (2007) work would be applicable in the other countries.
The pilot contained two parts. Participants were asked to rate the 40 traits on 
how much they reflected human uniqueness (“This characteristic is experienced solely 
by human beings; it is not experienced by animals.”), and human nature (“This 
characteristic is an aspect of human nature.”) on a scale from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 
7 (“strongly agree”). The Australian sample included 29 (17 women, 12 men, mean age 
36.41) volunteer participants approached in a public space on campus. The Spanish 
sample included 37 student participants (34 women, 3 men, mean age 19.58). The 
Swiss sample included 39 student participants (30 women, 9 men, mean age 22.82).
The Polish sample included 37 student participants (15 women, 22 men, mean age 
21.92).
For the four countries, I generated the humanness trait categories similarly to the 
process in Pilot 1 with the emotion words. I found the mean of HU ratings and HN 
ratings for traits within each country, and subtracted the mean of each trait from the 
total HU or HN mean to find a value for each word equal to its difference from the total 
HU or HN mean. I was interested in the words that were furthest from the total mean, 
to find the words that were most reflective of HU and HN. I, then, ranked all of the
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emotions in order from least to greatest on their HU score and HN score. I 
categorized words whose difference scores were one scale point above the total mean 
for HU as representative of HU and one scale point above the total mean for HN as 
representative of HN. I eliminated words that appeared as representative of both high 
HN and high HU. From this, I concluded that human uniqueness and human nature 
traits in the ANU sample were rated in the same classifications as in Haslam and Bain 
(2007). The trait categories differed in the other countries. The trait words used for 
each category for each country are listed in Table 10.2.
Table 10.2
Human Uniqueness and Human Nature Trait Categories for Each Country
HU I IN
Country Positive Negative Positive Negative
Australia Broadminded Ignorant Curious Jealous
Humble Stingy Analytic Insecure
Polite Rude Helpful Impulsive
Spain Broadminded Stingy Fun loving Impatient
Sympathetic Irresponsible Passionate Jealous
Humble Shy Analytic Nervous
Switzerland Polite Stingy Curious Selfless
Broadminded Irresponsible Imaginative Impulsive
Humble Fun loving Friendly Jealous
Poland Polite Rude Ambitious Curious
Humble Hard hearted Analytic Passionate
Conscientious Timid Thorough Jealous
Main Study
Participants
The Australian sample included 234 (152 women, 63 men, mean age 19.22) 
participants taking part as an activity in a first-year psychology course. The Spanish 
sample included 100 participants (80 women, 19 men, 1 unreported, mean age 22.43) 
who took part for partial course credit in either psychology or psychopedagogy. The 
Swiss sample included 89 participants (59 women, 29 men, 1 unreported, mean age
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22.63) who were students taking part for partial course credit in a psychology 
course. The Polish sample included 55 participants (25 women, 30 men, mean age 
22.67) taking part for partial course credit in a psychology course.
Materials and Design
Participants in each of the four countries completed questionnaires that had been 
translated from English to their home language and then backtranslated into English for 
confirmation. The study was a 4 (country of sample:
Australia/Spain/Switzerland/Poland) x 2 (inter-group context: criminals/aged-adults) x 2 
(group of target: in-group/out-group) design, with country of sample and inter-group 
context as between-subjects variables and group of target as a within-subjects variable.
Questionnaires were divided into “Section 1,” containing one part, and “Section 
2,” containing five parts. The inter-group context manipulation was not presented until 
Section 2, so questions in Section 1 were answered without a particular inter-group 
context salient. In Section 1, participants rated the extent to which each of 40 traits 
from the second pilot study indicated the humanness of a group on a 7 point scale, from 
1 (“not at all informative”) to 7 (“very informative”). This question was important for 
analyzing hypotheses 7.2 and 7.3.
Section 2 introduced the inter-group context of the study. Part A told 
participants that the rest of the study was interested in how they perceive specific 
groups of people, and introduced the inter-group context manipulation. Participants 
were told that the researchers were interested in their views about the groups of 
criminals or aged-adults (out-group) and people who obey the law or young-adults (in­
group). Criminals were defined as “people who have committed crimes such as 
breaking and entering, embezzlement, smuggling, and theft.” People who obey the law 
were defined as “ones who have never committed a crime or spent time in jail.” Young- 
adults were defined as “those between the ages of 18 and 30 who are in the early stages
241
of their adulthood, just starting a career, perhaps still in college or university, and 
just starting to think about marriage and families.” Aged-adults were defined as “those 
over the age of 65 who are retired or close to retiring from work, have families who are 
grown, and maybe are starting to have grandchildren.” The aged adult inter-group 
context questionnaire also noted that “of course, there are also a lot of people who fall 
between those two age categories. Don’t include these “middle aged” people in your 
idea of young and aged.” They were asked to consider the differences between the two 
groups and write a short description of each group. This task was intended to enhance 
the inter-group salience.
Part B of the questionnaire, Section 2, included one (criminal inter-group 
context) or two (age inter-group context) items to verify group belongingness, and a 
seven-item measure of identification (Doosje, et al., 1995; Leach, et ah, 2008). The 
belongingness questions read, “Have you ever committed a crime or spent time in jail?” 
in the criminal out-group inter-group context, and “Are you between the ages of 18 and 
30?” and “Are you over the age of 65?” on the aged adult out-group inter-group context 
with boxes to tick yes or no. The seven-item identification measure included items such 
as, “Being a young adult (person who obeys the law) is an important part of how I see 
myself’ and “Being a young adult (person who obeys the law) gives me a good 
feeling,” with participants indicating their agreement on a 7-point Likert scale, anchored 
with 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”). Chrombach’s alphas for the 
identification measure in the aged-adult condition was .75, and for the criminal 
condition was .85.
Parts C and D of Section 2 contained the main dependent variables. Each part 
asked about either the in-group or out-group, and the order of presentation of groups 
was counterbalanced. Participants were first presented with the same list of 40 emotion 
words presented in the first pilot that was taken from Demoulin et al. (2004a).
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Although the analysis included only 16 of the emotions that best fit the four emotion 
categorizations, all emotions were included so that the list presented would be 
consistent in each country. Participants were then asked to circle those emotions that 
they thought best described the feelings of criminals/aged-adults (people who obey the 
law/young-adults). They were told, “You can choose as many as you like but please try 
not to pick too many”. This was a replication of methods used in Studies 4 and 5.
Next, participants were presented with the list of 40 personality traits used in the 
second pilot study. Again, all 40 trait words were used to maintain consistency between 
the different countries’ versions of the questionnaire. Participants were asked to, 
“indicate the degree to which you think criminals/aged-adults (people who obey the 
law/young-adults) possess the following personality traits,” using a scale from 1 (“much 
less than the average person”) to 7 (“much more than the average person”). Two 
different measures were used (selection for emotions and rating for traits) for the two 
dependent variables in accordance with convention of previous work.
Part E of Section 2 included a manipulation check of the inter-group context 
being discussed (criminals and people who obey the law or aged and young-adults). It 
read, “In the questionnaire you have just completed, what were the group categories 
being discussed” and participants were asked to tick a box of either “criminals and 
people who obey the law” or “aged and young-adults.” There were also demographic 
questions including age and gender.
Results
Section 2, Part B asked questions to ascertain membership with one of the 
assumed in-groups in either of the two inter-group contexts. Participants who did not 
indicate being members of the assumed in-group (people who obey the law or young- 
adults) were removed from the sample. Part E was a manipulation check of the inter­
group context. Participants who did not correctly identify the intergroup context in their
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condition were taken out of the sample. This left 196 Australian participants (135 
women, 61 men, mean age 19.02), 94 Spanish participants (77 women, 17 men, mean 
age 22.48), 86 Swiss participants (58 women, 27 men, mean age 22.60) and 55 Polish 
participants (25 women, 30 men, mean age 22.67)
H. 7. la  and H. 7. lb
To create variables for emotion selection, I calculated a single “selection value” 
(value between 0 and 1, representing the percentage of the four possible words chosen) 
for each participant for each of the four emotion categories (primary positive, primary 
negative, secondary positive, and secondary negative) based on each country’s content 
of the emotion categories. I found the mean of the values for the four emotions in each 
group.
Hypotheses 7.1a and 7.1b address the attribution of humanness emotions. 
Hypothesis 7.1a predicts a three-way interaction between group, level, and country. 
Hypothesis 7.1b extends that by predicting a four-way interaction between group, level, 
country and inter-group context (criminal or aged adults). To assess these hypotheses, I 
conducted a five-way ANOVA with country and inter-group context as between- 
subjects variables, and group rated, level of emotion, and valence of emotion as within- 
subjects variables. Overall, there were 20 significant results in such a large design. 
Regarding the hypotheses, the results were somewhat as hypothesized, but not in a 
completely straightforward manner. For an overview, refer to the Table 10.3 source 
table that lists all of the significant effects from the five-way ANOVA.
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Table 10.3
Source table o f all significant effect from the five-way country by inter-group 
context by valence by group by level__________________________________
Significant effects DF F= P<
group (1,423) 270.25 0.001
group x country (3,423) 80.92 0.001
group x inter-group context (1,423) 25.23 0.001
group x country x inter-group context (3,423) 3.64 0.05
level (1,423) 83.36 0.001
level x country (3,423) 76.42 0.001
valence (1,423) 159.54 0.001
valence x country (3,423) 47.79 0.001
valence x inter-group context (1,423) 219.04 0.001
group x level (1,423) 12.30 0.001
group x level x country (3,423) 31.24 0.001
group x level x inter-group context (1,423) 4.97 0.05
group x valence (1,423) 116.32 0.001
group x valence x country (3,423) 53.17 0.001
group x valence x inter-group context (1,423) 59.99 0.001
level x valence (1,423) 159.19 0.001
level x valence x country (3,423) 55.75 0.001
group x level x valence (1,423) 130.55 0.001
group x level x valence x country 
group x level x valence x inter-group
(3,423) 64.71 0.001
context (1,423) 4.76 0.05
There was a main effect for group rated, such that emotions were attributed to 
in-groups (M=.31, SD=.01) to a greater degree than out-groups (M=.19, SD=.01). 
There was a main effect for level, such that primary emotions (M=.28, SD=.01) were 
attributed to a greater degree than secondary emotions (M=.22, SD= 01). There was a 
main effect for country such that the most emotions were attributed by the Polish 
sample (M=27, SD=.01), followed by the Swiss sample (M=.26, SD=.01), the 
Australian sample (M= 25, SD=.01), and the Spanish sample (M= 22, SD=.01). There 
was a main effect for valence, such that positive emotions were attributed to all groups 
to a greater degree (M=.30, SD=.01) than negative emotions (M=.21, SD=.01).
There was a significant two-way, group by level interaction that indicated 
overall infrahumanization,. As shown in Figure 10.1 There was greater attribution of
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emotion to the in-group than the out-group for both primary and secondary 
emotions, but the difference was greater for the secondary emotions.
In-group
— — Out-group
SecondaryPrimary
Figure 10.1. Two way, group by level interaction for the whole data set showing 
overall infrahumanization.
As seen in Table 10.3, the group by country interaction was significant, as was 
the group by inter-group context interaction and the level by country interaction. Rather 
than report the means of these interactions, 1 will report on higher order interactions that 
encompassed these interactions.
The three-way, country by group by level interaction that was predicted by 
H.7.1a, was significant. As anticipated, countries differed in the extent to which they 
attributed primary and secondary emotions. Figure 10.2 shows that, overall, more 
secondary emotions were attributed to in-groups than out-groups, but the degree to 
which this was true varied by country. Also varying by country were the levels of 
attribution of secondary emotions in relation to primary emotions. Of particular note is 
Spain, for which the in-group is attributed a much greater level of primary emotions 
than the out-group and this difference is larger than for the secondary emotions.
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Figure 10.2. Country by group by level significant interaction.
However, before any conclusions can be made on H.7.la based on the expected 
three-way interaction, it is important to describe an unexpected line of interactions 
involving valence that pertain to the three-way country by group by level interaction. 
There was a three-way group by level by valence interaction, suggesting an overall 
infrahumanization effect qualified by valence. As Figure 10.3 shows, the pattern was 
similar to that seen in previous studies in this thesis with more positive secondary 
emotions being attributed to the in-group and more negative secondary emotions 
attributed to the out-group, and primary emotions relatively even.
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In-group
— — Out-group
Positive Negative Positive Negative
SecondaryPrimary
Figure 10.3. Three-way group by level by valence interaction with more secondary 
positive emotions attributed to the in-group than the out-group and more negative 
secondary emotions attributed to the out-group than the in-group.
This interaction was further qualified by two, four-way interactions. There was 
a four-way group by level by valence by country interaction that qualified the three-way 
group by level by country interaction shown in Figure 10.2, and a four-way group by 
level by valence by inter-group context interaction.
I will first explain the four-way group by level by valence by inter-group context 
interaction that qualified the three-way the group by level by inter-group context 
interaction. As Figure 10.4 shows, for the criminal inter-group context, for secondary 
emotions, more positive emotions were attributed to the in-group than the out-group and 
more negative emotions were attributed to the out-group than the in-group. There was 
also a pattern of slightly more negative primary emotions being attributed to the out­
group than the in-group and more positive primary emotions being attributed to the in­
group. Overall, then, in the criminal condition, there is more of a pattem of in-group 
favouritism than infrahumanization. As can be seen in Figure 10.5, however, for the 
aged-adult inter-group context, for secondary emotions, more positive and negative
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emotions were attributed to the in-group than the out-group. This is the 
infrahumanization pattern of emotion attribution.
To analyze this four-way interaction in more detail, I conducted three-way group 
by level by valence ANOVAs within each inter-group context, criminals and aged-adult 
groups. For the criminal inter-group context ANOVA, the group by level 
(infrahumanization) interaction was not significant, F( 1,214)=.70, p=A  1. However, the
group by level by valence interaction was significant, F( 1, 214)=33.61,/?<.001.
In-group
— — Out-group
NegativePositive Positive Negative
Secondary
Figure 10.4. Criminal data only showing in-group favouritism in secondary emotion 
attribution.
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In-group
— — Out-group
Positive Negative Positive Negative
SecondaryPrimary
Figure 10.5. Aged-adult data only showing infrahumanization by both positive and 
negative emotions.
For the aged-adult inter-group context, the group by level interaction was 
significant, F( 1 ,213)=23.11,/?<001. The pattern is infrahumanization, with more 
secondary emotions for the in-group (M=.35, SD=.0\) than the out-group (M=. 18,
SD -.01), and a smaller difference between the in-group (A/=.35, SD=.02) and out-group 
(M=.26, SD=.01) for primary emotions. However, this is, again, qualified by a three- 
way group by level by valence interaction, F( 1,213)=61.41, /?<001. The valence 
interaction is that, while there is a greater difference between in-group and out-group 
negative emotions for the primary emotions, there is a greater difference between in­
group and out-group positive emotions for the secondary emotions. I would still 
describe this pattern as infrahumanization.
Now we will return to the four-way group by level by valence by country 
interaction. This interaction suggests an in-group favouritism pattern for some 
countries and an infrahumanization pattern for others. This interaction can be seen 
across Figures 10.6-10.9. For Australia (Figure 10.6), Switzerland (Figure 10.8), and 
Poland (Figure 10.9), the pattern is in-group favouritism, with more positive primary 
and secondary emotions attributed to the in-group than the out-group, and more
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negative primary and secondary emotions attributed to the out-group than the in­
group. For Spain (Figure 10.7), the pattern is infrahumanization in the secondary 
emotions, but there is a very large difference in the negative primary emotions between
the in-group and the out-group.
In-group
“  — Out-group
Positive Negative Positive Negative
SecondaryPrimary
Figure 10.6. Australian data that shows in-group favouritism.
In-group
— — Out-group
Positive Negative Positive Negative
SecondaryPrimary
Figure 10.7. Spanish data that shows infrahumanization.
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NegativePositive Negative Positive
SecondaryPrimary
Figure 10.8. Swiss data interaction non-significant.
NegativePositive Negative Positive
SecondaryPrimary
Figure 10.9. Polish data that shows in-group favouritism.
The four-way interaction of country by inter-group context by group rated by 
level of emotion that was predicted by H.7.1b was not significant, F(3, 423)=.28,/?>.05. 
Nor was the full five-way interaction, F(3, 423)=1.71, p>.05. I wanted to explore the 
four-way group by level by valence by country interaction further, by analyzing the 
results for each country individually. Also, despite the fact that the predicted four-way 
country by inter-group context by group rated by level of emotion interaction was not 
significant, I still wanted to explore the three way group by level by inter-group context 
interaction within each country. Of course, any results from these analyses need to be
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interpreted with caution, but such analyses would simply be an exploration of the 
data. Therefore, I conducted a four-way, inter-group context by group-rated, by level of 
emotion, by valence of emotion ANOVA for each country sample with inter-group 
context as between-subjects and group rated, level of emotion, and valence of emotion 
as within-subjects variables. I was looking for the three-way inter-group context by 
group rated by level of emotion interactions within each country sample to observe any 
differences between the countries in the specific inter-group context. I was also looking 
at the pattern of the group by level by valence interactions within each country.
In the Australian sample, the two-way, group by level interaction was significant 
(H.7.1a), showing the infrahumanization pattern overall, F(l,194)=34.99,/?<.001.
There was a small difference in the emotion attribution between in-group (M=.23, 
*SZ)=.01) and out-group (M=.22, STK01) for primary emotions and greater attribution of 
secondary emotions to the in-group (Af=.29, ,SZ)=.01) than the out-group (M=. 18,
SF^.Ol). However, this was qualified by a three-way group by level by valence 
interaction as Figure 10.6 shows F(l,194)=6.51,/?<.05.
The expected three-way, inter-group context by group rated by level of emotion 
interaction was not significant, F(l,194)=.53,/?>.05, but the full four-way interaction 
was significant, F(l,194)=4.20,/?<.05. The pattern was similar to the overall pattern 
found for all countries combined. In the criminal inter-group context, there was a 
pattern of greater positive emotions attributed to the in-group and greater negative 
emotions attributed to the outgroup, across level (Figure 10.10). That is, while in the 
positive emotion attribution there were more primary and secondary emotions to the in­
group than the out-group, there was more attribution of primary and secondary negative 
emotions to the out-group than the in-group. This could also be described as out-group 
humanization in secondary emotions. In the aged-adult inter-group context, there was
the infrahumanization pattern of greater secondary emotions attributed to the in­
group than the out-group (Figure 10.11).
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In-group
— — Out-group
PositivePositive Negative Negative
SecondaryPrimary
Figure 10.10. Australian sample; criminal context, showing the in-group favouritism 
pattern.
In-group
— Out-group
Positive Negative Positive Negative
SecondaryPrimary
Figure 10.11. Australian sample; aged-adult context, showing an infrahumanization 
pattern.
In the Spanish sample, the two-way group by level interaction was significant, 
F(l,92)=39.65,/?<.001; however, the pattern was greater attribution of both secondary 
(Min=.349, SDin=.02; Mou,=. 143, SDowr=.01) and primary emotions to the in-group than 
the out-group, with a larger difference for primary emotions (M;w=.598, SDin=.02;
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Mou,=.250, iSDow,=.01). This was qualified by a three-way group by level by valence 
interaction, shown in Figure 7, F(l,92)=305.48,/?<.001.
The expected three-way, inter-group context by group by level interaction for 
the Spanish sample was not significant F(l,92)=1.71,/?>.05. Therefore, the pattern 
described in the two-way group by level interaction was similar for both the aged-adult 
out-group inter-group context and the criminal out-group inter-group context. The full 
four-way interaction was also not significant F(l,92)=.681,p>.05. So, in the Spanish 
sample, patterns of emotion attribution were similar across inter-group inter-group 
context.
In the Swiss sample, the two-way group by level interaction was significant, 
F(l,84)=9.69,/?<.01, as shown in Figure 10.12. It followed an infrahumanization 
pattern with similar emotion attribution to the in-group and out-group on primary 
emotions (Min=.23, SD=.02; Mout=.21, SD=.02) and greater attribution of secondary 
emotions to the in-group than the out-group (Min=.23, SD=.02; Mout=A5, SD=.02).
.300
.250
.200
.150
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'in-group
’out-group
primary secondary
Figure 10.12. Swiss group by level significant interaction. Shows slightly greater 
attribution of secondary emotions to the in-group and similar primary emotions to the 
in-group and out-group.
For the Swiss data, the three-way group by level by valence interaction was non­
significant, F( 1,84)= 1.27,/?=.26. Therefore, the infrahumanization pattern was not 
qualified by valence. The three-way inter-group context by group by level interaction 
for the Swiss sample was marginally significant, F(l,84)=2.89,/?=.09. As Figure 10.13
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and Figure 10.14 show, the infrahumanization effect was stronger in the aged-adult 
inter-group inter-group context than in the criminal inter-group context. The four-way 
inter-group context by group by level by valence interaction was non-significant, 
F(l,84)=2.0 !,/?>. 05.
.300
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primary secondary
Figure 10.13. Swiss sample in the criminal inter-group context showing a relatively 
weak infrahumanization effect (significant, /?<.05) compared to the aged-adult inter­
group context (see Figure 10.14).
primary secondary
---- “  in-group
— ”  ~  out-group
Figure 10.14. Swiss sample in the aged-adult inter-group context showing a relatively 
strong infrahumanization effect (significant, /?<.001) compared to the criminal inter­
group context (see Figure 10.13).
In the Polish sample, the two-way group by level interaction was significant, 
F(l,53)=26.40,/?<.001, in the infrahumanization pattern. While there was little 
difference between primary emotion attribution (Min=.19, SD=.02; Mout=.22, SD=.02), 
there was greater secondary emotion attribution to the in-group than the out-group 
(vV/jn=26, SD=. 02; Mout= 14, SD=. 02). However, this was qualified by a three-way 
group by level by valence interaction, F(l,53)=7.1 !,/?=.01, shown in Figure 10.9.
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The three-way inter-group context by group by level interaction was not 
significant, F( 1,53)= 1.09, p>.05. The four-way inter-group context by group by level 
by valence interaction was marginally significant, F(l,53)=3.84,/?=.06. The pattern is 
depicted in Figures 10.15-10.16. In the criminal inter-group context, there was the in­
group favouritism pattern of greater attribution of positive primary and secondary 
emotions to the in-group and greater attribution of negative primary and secondary 
emotions to the out-group (Figure 10.15). In the aged-adult inter-group context there 
was an infrahumanization pattern being driven by the positive secondary emotions 
(Figure 10.16). There were relatively equal positive and negative primary emotions 
attributed to the in-group and the out-group.
In-group
Out-group
Positive Negative Positive Negative
SecondaryPrimary
Figure 10.15. Group by level by valence interaction within the Polish sample for the 
criminal inter-group context.
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In-group
Out-group
Positive Negative Positive Negative
SecondaryPrimary
Figure 10.16. Group by level interaction within the Polish sample for the aged-adult 
inter-group context.
To summarize the results for this section, a two-way group by level interaction 
showed that there was a general tendency towards infrahumanization, across countries 
and inter-group context, with greater attribution of secondary emotions to the in-group 
than the out-group. The country by group by level interaction that was predicted by 
H.7.1a was significant. While there was always more secondary emotion attributed to 
the in-group than the out-group, the extent to which this was true differed by country, as 
did the relative attribution of primary and secondary emotions. However, what was not 
predicted was the four-way inter-group context by group by level by valence interaction 
that was also significant, qualifying the three-way interaction. As described above, 
when valence qualifies the group by level interaction, often, the pattern of emotion 
attribution is not infrahumanization. In this case, for Australia, Switzerland and Poland, 
the pattern was in-group favouritism. For Spain, the pattern was more similar to 
infrahumanization, but the larger difference in primary relative to secondary emotions
made the pattern unclear.
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Hypothesis 7.1b predicted a four-way interaction between country, inter­
group context, group and level. While this interaction was not significant, there were 
significant interactions in which inter-group context was at play. There was a 
significant group by level by valence by inter-group context interaction. This showed 
that overall, across countries, the pattern of emotion attribution in the criminal inter­
group context was in-group favouritism, and the pattern in the aged-adult inter-group 
context was infrahumanization. When I analysed the three-way group by level by 
valence interaction within each inter-group context, the interactions were again 
significant in the same pattern. So the emotion attribution pattern overall was different 
between the two out-group inter-group contexts.
Finally, I also conducted four-way ANOVAs within each country, to explore the 
data further. The two-way group by level interaction was significant in all four country 
samples. The three-way group by level by valence interaction was significant in 
Australia, Spain and Poland. The predicted three-way interaction of group by level by 
inter-group context interaction was significant in Switzerland, showing a stronger 
infrahumanization effect in the aged-adult inter-group context than the criminal inter­
group context. And the full four-way group by level by valence by inter-group context 
interaction was significant in Australia and Poland, echoing the pattern in the full 
sample, with in-group favouritism in the criminal inter-group context and 
infrahumanization in the aged-adult inter-group context. So in essence, in Australia, 
there was infrahumanization for the aged-adult inter-group context only. For Spain the 
pattem of secondary emotions was infrahumanization across inter-group context, but the 
attribution pattem of primary emotions was not. For Switzerland there was general 
infrahumanization in both inter-group context, but slightly greater in the aged-adult
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inter-group context. For the Polish sample, there was infrahumanization in the 
aged-adult inter-group context only.21 
H. 7.2
To analyze the second hypothesis, I calculated a variable of “informativeness” 
for each participant for each humanness category (HU positive, HU negative, HN 
positive, HN negative) by calculating a single mean of their ratings of the traits in that 
category. Content of the categories were different for each country and were based on 
the results of Pilot Study 2. Then, I conducted a two-way, country 
(Australia/Spain/Switzerland/Poland) x humanness dimension (HU/HN) ANOVA, with 
country as a between-subjects variable and humanness dimension a within-subjects 
variable. I collapsed across valence because I was only interested in whether HU or HN 
traits in general were more informative of the humanness of a group.
The expected two-way interaction between humanness dimension and country 
was significant, F(3,427)=4.15, p<.01. Thus, there was a difference in the ratings of the 
importance of the two types of humanness between countries. Figure 10.17 shows this 
two-way interaction. There was a tendency to rate HU traits as more informative than 
HN traits for Australia, Spain, and Switzerland. The pattem reversed for Poland, where 
HN traits were rated as more informative than HU traits. There were no other 
significant effects from this analysis.
21 As the source table shows, there were additional significant effects from the full five-way ANOVA. 
However, as these are not theoretically meaningful, they have not been addressed in the chapter. Instead, 
these are described in the Appendix.
260
Figure 10.17. Two-way country by humanness dimension interaction with Australia, 
Spain and Switzerland rating HU higher than HN and Poland rating HN higher than
HU.
H. 7.3, and H. 7.3 a
From the results relevant to H.7.2, the details of H.7.3a can now be specified. 
Regarding infrahumanization in human uniqueness and human nature terms, I would 
now expect that samples in Australia, Spain, and Switzerland will display 
infrahumanization in attribution of HU. I expect that the Polish sample will display 
mechanistic dehumanization in the attribution of HN. To test this, I conducted a four­
way ANOVA with country and inter-group context as between-subjects variables and 
group (in-group/out-group) and humanness dimension (HU/HN) as within-subjects 
variables.
There were two main effects in the analysis. There was a main effect for group, 
with in-groups were attributed traits to a greater extent (Af= 4.24, SD=.02) than out­
groups (A/=3.97, SD=.02), F( 1,423) =99.41,/?<.001. There was a main effect for 
humanness dimension, with greater attribution of HN traits (M=4.22, SD=.02) than HU 
traits overall (M= 3.99, SD=. 02), F( 1,423) = 181.54,/?<001.
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There were three, two-way interactions. The group by inter-group context 
interaction was significant, F( 1,-423)= 104.4\,p< .001. While in the criminal inter-group 
context, people were attributed approximately equal degrees of traits to the in-group 
(A/=4.04, SD=.03), and the out-group (M=4.04, SD=.03), in the aged-adult inter-group 
context, the in-group was attributed more traits (A/=4.44, SD=.03) than the out-group 
(A/=3.90, SD=.03). The group by humanness dimension interaction was significant, 
F(l,423)=21.15,/?<.001. Overall, there was virtually no difference between the 
attribution of HU traits between in-group {M=4.08, SD=.D2) and out-group (M= 3.90, 
SD=.02), but more attribution of HN to the in-group (M=4.39, SZ)=.03) than the out­
group (M=4.04, SD=.03). This effect points to broad mechanistic dehumanization by 
HN traits but a general lack of infrahumanization by HU overall.
Humanness dimension interacted with country such that, while HN traits were 
attributed more in each country, this was most the case for Poland, and least the case for 
Switzerland, F(3,423)=7.58,/?<.001. The means are displayed in Table 10.4. While 
this interaction was not explicitly predicted by H.7.3a, it follows that the difference 
between HN and HU is highest where HN was expected to be most informative and the 
difference between HN and HU is least where HU was expected to be most informative, 
according to the results relevant to H.7.2.
Table 10.4
Interaction o f Humanness Dimension with Country
Country HU HN
Australia M 4.04 4.25
SD 0.02 0.02
Spain M 4.00 4.33
SD 0.03 0.04
Switzerland M 4.05 4.16
SD 0.03 0.04
Poland M 3.87 4.13
SD 0.04 0.05
262
I was expecting the full four-way interaction between country, inter-group 
context, group, and humanness dimension to be significant, but it was not, 
F(3,423)=.25,/?>.05. However, the three-way group by humanness dimension by inter­
group context interaction (F(l,423)=321.00,/?<.001) and three-way group by 
humanness dimension by country interaction (F(3,423)=2.92,/?<.05) were both 
significant.
The first interaction of group by humanness dimension by inter-group context 
showed an interesting pattern, reflecting the unique understanding of the two distinct 
inter-group relationships. As Figure 10.18 shows, in the aged-adult group, attributions 
of HU were relatively similar for both groups. But there was mechanistic 
dehumanization in the HN attribution, with more HN attributed to the in-group than the 
out-group. In the criminal inter-group context, the pattern was different, as is shown in 
Figure 10.19. There was generally infrahumanization in HU traits, but humanization of 
the criminal out-group in HN traits. I will address why this might be the case in the 
Discussion.
in-group
— — — out-group
Figure 10.18. Group by humanness dimension interaction for the aged-adult group 
context showing mechanistic dehumanization in HN traits.
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in-group
out-group
Figure 10.19. Group by humanness dimension interaction for the criminal group 
context showing infrahumanization by HU and humanization of the out-group by HN.
In the second interaction of group by humanness dimension by country, the 
patterns are similar in each country with higher ratings of HU and HN to the in-group 
than the out-group (depicted in Figures 10.20-10.23 by the solid lines always being 
higher than the dotted lines). There are, however, subtle differences. Figure 10.20 
shows that for Australia, differentiation of the in-group and out-group was more 
substantial in HN than in HU. Figure 10.21 shows that for Spain, differentiation of the 
in-group and out-group were virtually the same for both humanness dimensions. Figure 
10.22 shows that for Switzerland, differentiation of the in-group and out-group was 
greater for HN ratings than HU ratings, but not significantly. Figure 10.23 shows that 
for Poland, differentiation of the in-group and out-group was also greater in HN traits 
than HU traits.
Figure 10.20. HU and HN ratings for Australian sample showing greater inter-group 
differentiation in HN terms than HU terms.
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In-group
Out-group
Figure 10.21. HU and HN ratings for Spanish sample showing equal inter-group 
differentiation in HU and HN traits.
In-group
Out-group
Figure 10.22. HU and HN ratings for Swiss sample showing greater inter-group 
differentiation in HN terms than HU terms.
In-group
Out-group
Figure 10.23. HU and HN ratings for the Polish sample showing greater inter-group 
differentiation in HN terms than HU terms.
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Discussion
Overall, the study had many interesting significant effects. The first goal of the 
study, to gain support for previous methodology, was achieved. Analyses revealed 
general infrahumanization by emotions attribution in Switzerland and 
infrahumanization in the aged-adult inter-group context in Australia and Poland. To the 
extent that the current methodology was a replication of that used in previous studies of 
the thesis, there is support that the failure to observe infrahumanization in previous 
studies was the result of the inter-group contexts presented and not a failure of the 
methodology.
Another goal of the study was to assess denial of human uniqueness and human 
nature by three measures of humanness. Broadly, HU and HN were attributed 
differently in different inter-group contexts. There was denial of uniquely human 
emotions to the aged-adult out-group. There was denial of HU to the criminal group but 
attribution of HN to the criminal group. For the aged-adult inter-group context the 
pattern reversed, where HU was granted to the out-group and HN was denied to the out­
group. These results shed light on the third goal that wanted to assess the extent to 
which groups selectively attribute and deny different types of humanness. However, I 
expected that these attributions would follow the pattern of denial of the humanness 
traits found most informative for determining humanness. It turned out that the specific 
measure used in this study was not an effective means of predicting humanness 
attribution. I will discuss why more in the assessment of H.7.3.
H. 7.1a
Hypothesis 7.1a predicted that the patterns of emotion attribution would differ 
between countries and between inter-group context. That is, samples in different 
countries would be different in their expression of infrahumanization depending on the 
reference group. The predicted three-way interaction between group, level, and country
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was significant. The patterns in primary and secondary emotion attribution patterns 
differed in the four samples. Specifically, there was a strong infrahumanization pattern 
in Australian and Polish samples, a weak effect in the Swiss sample, and an emotion 
attribution pattern that differed from infrahumanization pattern in the Spanish sample. 
However, these effects were qualified by a four-way country by group by level by 
valence interaction. For Australian, Swiss, and Polish samples, there was, instead in­
group favouritism. For the Spanish sample, the pattern was not exactly 
infrahumanization because of an unusual pattern in the primary emotions.
The pattern displayed by the Spanish sample is difficult to explain. One 
possible explanation of the effect is that contextually, both in-groups were being 
attributed with greater emotionality overall, compared to the out-groups, based on their 
unique characteristics. It could also be that primary emotions are more meaningful in 
the Spanish culture than in the other countries sampled. Alternatively, emotionality 
itself may be a valued trait in Spanish culture. In either case, the effect of greater 
primary than secondary emotionality to the in-group would be an expression of in-group 
favouritism. Without more data, it is not possible to make a firm conclusion.
This result for Australia was similar to that of the rest of the thesis. While there 
was greater attribution of secondary emotions to the in-group than the out-group, this 
was the case for positive but not negative emotions. This result is interesting because it 
shows consistency of infrahumanization being qualified by valence across the thesis in 
Studies 1, 4, and 5. The similar results in the Swiss and Polish samples and the 
different pattern in Spain, all countries in which infrahumanization has been measured, 
paint a picture of infrahumanization as less common than previous literature has
claimed.
HJ.lb
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Hypothesis 7 .lb was that countries would differ in their evaluations of 
humanness by emotion attribution between the particular inter-group contexts 
presented. I expected that the meanings made of the inter-group relationships would be 
unique to each country, and therefore different country’s samples might infrahumanize 
neither, one or the other, or both of the out-groups. The four-way interaction was not 
significant, so the specific hypothesis was not supported. However, there were some 
interesting effects involving the inter-group context variable.
There was a four-way inter-group context by group by level by valence 
interaction showing that across the countries, the meanings of the two inter-group 
contexts were interpreted differently. The criminal intergroup context resulted in in­
group favouritism. Participants expressed the belief that criminals perceive more 
negative emotions and people-who-obey-the-law more positive emotions. The meaning 
made of this inter-group context is that the out-group experiences fewer positive and 
more negative emotions given their life choices. The aged-adult intergroup context 
resulted in infrahumanization. In this context, the out-group was perceived to 
experience less uniquely human emotions than the in-group, and by extension, was 
perceived to be less human.
Also, despite the four-way predicted interaction not being significant, I chose to 
look at each country individually. While this analysis should be interpreted with 
caution, there were some significant effects of inter-group context within the country 
analyses. The above four-way inter-group context by group by level by valence 
interaction was echoed in Australian and Polish samples. The Swiss sample was the 
only one in which the group by level interaction was not qualified by valence, and the 
three-way group by level by inter-group context interaction was significant. There was
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greater infrahumanization in the aged-adult inter-group context, but the criminal 
inter-group context did have the infrahumanization, and not in-group favouritism, 
pattern.
Within the Australian sample, the group by level by inter-group context 
interaction was not significant, however the inter-group context by group by level by 
valence interaction was significant. In the aged-adult inter-group context, the pattern of 
emotion attribution was infrahumanization. This was the first effect in the thesis in 
which an out-group was infrahumanized by an Australian sample, and it echoes the 
findings of Study 6 that given the right inter-group context, Australians will 
infrahumanize an out-group. However, this effect was not apparent in the most 
straightforward analyses and was only apparent through some searching. It should be 
interpreted with caution.
One potential explanation for this effect lies in the order in which the tasks of 
the study were presented. For the first time in the thesis, this study began with a task 
asking participants to consider the importance of traits in assessing humanness. This 
may have primed participants to think of humanness and may have influenced later 
tasks such as the in-group and out-group humanness emotion attribution task. An 
improved design of the study would have been to have the trait importance measure as a 
pilot study, but as the study had two pilot studies already, a third did not seem practical. 
H.7.2 andH. 7.3
Hypothesis 7.2 was supported. There was a two-way interaction between 
country and humanness dimension on the importance variable. The Australian, Spanish 
and Swiss samples found HU more informative and the Polish sample found HN more 
informative. Hypotheses 7.3a, predicted that each country’s sample would deny 
humanness to out-groups in the humanness domain that they found most informative of
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humanness. Therefore, H.7.3a predicted that Australian, Spanish and Swiss samples 
would deny out-groups HU and the Polish sample would deny out-groups HN.
Australia, Spain, and Switzerland were expected to display infrahumanization in 
HU traits and Poland was expected to display mechanistic dehumanization in HN traits. 
The analysis showed a pattern of very small infrahumanization effects by HU traits and 
larger mechanistic dehumanization effects for HN traits across countries. In particular, 
while more humanness traits (both HU and HN) were attributed to the in-group than the 
out-group overall, mechanistic dehumanization by HN traits was actually a stronger 
effect for the Australian, Swiss, and Polish samples. The effects of infrahumanization 
and mechanistic dehumanization were generally equivalent in the Spanish sample. The 
result for Australia and Switzerland were contrary to the findings of the humanness 
informativeness ratings of H.7.2 with relative greater informativeness of HU in the both 
samples. The effects for Spain were virtually the same for HU and HN traits, again 
contrary to what was expected by the findings of H.7.2 and the prediction of and H.7.3a. 
It was only the effect for Poland, in which there was greater dehumanization by HN 
traits than infrahumanization by HU traits, that was as predicted by the higher ratings of 
HN informativeness by the Polish sample in H.7.2. Therefore, operationalized 
Hypothesis 7.3a was generally not supported.
Similar to previous research (Bain, et al., 2010; Bain, et al., 2009), the 
Australian sample dehumanized out-groups more by HN traits than infrahumanized out­
groups by HU traits. These data support the hypothesis that HU and HN are denied 
selectively. Previous research has hypothesized that the different dimensions of 
humanness (HU and HN) are valued differently by different in-groups, and that this is 
reflected in their attributions of humanness dimensions such that they will favour the in­
group on the more valued trait (Bain, et al., 2010; Bain, et al., 2009). Study 7 found 
differences between groups in the degree to which they found HU and HN informative
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of a group’s humanness. However, the unexpected effect was that in three of the 
four countries sampled, participants did not discriminate the in-group and the out-group 
more on the more informative dimension.
However, I would not conclude that the hypothesis of Bain et al. (2010; 2009) 
(that groups deny humanness selectively based on the traits they possess) was not 
supported. Bain et al.’s hypothesis was based on a nationality inter-group context and 
national group self-stereotypes. In this way, the traits believed to be informative were 
specific to the inter-group context. In the present study, the measure of the 
informativeness of humanness traits was not specific to the two inter-group contexts 
presented. Rather, the informativeness measure was of general beliefs about the 
informativeness of traits. An improved design would be to have a pilot study asking a 
sample which types of traits participants think are informative for assessing the 
humanness of a particular group.
Another interesting effect that came from the H.7.3 analysis was a three-way 
interaction of group rated by humanness dimension by inter-group context. Across 
countries, there were differences in the HU and HN ratings of the two out-groups that 
show the unique nature of the two inter-group relationships. In the aged-adult inter­
group context, aged-adults were granted HU, the aspects of humanness that make them 
refined and civilized, largely to the same degree as the in-group of young-adults. 
However, the aged-adult out-group was denied the more “salt of the earth” aspects of 
what makes people passionate, curious, active, and jealous, perhaps suggesting a lack of 
vitality.
In the criminal inter-group context, there was the expected infrahumanization by 
HU but an interesting effect for HN. In the HN humanness dimension, across countries, 
the criminal out-group was attributed more HN than the in-group of people-who-obey- 
the-law. That is, the criminals were attributed more emotionality, agency, and openness
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characterized by traits such as impatient, impulsive, and fun-loving. Said a different 
way, they have what makes people “only human” and are susceptible to traits such as 
impulse and curiosity.
Broad Discussion
Several effects demonstrated how the meaning made of inter-group relationships 
affects the particular way in which humanness is attributed. One was the three-way 
group by humanness dimension by inter-group context interaction described in H.7.3 
that found humanization of criminals and dehumanization of aged-adults. Results are 
similar to those of Loughnan and Haslam (2007) who found that Australians would 
attribute HU and HN differently depending on the inter-group context. In their study, 
artists were denied HU and businesspeople were denied HN.
The other effect that showed the importance of inter-group contextual 
understandings was in H.7.1b in which the Australian and Polish emotion attribution 
results showed humanization of the criminal out-group in negative emotions, the Swiss 
sample showed mfrahumanization of the criminal out-group, and the Spanish sample 
showed an ambiguous pattern. It is clear from these results that culture was affecting 
the understanding of the nature of the inter-group relationship, and this was being 
reflected in the inter-group humanness attribution. Out-groups are denied humanness 
selectively by dimension and by degree, according to the way the in-group views the 
out-group, and the way the in-group views the out-group in relation to itself.
While there were many nuances in the way types of humanness and degrees of 
humanness were attributed to in-groups and out-groups, there were also patterns to 
humanness attribution. When collapsed across valence, secondary emotions were 
always attributed more to the in-group than the out-group. Collapsed across inter-group 
context, country and valence, the pattern of emotion attribution was generally that of 
infrahumanization. Collapsed across country and inter-group context, HN traits were
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always attributed more to in-groups than out-groups. That is, groups were reserving 
more of what it means to be human for their own group, only granting humanness to 
out-groups under certain inter-group context. The following chapter will review the 
findings of the thesis as a whole and draw broad conclusions with reference to the 
overarching hypotheses of the thesis.
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Chapter 11: Summary and Conclusions
The overarching aim of the thesis was to develop further the understanding of 
the process of infrahumanization. While the initial goals changed over the course of the 
thesis, taken together, the empirical findings have an impact on the theoretical literature. 
To conclude the thesis, I will first provide an overall summary of the thesis and the key 
findings. I will then return to the overarching hypotheses, outline theoretical 
implications, and describe what the thesis adds to the literature. Finally, I will comment 
on the state of the research and make suggestions for future research.
Summary and Key Findings
Theoretical Background
Social identity theory. I approached the field of infrahumanization as an inter­
group process within the framework of social identity theory. Therefore, I started with 
the understanding of infrahumanization as a type of in-group bias which is an outcome 
of social identification and self-categorization processes. Individuals identify with 
psychological groups as a way to define themselves in the social world (Turner, 1982; 
Turner & Reynolds, 2001). From these group identities, they derive positive self­
esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1999). One way to maintain that self-esteem is 
to distinguish one’s own group positively in comparison to an out-group (Turner & 
Reynolds, 2001). Humanness is one characteristic from which to gather positive 
distinctiveness. Infrahumanization takes place to the extent that humanness is a 
relevant inter-group category for comparison.
Infrahumanization. According to the literature and my operational definition, 
infrahumanization is a very specific effect. It is an inter-group phenomenon that is a 
subtle denial of a degree of humanness to members of another group (Leyens, et al., 
2000b). It is not a complete denial of the humanity of an out-group, and in this way it is 
distinct from dehumanization. It is usually measured in the domain of uniquely human
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emotions or through implicit measures, but could also be understood as the denial of 
either of the other two uniquely human attributes, language and competence (Demoulin, 
et al., 2004b; Leyens, et al., 2000b). Uniquely human emotions are termed secondary 
emotions, and those that animals are also thought to experience are primary emotions 
(Leyens, et al., 2000b). When observed in the attribution of uniquely human emotions, 
infrahumanization is the attribution of equal primary emotions and greater positive and 
negative secondary emotions to the in-group compared with the out-group (Leyens, et 
al., 2001). The research was somewhat ambiguous on the extent to which attribution of 
primary emotions is informative as an indicator of infrahumanization. I argued in the 
Chapter 2 that the difference between primary emotions should be less than the 
difference between in-group and out-group secondary emotions and the secondary 
should be attributed more to the in-group than the out-group. It is important 
conceptually that infrahumanization is understood as the denial of both positive and 
negative secondary emotions, as the denial of only positive emotions would confound 
infrahumanization with in-group favouritism. I also argue in the infrahumanization 
theoretical chapter (Chapter 2) that there is not yet sufficient evidence to clarify whether 
greater attribution of secondary emotions expresses a belief in out-group superiority in 
terms of uniquely human emotions or actually a type of out-group discrimination based 
on their dissimilarity to the in-group.
Related concepts. As discussed earlier, the distinction between 
infrahumanization and dehumanization is a somewhat murky area. In Chapter 4 ,1 
observed that in the literature, dehumanization can be thought of as a more general term, 
of which infrahumanization is one specific type. Otherwise, dehumanization can be 
thought of as a phenomenon on an equal plane with infrahumanization, but as having 
different characteristics. There is no consensus in the literature on what separates the 
two processes, but there are some characteristics outlined. Dehumanization can be
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expressed in either a subtle or blatant manner. It may involve the denial of human 
nature, human uniqueness, language and/or competence. Infrahumanization, however, 
is subtle and involves the denial of human uniqueness, language and/or competence.
Infrahumanization was also differentiated from several other concepts in the 
literature such as moral exclusion, delegitimization, dehumanization, in-group 
favouritism, and the in-group projection model. However, they do have similarities, 
and for this reason, I used those similar concepts to inform this thesis on potential 
moderating variables of infrahumanization. Moral exclusion, for example, was 
described as a potential outcome of infrahumanization wherein a group that is denied its 
humanness is also denied the moral considerations that accompany that status as fully 
human. The antecedents of moral exclusion, including identification, contact, and 
conflict, were examined in Studies 1-5. Delegitimization was described as having 
similar outcomes as infrahumanization, such as harming or excusing the harm of the 
out-group after the fact. From delegitimization came the foundations for studying 
threat and level of contact.
Human nature and human uniqueness. Finally, the concepts of human 
uniqueness and human nature were introduced. Human uniqueness is the domain that 
separates humans from animals. Human uniqueness is assumed to include culture, 
higher cognition, sophisticated language, and morality. Human nature is assumed to be 
that which separates humans from automata. It is what makes humans warm-blooded, 
feeling beings with depth and individuality. Human nature includes those attributes that 
involve warmth, flexibility and animation (Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). These concepts 
are not two ends of the same continuum, but rather two distinct attributes. I showed this 
experimentally in Study 7.
Introduction to Studies 1-5. The final chapter in the theoretical section out-lined 
goals for the thesis and introduced broad theoretical hypotheses. The primary goal at
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the outset was to pursue identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions that 
cause infrahumanization. A second goal was to expand the types of inter-group 
contexts evaluated. The goal of Study 1 was to analyze the effect of threat on 
infrahumanization. These goals shifted through Studies 2-5 and after Study 5, there was 
a re-evaluation of the goals. The broad theoretical hypotheses regarded the contexts in 
which infrahumanization would be observed and the predicting variables. I will return 
to these in greater detail later in this chapter.
Summary o f Findings
Study 1. The first study of the thesis created an inter-group context based on 
nationality as an Australian and included two conditions in which the migrant out­
groups were presented as either economically or culturally threatening to the Australian 
in-group. The aim was to measure the extent to which the inter-group relevance of 
economic (or realistic) and cultural (or symbolic) threat influence infrahumanization. 
This study measured attribution of uniquely human emotions with a rating scale. The 
study revealed no two-way, group-context by level-of-emotion infrahumanization 
effect. There was a three-way interaction in which there was attribution of lesser 
negative secondary emotions to migrants but greater positive secondary emotions. This 
was hypothesized post facto to be due to stereotype content of the emotions used for the 
specific inter-group context.
Study 2. The second study of the thesis created one of three inter-group 
contexts of citizens and immigrants, hetero- and homosexual people, and students and 
non-student targets. Identification with the in-group was measured. Infrahumanization 
was again measured with attribution of uniquely human emotions on a rating task. 
Another dependent variable was the ratings of an altruism scale and the intent to either 
help or act against the out-group’s cause. One purpose of this study was to account for 
the stereotype content of emotions that was hypothesized to influence Study 1.
Stereotyped emotions were removed from the analysis, but there was still no 
infrahumanization of any of the out-groups. Therefore, stereotype content did not affect
the results as stereotyped emotions were not attributed to a greater extent than non-
• 22stereotyped emotions.
In this study, neither the two-way group (in-group/out-group) by level 
(primary/secondary) interaction, nor the three-way group by level by valence 
(positive/negative) interaction was significant. Despite these non-significant effects on 
emotion attribution, there were other significant effects that indicated inter-group 
processes were at work. There was an in-group favouritism by emotion valence 
interaction and there was more willingness to help the out-group among low identifiers 
compared with high identifiers. From these findings, I concluded that the inter-group 
context was salient yet missing the conditions necessary to elicit infrahumanization.
Study 3. The third study used a sport fan context, with fans of the local 
Brumbies rugby team as the in-group and the rival Warratahs rugby team as the out­
group. Identification with the local in-group team was measured. Dependent measures 
were uniquely human emotions measured on a rating scale as well as attribution of high 
and low level language competency summaries of a rugby match. This, to my 
knowledge, was the first time language proficiency had been used as a measure of 
infrahumanization. According to the work by Leyens et al. (2000a), language is a 
characteristic that makes humans distinct from animals. Therefore, to attribute greater 
language proficiency to the in-group compared to the out-group is a sign of 
infrahumanization.
For the emotion measure, the two-way, group-rated by level-of-emotion 
interaction was significant, but in the opposite direction that would be expected. There
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22 However, I did not argue that this study demonstrates that stereotype content is not a factor which 
affects the measurement of infrahumanization. I did not believe this single study was sufficient to do so.
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were more secondary emotions attributed to the out-group than the in-group. The 
two-way language-level by group-rated effect, however, was significant. Higher 
proficiency reviews were attributed to the in-group, while low level proficiency reviews 
were attributed to the out-group. I agrue that this effect is a sign of infrahumanization, 
even in the absence of infrahumanization by secondary emotion attribution This effect 
interacted with identification, with high identifiers showing more infrahumanization 
than low identifiers. Overall, infrahumanization was exhibited in the language measure 
and not in the emotion measure.
Study 4. In the fourth study, participants read about an Olympic athlete from 
Australia or Russia who either cheated or did not cheat in the Olympics with 
performance enhancing drugs. In this way, there were two identity contexts created, 
nationality and morality. The dependent variables were, again, uniquely human 
emotions, this time including a selection task as well as a rating task. Two emotion 
attribution measures were used to test the efficacy of the two types of measurement.
For the morality inter-group context, the results in this study had both similarities and 
differences for the emotion selection task and the emotion rating task. There was no 
effect of infrahumanization revealed by either of the two emotion measures. There was 
a significant three-way, group rated by level of emotion by valence of emotion effect on 
the measure of emotion ratings, that revealed more negative secondary emotions 
attributed to the out-group and more positive secondary emotions attributed to the in­
group for the morality inter-group condition. This three-way interaction was similar for 
the emotion ranking scale for secondary emotions, but primary emotions were equally 
attributed between the groups. There were no significant effects for the nationality 
inter-group context variable. As in Studies 1 and 2, there were no infrahumanization 
effects with an Australian sample for an inter-group context of nationality. For the
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unique inter-group context of morality, there were also no significant 
infrahumanization effects.
Study 5. The fifth study used a University residence hall context, with 
participants being members of a University residential hall who rated an out-group of 
residents of another hall. The independent variable was the group being rated (in-group 
or out-group). This variable was within-participants. There was also an independent 
variable of time, with participants being sampled in the first week of residence and then 
seven weeks later. Study 5 also used both the emotion rating and the emotion selection 
tasks (as in Study 4). Again, the goal was to measure the extent to which the 
infrahumanization effect could be detected by two different measurement techniques.
The results for emotion rating showed no two-way interaction for group-rated 
and level-of-emotion. The three-way interaction was significant, showing more 
negative secondary traits attributed to the out-group, and more positive secondary 
attributed to the in-group. For the emotion selection task, there was a two-way group­
rated by level-of-emotion interaction that suggested infrahumanization. This was 
qualified by a three-way interaction including valence that showed infrahumanization 
only in negative emotions. This means that the infrahumanization effect was driven 
primarily by negative emotions, which suggests in-group favouritism. I observed that 
the effects detected by the two different measures of emotion attribution were different. 
This result calls into question the efficacy of the measures.
Regrouping and Reanalysis. Following Study 5, it was necessary to pause and 
re-evaluate the direction of the thesis. It was not possible to pursue the initial goals 
without being able to replicate the infrahumanization effect. I had tried using a diverse 
range of inter-group contexts and inter-group relationships. I returned to the literature, 
looking at four studies, three of which had been published since I started the empirical 
program, in which the infrahumanization effect was measured and not found. These
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studies suggested that it was valid to present an inter-group context and not observe 
infrahumanization. I planned the remaining studies with two new goals. One goal was 
to evaluate whether Australians would discriminate against any groups in humanness 
attribution, and the other goal was to examine infrahumanization cross-culturally. I 
needed to show that the lack of observation of infrahumanization was valid and not due 
to methodological error. I, then, wanted to explore the way Australians may (or may 
not) infrahumanize in relation to other countries.
Study 6. The primary purpose of Study 6 was to test whether an Australian 
sample would deny humanness to non-human groups: animals. That is, would an 
Australian sample ever demonstrate inter-group discrimination on humanness? I fully 
expected that the Australian sample would discriminate animals from humans on 
humanness. But it was theoretically important to demonstrate that it was possible for 
Australian samples of Studies 1 -5 to have displayed inter-group infrahumanization.
A secondary purpose was to test how the difference in nature of the inter-group 
relationship to the out-group (one of violence vs. non-violence) would affect 
infrahumanization. Therefore, the participants consisted of both omnivores and 
vegetarians. Participants rated humans, apes, horses and cattle. The dependent 
variables were primary and secondary emotions as well as human traits such as 
thoughts, wishes, intentions, and morals. It was expected that there would be 
differences in the ratings of omnivores and vegetarians on cattle, reflecting the 
difference in the inter-group relationship.
The findings, overall, were that animals were rated as less human than humans 
by both omnivores and vegetarians, as expected. Therefore, the main hypothesis was 
supported. Australians do show inter-group differentiation in the domain of humanness. 
They also demonstrated differentiation in the mental states. Humans and apes were 
attributed greater morality than cattle.
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There were also more nuanced effects driven by the differences in the nature 
of the inter-group relationship between omnivores and animals, and vegetarians and 
animals. As expected vegetarians infrahumanized cattle (as well as horses) less than 
omnivores, but no differences were found for apes or humans. On mental states, 
vegetarians rated cattle as having psychological states to an overall greater degree than 
did omnivores, particularly for morality. Omnivores did differentiate apes from the 
other animals, presumably because they are our closest animal cousin. These findings 
further support the view that the nature of the inter-group relationship affects the 
attribution of humanness to out-groups.
Study 7. The purpose of the final study was to test infrahumanization cross- 
culturally to observe any differences between the patterns of infrahumanization between 
Australians and citizens of other countries. It included samples from four participating 
countries, Australia, Spain, Switzerland, and Poland. Another independent variable was 
the inter-group context, which was either criminals (out-group) relative to people who 
obey the law, and aged adults (out-group) relative to young adults. Dependent variables 
included emotion ratings, and ratings of HU and HN traits. Theory on human 
uniqueness and human nature regards HU and HN as two separate domains of 
humanness, and therefore predicts that denial of one will have no bearing on the other.
I tested this in Study 7 and found support, as there were both similarities and differences 
in the attribution of emotions and HN and HU within, as well as between the countries.
There were broad similarities between countries in how aged adults were 
evaluated and how criminals were evaluated. Generally, for emotion attribution, out­
groups were infrahumanized compared to in-groups and there was greater 
discrimination in HN traits than in HU traits. However, there were differences between 
countries that can be attributed to the unique understandings of inter-group relationships 
within each culture that affects the way groups are rated on humanness dimensions.
For example, the Spanish sample did not infrahumanize on uniquely human 
emotions. In the Australian and Polish samples, criminals were humanized in negative, 
but not positive secondary emotions. There were also differences between effects for 
two inter-group contexts that indicate it is the nature of the inter-group relationships that 
affects infrahumanization. Criminals were attributed HN but denied HU. Aged-adults 
were granted HU but denied HN
Another goal of the study was to evaluate discrimination on HU and HN and 
how the two dimensions are considered to be informative of humanness and 
stereotypical of the in-group. It was found that neither self-stereotypes, nor 
informativeness of HN or HU were predictive of in which humanness dimension an out- 
group would be infrahumanized or mechanistically dehumanized .
What Changed?
So what was it about Studies 6 and 7 that created conditions in which 
infrahumanization would be exhibited in an Australian sample where it wasn’t before? 
While I cannot be certain, I can speculate post-hoc on several reasons why Studies 6 and 
7 were theoretically different and created different intergroup conditions from previous 
studies.
Based on Social Identity Theory, inter-group discrimination happens to the 
extent to which the comparison dimension is relevant to the inter-group situation. In 
Studies 6 and 7, humanness, the comparison dimension if infrahumanization is to occur,
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23 The studies o f this thesis consistently used explicit measures o f infrahumanization. It is true that some 
researchers in the infrahumanization work have used implicit measures such as the Implicit Association 
Task (IAT) (Leyens et al, 2000) and the Person Categorization Task (PCT) (Boccato et al., 2007). 
However, from the literature, there was no indication that implicit measures were necessary to measure 
infrahumanization, with the explicit measures being more commonly used. Implicit measures were used 
in one o f the first studies on infrahumanization as it was assumed that people would not explicitly 
attribute greater humanness traits to the in-group over the out-group. However, once it was determined 
that explicit measures could be used to observe the effect, only four further studies used implicit measures 
of infrahumanization, mostly with the goal of determining the nature o f the attributions (more human to 
in-group or less human to out-group) rather than finding the effect itself. Therefore, in not using implicit 
measures, I was adhering to the prevailing methodology used in the literature.
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was relevant and salient. In Study 6, this was simply the case because of the nature 
of the inter-group comparison -  humans and animals. And in Study 7, humanness was 
primed as a domain of comparison by the first task, which asked participants to select 
traits that were informative of humanness. It is likely, then, that humanness was 
perceived as a relevant point of comparison in the subsequent tasks of the study. While 
this priming of humanness was not intentional, it is a key difference between Studies 1- 
5 and Study 7.
Also, the concepts of SIT allow us to speculate how inter-group discrimination 
may be more likely when positive distinctiveness is threatened and inter-group 
boundaries are permeable. In Study 7, there was infrahumanization in the aged-adult 
out-group condition but not in the criminal out-group condition for the Australian 
sample. In the criminal condition, the in-group of people-who-obey-the-law are clearly 
positively distinct. Our society values law-abiding citizens. In the other condition, the 
positive distinctiveness was less clear. While our society values youth, young people 
express positive stereotypes of aged adults in some domains (Hummert, 1990; Kite,
1991; Slotterback, 1996). The sample had an average age of 19, and may have felt the 
need to assert positive distinctiveness from those of a more mature age.
Regarding boundaries, it is again clear why there was infrahumanization in one 
inter-group condition and not the other. People have almost complete control over their 
ability to remain in the law-abiding in-group. However, we will all move through life 
stages, and the young-adults will move into the aged-adult group. This boundary 
permeability and lack of positive distinctiveness may have been threatening and the 
participants may have responded with discrimination on the salient dimension of 
humanness with infrahumanization.
Study 6 had an additional element that may have been influencing the greater 
infrahumanization of animals by the omnivorous group than by the vegetarian group.
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As Castano and Giner-Sorolla (2006) showed, infrahumanization can act as a 
justification for past violence. Omnivores may struggle with feelings of guilt over meat 
consumption when faced with the possibility to humanize animals, and may have 
reacted with infrahumanization to a greater extent than vegetarians because of that guilt.
To summarize, the infrahumanization that was observed in the final two studies, 
may have seemed incongruous, but may have been driven by social identity principles. 
Participants were primed to think of humanness. Once humanness was a relevant 
dimension of comparison, they were motivated by the desire for positive distinctiveness 
and the threat of inter-group boundaries being permeable. Outside of the SIT domain, 
participants were motivated by the desire to excuse mistreatment towards an out-group 
to deny equal humanness to the out-group. In more general terms, I would say that the 
specific inter-group contexts created were based on a complex interplay of factors led to 
infrahumanization and these may be able to be predicted by social identity principles. I 
must reiterate, however, that this commentary is post-hoc, and the analyses did not 
include mediators or moderators that would support the above explanation. However, 
the theoretical underpinnings suggest that testing this interpretation might provide 
valuable insights into the infrahumanization literature.
Theoretical Implications
Return to the Initial Hypotheses
In Chapter 5 ,1 made three broad hypotheses for the thesis, based on the 
literature presented in the theoretical chapters.
Hypothesis A. The first broad theoretical hypothesis that I made was that the 
infrahumanization effect would be replicable using similar inter-group contexts as those 
used in the published research on infrahumanization. This hypothesis was partially 
supported. When I wrote that hypothesis, I intended “similar” to mean inter-group 
contexts of nationality and ethnicity, as was the focus of much of the previous published
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work. In this sense, the hypothesis was not supported. I used inter-group contexts 
of nationality in three of the studies, but did not observe infrahumanization in any of 
them. So, in several Australian nationality-based inter-group contexts, I did not observe 
infrahumanization. I also measured infrahumanization in a sports context (the other that 
had been previously evaluated) and did not observe infrahumanization in the attribution 
of secondary emotions, as was the case in the published work (Gaunt, et al., 2005). I 
subsequently established that this was not the case because Australians do not 
discriminate on the basis of humanness emotions (Study 6). Nor was it the result of 
having inadequate measures (Study 7). At the same time, I would not conclude that the 
failure to observe infrahumanization in Studies 1 -5 is because Australians do not 
infrahumanize on the basis of nationality. I only tested three very specific contexts. 
There are countless other inter-group contexts created on the basis of the Australian in­
group identity. I would, instead, argue that not observing infrahumanization in Studies 
1 -5 was because of the nature of the inter-group context that was created.
That said, I did observe the infrahumanization (with human groups) in Study 7 
when the inter-group context presented was young and aged-adults, and in Study 6 
when the inter-group context was omnivores and animals and vegetarians and animals. 
The groups themselves were not the same as those in the published literature, but rather 
the inter-group contexts created by priming and SIT principles resulted in the same out­
come of infrahumanization.
In returning to the published literature, there are examples of how SIT principles 
may have been playing a role in inter-group infrahumanization based on what is known 
about the nature of the inter-group contexts. For example, in two studies, the inter­
group context was such that boundaries were permeable between the two groups, and 
immigrant groups were potentially capable of moving into the participant’s high status 
in-group. Belgians infrahumanized Arabs who are a threatening and discriminated
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immigrant group (Gaunt, et al., 2002; Levecque, Lodewyckx, & Vranken, 2007). 
Belgians and Spanish infrahumanized North Africans, the most controversial immigrant 
group to Europe (Paladino, et al., 2002). Two other examples are of inter-group 
contexts of an illegitimate status differential and impermeable boundaries causing inter­
group discrimination in the form of infrahumanization, this time by a low status group. 
Canarians resent the illegitimate higher status of Penninsulars and infrahumanize them, 
but do not deny them competence, showing that inter-group discrimination is selective 
(Leyens, et al., 2001). In another study, French speaking Belgians infrahumanized 
Flemish speaking Belgians who have illegitimate higher status (Paladino, et al., 2002). 
In these examples, the published work did not cite these SIT principles as instrumental 
in driving infrahumanization, but it can be inferred that they were based on the inter­
group contexts.
Hypothesis B. The second broad theoretical hypothesis was that 
infrahumanization is not common to all inter-group relationships. This hypothesis was 
definitely supported by the empirical program of the thesis. In the whole of the thesis, 
there were only two inter-group relationships in which Australians showed inter-group 
discrimination on secondary emotion attribution. These were with animal out-groups in 
Study 6, and aged-adult out-groups in Study 7. These results are significant because 
previous research outside of this thesis has had difficulty finding inter-group contexts in 
which infrahumanization occurs in Australian samples (Bain, et al., 2010; Bain, et al., 
2009). This shows that Australians do infrahumanize in particular inter-group contexts, 
when the intergroup context is humanness and SIT principles call for inter-group 
discrimination.
However, there were many salient inter-group contexts in the studies of this 
thesis, in which infrahumanization did not occur. Australian samples did not display 
infrahumanization in inter-group contexts of nationality when non-Australians were
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presented as threatening and immoral. Nor did they display denial of secondary 
emotions in inter-group contexts including sexuality, student-status, sports team 
affiliation, and morality. Sometimes the findings were even opposite to the 
infrahumanization effect as with Studies 3, 4, and 7 in which out-groups were attributed 
more secondary emotions than the in-group. One variable that is clearly identifiable is 
that in these conditions, humanness was not primed as a relevant inter-group 
comparative dimension. However, without having measured inter-group variables such 
as inter-group permeability, status legitimacy, and degree of inter-group comparison, it 
is impossible to say exactly what inter-group variables were present or lacking.
While infrahumanization was not often observed, most studies in this thesis 
indicated that in-group favouritism was occurring for the inter-group contexts created, 
in terms of valence of emotion. More positive emotions were attributed to the in-group 
and more negative emotions were attributed to the out-group. Therefore, while in-group 
favouritism via valence of emotion attribution was happening, infrahumanization via the 
denial of uniquely human emotions was not. Also, in Study 2 and Study 5, there were 
in-group favouring attitudes in helping behaviours and allocation of resources. These 
effects had a positive relationship with identification such that more highly identified 
participants showed more in-group favouritism. Additionally, in Study 3, there was an 
effect of infrahumanization on a measure of language attribution, in which high 
identifiers differentiated the groups more than low identifiers.
All of these effects suggest that the inter-group contexts created were salient and 
meaningful to the participants. Therefore, there is little support for an argument that 
infrahumanization was not present because the inter-group contexts were not relevant to 
the participants. It is evident that the inter-group contexts were meaningful to 
participants as they showed inter-group differentiation and in-group favouritism. But 
these inter-group relationships were not ones in which infrahumanization was a
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meaningful way to differentiate the groups for in-group members. As the analysis 
of the third hypothesis describes, exactly what the inter-group relationship is lacking is 
unclear.
Hypothesis C. The third broad theoretical hypothesis was that infrahumanization 
can be reliably predicted based on a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. On this 
hypothesis, the present studies are inconclusive. As I did not observe infrahumanization 
of a human group until the last study, I was not able to empirically test the conditions 
required for infrahumanization to occur by experimental manipulation. Any 
observations on this hypothesis must be inferred from the results of the seven studies.
That said, the picture created in the seven studies is does not suggest that finding 
the necessary and sufficient conditions would be a simple matter of testing individual 
variables. Indeed, variables have been proposed as necessary and as sufficient, but not 
as both (Leyens, 2009). I do not believe that research will show that there is a single 
inter-group variable or even an interaction of two or several that contribute to 
infrahumanization such as conflict or contact. I think, and the results support, that it is a 
constellation of variables that are at play and that these may differ by different inter­
group contexts. As SIT predicts, it is not a certain inter-group context that will always 
result in inter-group differentiation, but rather when there are any of a group of 
conditions met in the nature of the inter-group comparison.
I return now to Chapter 3 on the foundations of inter-group processes. 
Infrahumanization is a type of inter-group discrimination, and as such, the SIT approach 
can offer insight into its mechanisms. As said in Chapter 3, group categorization, for 
example, on the basis of status or conflict, does not cause inter-group discrimination 
necessarily (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The theory outlines four aspects of the inter-group 
relationship that affect the likelihood of inter-group discrimination. While I would not 
necessarily assert that it is these same four aspects of the inter-group relationship that
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affect infrahumanization, I think that infrahumanization follows the same pattern as 
inter-group discrimination. It is not the presence or absence of a certain group-level 
trait, but a combination or constellation of factors that determine how the humanness of 
an out-group is perceived.
Hypothesis D. The fourth broad theoretical hypothesis was that 
infrahumanization would be affected by similar variables as related concepts that were 
introduced in Chapter 4, such as in-group favouritism, moral exclusion, 
dehumanization, and delegitimization. This hypothesis proved hard to evaluate. I 
expected to observe the infrahumanization effect in most of the inter-group contexts 
presented in the studies; I assumed that I would be able to systematically evaluate 
moderating variables.
Although it may seem like I was chasing the effect, the program of studies was 
systematic. I began by replicating the inter-group context of previous work. When I 
did not observe infrahumanization in Study 1 or 2 ,1 began to vary inter-group contexts 
and inter-group relationship variables in each study, so that in the event that the effect 
was evident, I could evaluate moderating variables. This was because, as I have said, I 
began with the idea that infrahumanization would be the result of a particular inter­
group variable such as conflict or perceived morality. However, by the end of Study 5, 
the picture had changed. It became necessary to test whether an Australian sample 
would deny secondary emotions in any inter-group context, even a non-human one. 
Finally, in Study 7, the picture of infrahumanization that has developed is that there 
may not be particular moderating variables. Rather, it may be the complex nature of the 
inter-group relationship. It may involve variables that have already been studied, but 
not in terms of the presence or absence of a variable.
In the case of Study 7, it was the case that there was a threat to positive 
distinctiveness and to boundary permeability, but infrahumanization still may not have
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occurred if a different dimension of comparison had been more relevant than 
humanness. In other inter-group contexts, there may be relevance of humanness but a 
lack of identification with the in-group or high identification, but no perceived threat of 
an impotent out-group. While the examples I have provided are particular to SIT 
concepts, there are likely other intergroup dynamics that would be influential, such as 
past history of discrimination or conflict or differences in ideology between the groups. 
Return to the Literature
Based on the above results, therefore, I can make several conclusions and 
assertions. Firstly, my findings are in some ways consistent with some previous findings 
from the literature. In the literature, as well as in the present studies, infrahumanization 
by denial of secondary (uniquely human) emotions was found to be common across 
different countries. In Study 7, this included Australia, Switzerland, and Poland. In the 
infrahumanization literature countries have included the US (Cuddy, et al., 2007b), 
Chile, Serbia (Cehajic, et ah, 2009), Spain (Delgado, et ah, 2009), Belgium (Leyens, et 
ah, 2000a), Ireland (Tam, et ah, 2008) and others. While I cannot assert the universality 
of the phenomenon, it was found in three countries that are both culturally and 
geographically diverse.
My results are also congruent with literature that describes human uniqueness 
and human nature as distinct concepts (N. Haslam, et ah, 2008c). Denial of HU and HN 
were found to be different in the same group context in Study 7. For example, 
generally, criminals (the out-group) were attributed less human uniqueness than people 
who obey the law (the in-group), but more human nature. Aged adults were granted 
human uniqueness by denied human nature.
Although previous work has suggested that most or all groups (Demoulin, et ah, 
2009a; Leyens, et ah, 2007) would deny humanness to out-groups relative to 
themselves, the studies of the present thesis form a picture of infrahumanization as an
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extremely specific effect, likely to be qualified by additional variables. Most of the 
published data finds infrahumanization in national or ethnic groups (Castano & Giner- 
Sorolla, 2006; Cehajic, et al., 2009; Costello & Hodson, 2011; Cuddy, et al., 2007b; 
Delgado, et al., 2009; DcLuca-McLean & Castano, 2009; Demoulin, et al., 2005; Gaunt, 
2009; Paladino, et al., 2002; Paladino, et al., 2004; Vacs, et al., 2010a; Vaes & Paladino, 
2010b; Wohl, et al., 2011). While these groups do differ in terms of people’s level of 
identification and the nature of inter-group relations, conflict, as well as other variables, 
they are only one type of inter-group context. This thesis tested the effect in a wide 
variety of contexts, including, but not limited to, nationality. Infrahumanization was not 
found broadly among these inter-group contexts while other inter-group effects were 
observed.
Also, from the studies in this thesis, the infrahumanization effect does not seem 
very robust in the way that it is currently measured with emotion attribution.
Attribution of secondary emotions was at times measured in this thesis with an emotion 
selection task as well as an emotion rating task and the results were not always 
consistent between the two measures. Specifically, in Study 4, infrahumanization 
results were the same irrespective of emotion rating or ranking. Neither measure 
observed the infrahumanization effect. However, in Study 5, there were differences in 
the two-way interaction between group and level with one significant and the other not. 
If infrahumanization by secondary emotion attribution can be observed with one 
measurement task and not with another, it is not a very robust effect or the measurement 
technique is not very precise.
In addition, in Study 3, human uniqueness was granted in an emotion rating task, 
but denied in a language attribution task. It is theoretically unclear if infrahumanization 
has occurred if it is found in any of these measures or if it must be all measures, or if 
infrahumanization is only the denial of secondary emotions in particular. If it is the
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latter, infrahumanization does not seem to be denial of humanness generally, but a 
very specific type of humanness based on a very specific type of inter-group 
relationship.
The central conclusion that can be drawn from the present work is that 
infrahumanization is highly context dependent, based on the specific inter-group 
relationship. Within one country (Australia), results did not indicate that all out-groups, 
or even most out-groups, are infrahumanized. Between countries, with methods and 
group contexts held constant, there were differences in the ways and extent to which the 
same group was infrahumanized. This is likely to be because of the subtle differences 
in the meaning that participants were making of the nature of the inter-group 
relationships.
Based on the findings, I can conclude that infrahumanization of a group category 
by one party does not predict infrahumanization of that same group by another party.
For example, in Study 6, omnivores infrahumanized cattle to a greater degree than 
vegetarians because of the nature of their relationships to the animal. Also, in Study 7, 
whereas Swiss participants infrahumanized criminals and aged adults, Australian and 
Polish samples humanized criminals in negative emotions. It was not a characteristic of 
a category that caused infrahumanization but the unique sociocultural context in which 
the relationship occurs.
I can then speculate that a group that is infrahumanized in one inter-group 
context, may not be infrahumanized in another. For example, as Costello and Hodson 
(2011) find, the same immigrant out-group that is infrahumanized when they present 
realistic and/or symbolic threat, is not infrahumanized when they present no threat. In 
this way it is not who “they” are that elicits infrahumanization, but who they are in 
relation to us. A follow up study to Study 7 that could test this hypothesis would be to 
compare the twenty-year-old attribution of humanness to the over 65 generation and the
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forty-year-old attribution of humanness to the over 65 generation. Whereas for the 
younger group the out-group is a grandparent figure, for the middle-aged group, the out­
group is a parent. The difference in those two inter-group relationships may result in 
different attributions of humanness.
Both of these conclusions are based on the extremely context specific nature of 
the phenomenon, and the fact that infrahumanization is the result of the nature of the 
inter-group relationship. In the present set of studies, the inter-group contexts included 
many of the elements that have been theorized to be at least sufficient to cause 
infrahumanization, such as highly meaningful groups, high identification, and conflict 
between the groups. Yet infrahumanization was only found in two (human) inter-group 
contexts presented in the Australian sample. It may be that there is no simple formula 
for which inter-group characteristics often predict infrahumanization and which do not. 
Rather, it is the specific and unique nature of the individual inter-group relationship that 
causes infrahumanization.
In that sense, trying to predict infrahumanization will be very difficult to the 
extent that inter-group relationships are constantly in a state of flux. Infrahumanization 
of an out-group is only likely to be stable to the extent that the inter-group relationship 
remains stable. Should the nature of the inter-group relationship change, it is likely that 
the occurrence of infrahumanization between the groups will change. While migrants 
from one country may be infrahumanized in one decade, migrants of the same nation 
may not be infrahumanized in the next as they become more integrated, less threatening, 
smaller in number, or other factors. While players of one rival team may be 
infrahumanized in one season, they may not be infrahumanized in another season as the 
players, statistics, and record change. One could argue that the variable nature of 
infrahumanization renders it meaningless. However, this quality of infrahumanization 
is really no different to that of other inter-group discrimination processes. For example,
in-group favouritism is not stable. If it is driven by high in-group identification, and 
that identification becomes less salient, the in-group favouritism will no longer be 
expressed. So, in this sense, infrahumanization is similar to other inter-group processes. 
Future Directions
This brings me to future directions for infrahumanization research. I think the 
most pressing issue is developing the theoretical underpinnings of infrahumanization.
In particular, the area needs to define what it is, and what it is not. I have identified 
several of the issues throughout this thesis that are theoretical questions for which the 
answers are unclear. For example, in the attribution of secondary emotions, what is the 
specific pattern or patterns of emotion attribution that signify infrahumanization? Is it 
the two interaction patterns that I outlined in Chapter 2, including a larger difference in 
the attribution of secondary emotions (with more to the in-group) and a smaller 
difference in primary emotions regardless of which is greater? Does there need to be an 
overall main effect for group in which the in-group is attributed greater primary and 
secondary emotions? Do primary emotions provide a baseline comparison or is there 
not a need to even consider primary emotions in the analysis?
I provided an operational definition for the purposes of this thesis, but the issue 
is unclear in the literature. I argue that the effect should be a rather specific pattern of 
emotion attribution. The difference between in-group and out-group primary emotion 
attribution, as it is theoretically not meaningful for inter-group discrimination, should be 
a baseline for emotion differences. The secondary emotion attribution difference 
between in-group and out-group should be larger. If any attribution of greater 
secondary emotions to the in-group than the out-group is considered infrahumanization 
with no reference to primary emotions, then a case must be made for why they have 
traditionally been measured at all. Having the effect be too broadly defined threatens
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the value of the effect.
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Another theoretical question is whether infrahumanization is indicated by 
greater attribution of uniquely human emotions to the in-group only? Or does it include 
attribution of uniquely human traits as well? And does it include other domains of 
humanness such as language and competence? My theoretical understanding is that 
infrahumanization is the subtle denial of humanness to an out-group, and it should be 
that denial of humanness on any single one of these domains is infrahumanization. But 
this is theoretically unclear. And if my assessment is accurate, what type of 
measurement would be accurate and all-encompassing? Certainly a measure that 
included brief sections on all three components of humanness (emotion, language, 
competence) would be more thorough, but would run the risk of being impractical in its 
length. I would suggest, then, that infrahumanization should be defined as denial of 
uniquely human emotions and not the denial of humanness generally. As the present 
thesis has shown (Study 3), the domains of humanness (in this case uniquely human 
emotion and high competence language) are not denied in confluence, it is incorrect to 
label denial of secondary emotions as denial of humanness generally. This is a major 
theoretical shortcoming of the literature.
Also, based on the conclusions drawn in this thesis, there needs to be a change in 
direction in the empirical work on infrahumanization. The focus, as I have noted, has 
been on finding the necessary and sufficient conditions that will elicit 
infrahumanization. But if, as I have claimed, infrahumanization is the result of a unique 
cluster of inter-group variables that create the nature of the inter-group relationship that 
may be different in different inter-group contexts, then a single set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions cannot be found. It does not seem to be the case that if X variable 
is present or absent, infrahumanization will occur. Based on the studies reviewed in this 
thesis, it seems more likely that infrahumanization of an out-group occurs in any case 
when the humanness dimension is made salient and it is useful for an in-group to have a
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diminished perception of the out-group’s place in the superordinate human group.
This may serve the purpose of excusing past or future actions, providing positive 
distinctiveness, or providing positive group-based self-esteem, for example. I think that 
particular benefit could be gained from relying more heavily on social identity 
principles in identifying conditions in which infrahumanization is likely.
Another future direction of the work would be to have a more sustained 
treatment of culture as a variable in the expression of infrahumanization. Culture is 
claimed to be an explanation for variations in many social psychological processes such 
as stereotyping, prejudice, stereotyping, and mortality salience. Whether any such 
social psychological process is necessarily “universal” would be nearly impossible to 
prove. But the fact that their expression or outcomes differ between cultures is not 
evidence that they are not universal. For example, Ma-Kellams and Blascovich (2012) 
found that while mortality salience was common to participants from both eastern and 
western cultures, participants from eastern cultural perspectives reacted to mortality 
salience more positively and with resolve for greater enjoyment of life as compared to 
their western counterparts. The explanation is that culturally, eastern philosophy has 
more acknowledgement of death being an inevitable part of life than does western 
culture. The same information (mortality salience) garnered a different response based 
on the different “lenses” of culture.
I would assert that infrahumanization is similar. I would not claim that 
infrahumanization is culture-bound or unique to some cultures. But rather, the 
particular expression of denial of humanness is culturally variable. As demonstrated in 
the thesis, the expression of infrahumanization in the under-attribution of uniquely 
human traits and emotions has been clearly demonstrated in certain countries, but not as 
easily in others. Studies 1-5 show that infrahumanization is not readily expressed in an 
Australian context through the same measures as much of the published literature.
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Study 7 tests the expression of infrahumanization for the same inter-group context 
in four different cultures.
While it is impossible to draw firm conclusions on why this may be the case, it 
is possible to speculate on why one culture may express denial of humanness differently 
than another. If culture is an “arbiter” of the way we see the world (Ma-Kellams & 
Blascovitch, 2012), then it would affect the way we define humanness and who does 
and does not belong to that category. If humanness is defined by who “we” are and that 
image is defined by our culture, than the definition of who is human and who is not will 
be unique to each culture. Furthermore, if the difference between “us” and them “them” 
is unique to a particular cultural understanding, then we can conclude that as culture 
affects the nature of the inter-group relationship, this will be reflected in the inter-group 
humanness attribution.
That said, to truly discern how a particular culture conceptualizes humanness or 
moreover to ascertain how specific cultural differences affect attribution of humanness 
more broadly would require systematic and sustained study. It would require the 
selection of countries based on a measurable quality to be used as a between-subjects 
variable. Such a variable might be individualism, conservatism, or SDO. In the present 
study, countries were not chosen for their place on the continuum of any such variable, 
nor was any such variable measured. Rather, countries were chosen practically, based 
on contacts and availability. Such a sustained treatment of culture as described above is 
both interesting and relevant, but is beyond the scope of the thesis.
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Final Thoughts
Taking a step back, this thesis is about humanness, what it means to be human, 
and what it means to acknowledge (or fail to acknowledge) the full humanness of 
others. In a broad sense, what it means to be human is what it means to be “us” in the 
most inclusive manner.
I have observed an underlying irony in this issue, that when people are asked to 
define what it means to be “us,” part of that is our jealousies (HN) our insecurities 
(HU/HN), our ignorance (HU) and our impulses (HN). And by these traits, when we 
act human, we discriminate against that which is “other.” But at the same time, we 
define our humanness by our reason, our civility (HU), our moral sensibility (HU), our 
warmth (HN), and our openness (HN). And in this sense, to act human is to 
acknowledge and respect the humanness in all people.
Once I began to do research on the effect, I began to notice denial of humanness 
in everyday life, be it the reference to a criminal as a monster or the metaphor of 
migrants as packed like sardines into boats bound for Australian shores. It is even 
evident in the names we use for our own groups in others. Anthroponyms are in-group 
ethnic terms that are based on the unique humanness of the in-group, such as “the 
people” translated from the Mi wok of North America (Mullen, Calogero, & Leader, 
2007) or the “principal people” from the Cherokee of North America(Merloa & 
McGlone, 2011). Failure to acknowledge the full rich human experience of out-groups 
is something that happens in everyday life. While it may not result in direct violence or 
blatant mistreatment, it allows us to ignore suffering that we would otherwise find 
unacceptable. It is for this reason that infrahumanization research must continue, so that 
future research can offer ways to combat this passive neglect.
299
References
Abrams, D., Viki, G. T., Masser, B., & Bohner, G. (2003). Perceptions of stranger and 
acquaintance rape: The role of benevolent and hostile sexism in victim blame 
and rape proclivity. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 84( 1), 111- 
125.
Aroian, K. J., Norris, A. E., Patsdaughter, C. A., & Tran, T. V. (1998). Predicting
psychological distress among former soviet immigrants. International Journal o f  
Social Psychiatry, 44(4), 284-294.
Aronson, J., & McGlone, M. S. (2009). Stereotype and social identity threat. In T. D. 
Nelson (Ed.), Handbook o f Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination (pp. 
153-177). Hoboken: Taylor & Francis.
Bain, P., Haslam, N., & Kashima, Y. (2010). Subtle intergroup dehumanization: 
Ethnocentrism or stereotyping? Unpublished Manuscript, 1-17.
Bain, P., Park, J., Kwok, C., & Haslam, N. (2009). Attributing human uniqueness and 
human nature to cultural groups: Distinct forms of subtle dehumanization.
Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 12(6), 789-805.
Bar-Tal, D. (1989). Delegitimization: The extreme case of stereotyping and prejudice.
In D. Bar-Tal, C. F. Graumann, A. W. Kruglanski & W. Stroebe (Eds.), 
Stereotyping and prejudice: Changing conceptions (Vol. 1, pp. 169-182). New 
York: Springer Verlag.
Bar-Tal, D. (1990). Causes and consequences of delegitimization: Models of conflict 
and ethnocentrism. Journal o f Social Issues, 46( 1), 65-81.
Barker, V., & Giles, H. (2004). English only policies: Perceived support and social 
limitation. Language and Communication, 24(1), 77-95.
300
Bettencourt, B. A., Dorr, N., Charlton, K., & Hume, D. L. (2001). Status differences
and in-group bias: A meta-analytic examination of the effects of status stability, 
status legitimacy, and group permeability. Psychological Bulletin, 127(4), 520- 
642.
Bilewicz, M., Imhoff, R., & Drogosz, M. (2011). The humanity of what we eat:
Conceptions of human uniqueness among vegetarians and omnivores. European 
Journal o f Social Psychology\ 41(2), 201-209.
Boccato, G., Capozza, D., & Falvo, R. (2008). The missing link: Ingroup, outgroup and 
the human species. Social Cognition, 26(2), 224-234.
Boccato, G., Cortes, B. P., Demoulin, S., & Leyens, J.-P. (2007). The automaticity of 
infra-humanization. European Journal o f Social Psychology, 37(5), 987-999.
Bomstein, G., Crum, L., Wittenbraker, J., Harring, K., Insko, C., A., & Thibaut, J. 
(1983). On the measurement of social orientations in the minimal group 
paradigm. European Journal or Social Psychology, 15(4), 321-350.
Branscombe, N. R., Ellemers, N., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (1999). The context and 
content of social identity threat. In N. Ellemers, R. Spears & B. Doosje (Eds.), 
Social identity context, commitment, content (Vol. 1, pp. 35-58). Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers.
Brown, R., Eller, A., Leeds, S., & Stace, K. (2007). Intergroup contact and intergroup 
attitudes: A longitudinal study. European Journal o f Social Psychology, 37(4), 
692-703.
Buckler, K., Swatt, M. L., & Salinas, P. (2009). Public views of illegal migration policy 
and control strategies: A test of the core hypotheses. Journal o f Criminal
Justice, 37(4), 317-327.
301
Campbell, A., Cranley Glass, K., & Charland, L. C. (1998). Describing our
"humanness": Can genetic science alter what it means to be "human"? Science 
and Engineering Ethics, 4(4), 413-426.
Castano, E. (2008). On the perils of glorifying the in-group: Intergroup violence, 
ingroup glorification and moral disengagement. Social and Personality 
Psychology Compass, 2(1), 154-170.
Castano, E., & Giner-Sorolla, R. (2006). Not quite human: Infrahumanization in 
response to collective responsibility for intergroup killing. Journal o f 
Personality and Social Psychology, 90(5), 804-818.
Castano, E., Paladino, M. P., Coull, A., & Yzerbyt, V. Y. (2002). Protecting the ingroup 
stereotype: Ingroup identification and management of deviant ingroup members. 
British Journal o f Social Psychology, 41(3), 365-385.
Cehajic, S., Brown, R., & Gonzalez, R. (2009). What do I care? Perceived ingroup
responsibility and dehumanization as predictors of empathy felt for the victim 
group. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 12(6), 715-729.
Chang, D., & Demyan, A. (2007). Teachers' stereotypes of Asian, Black, and White 
students. School Psychology Quarterly, 22(2), 91-114.
Chen-Hayes, S. F., Chen, M.-W., & Athar, N. (2000). Challenging linguicism: Action 
strategies for counselors and client-colleagues. In J. Lewis & L. Bradley (Eds.), 
Advocacy in counselling: Counselors, clients, and community (pp. 25-35). 
Greensboro, NC: Caps Publications.
Coope, C. (1995). A philosopher's point of view. Nature, 576(6535), 100.
Cortes, B. P., Demoulin, S., Rodriguiez, R. T., Rodriguez, A. P., & Leyens, J.-P. (2005). 
Infrahumanization or familiarity? Attribution of uniquely human emotions to the 
self, the in-group and the out-group. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
31(2), 243-253.
302
Costello, K., & Hodson, G. (2010). Exploring the roots of dehumanization: The role 
of animal-human similarity in promoting immigrant humanization. Group 
Processes and Intergroup Relations, 13(\), 3-22.
Costello, K., & Hodson, G. (2011). Social domininance-based threat reactions to
immigrants in need of assistance. European Journal o f Social Psychology, 41(2), 
220-231.
Crisp, R. J., Hewstone, M., & Cairns, E. (2001). Multiple identities in Northern Ireland: 
Hierarchical ordering in the representation of group membership. British 
Journal o f Social Psychology, 40( 1), 501-514.
Crisp, R. J., Hewstone, M., & Rubin, M. (2001). Does multiple categorization reduce 
intergroup bias? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27(1), 76-89.
Crisp, R. J., Walsh, J., & Hewstone, M. (2006). Crossed categorization in common
ingroup contexts. Personality and Social Psychology; Bulletin, 32(9), 1204-1218.
Cuddy, A. J. C., Fiske, S. T., & Glick, P. (2007a). The BIAS map: Behaviors from
intergoup affect and steretypes. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology’, 
92(4), 631-648.
Cuddy, A. J. C., Rock, M. S., & Norton, M. I. (2007b). Aid in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina: Inferences of secondary emotions and intergroup helping. 
Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 10( 1), 107-118.
Delgado, N., Rodriguez Perez, A., Vaes, J., Leyens, J.-P., & Betancor, V. (2009). 
Priming effects of violence on infrahumanization. Group Processes and 
Intergroup Relations, 12(6), 699-714.
DeLuca-McLean, D., & Castano, E. (2009). Infra-humanization of ethnic minorities:
The moderating role of ideology. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 31, 102-
108.
303
DeLuca, D. (2009). Exploring the link between infrahumanization and intergroup 
harm. Unpublished PhD, Dissertation Abstracts International.
Demoulin, S., Cortes, B. P., & Leyens, J. P. (2009a). Infrahumanization: The
differential interpretation of primary and secondary emotions. In S. Demoulin, J. 
P. Leyens & J. F. Dovidio (Eds.), Intergroup misunderstandings: Impact o f 
divergent social realities (Vol. 1, pp. 153-172). New York: Psychology Press.
Demoulin, S., Cortes, B. P., Viki, G. T., Rodriguez, A. P., Rodriguez, R. T., Paladino, 
M. P., et al. (2009b). The role of in-group identification in infra-humanization. 
International Journal o f Psychology, 44{ 1), 4-11.
Demoulin, S., Leyens, J. P., Paladino, M.-P., Rodriguez-Torres, R., Rodriguez-Perez, 
A., & Dovidio, J. F. (2004a). Dimensions of "uniquely" and "non-uniquely" 
human emotions. Cognition and Emotion, /#(1), 71-96.
Demoulin, S., Leyens, J. P., Rodriguez-Torres, R., Rodriguez-Perez, A., Paladino, P. 
M., & Fiske, S. T. (2005). Motivation to support a desired conclusion versus 
motivation to avoid an undesirable conclusion: The case of infrahumanization. 
International Journal o f Psychology, 40(6), 416-428.
Demoulin, S., Saroglou, V., & Van Pachterbeke, M. (2008). Infra-humanizing others, 
supra-humanizing gods: The emotional hierarchy. Social Cognition, 26(2), 235- 
247.
Demoulin, S., Torres, R. R., Perez, A. R., Vaes, J., Paladino, M. P., Gaunt, R., et al.
(2004b). Emotional prejudice can lead to infra-humanisation. European Review 
o f Social Psychology, 15, 259-296.
Doosje, B., Ellemers, N., & Spears, R. (1995). Perceived intragroup variability as a 
function of group status and identification. Journal o f Experimental Social
Psychology, 31(5), 410-436.
304
Dovido, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (1998). On the nature of contemporary prejudice:
The causes, consequences, and challenges of aversive racism. In J. L. Eberhardt 
& S. T. Fiske (Eds.), Confronting racism: The problem and the response (pp. 3- 
32). Thousand Oaks, CA, US: Sage Publications, Inc.
Dreyfus, E. A. (1967). Humanness: A therapeutic variable. Personnel & Guidance 
Journal, 45(6), 573-578.
Educational attainment: Migrants and education. (1996). 4102.0 - Australian Social 
Trends, 1996 Retrieved 05/10/2007, 2007, from
http://www.abs.gov.aU/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/2f762f95845417aeca25706c0083 
4efa/2c91fa87ffa4595fca2570ec0073df08!QpenDocument 
Ellemers, N., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (2002). Self and social identity. Annual Review 
o f Psychology, 53, 161-186.
Esses, V. M., Veenvliet, S., Hodson, G., & Mihic, L. (2008). Justice, morality and the 
dehumanization of refugees. Social Justice Research, 27(1), 4-25.
Family formation: Cultural diversity in marriages. (2000). 4102.0 - Australian Social 
Trends, 2000 Retrieved 05/10/2007, 2007, from
http://www.abs.gov.aU/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/2f762f95845417aeca25706c0083 
4efa/c414ec2a595eb029ca2570ec000e2817!QpenDocument 
Finnstrom, K., & Cary, M. (2008). Dad faces son's killer; sees 'normal' youngster. 
International CNN.com. Retrieved from
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/US/03/26/iamielshaw. folo/index.hlml?iref=allsearc 
h
Gaunt, R. (2009). Superordinate categorization as a moderator of mutual
infrahumanization. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 12(6), 731-746. 
Gaunt, R., Leyens, J. P., & Demoulin, S. (2002). Intergroup relations and the attribution 
of emotions: Control over memory for secondary emotions associated with the
ingroup and the outgroup. Journal o f Experimental Social Psychology,
38(5), 508-514.
Gaunt, R., Sindic, D., & Leyens, J. P. (2005). Intergroup relations in soccer finals: 
People's forecasts of the duration of emotional reactions of in-group and out­
group soccer fans. The Journal o f Social Psychology, 145(2), 117-126.
Gervais, S. J., & Vescio, T. K. (2007). The origins and consequences of subtle sexism.
In A. M. Columbus (Ed.), Advances in psychology research (Vol. 49, pp. 137- 
166). Hauppauge, NY, US: Nova Science Publishers.
Giles, H., & Coupland, N. (1991). Language: Contexts and consequences. Buckingham, 
UK: Open University Press.
Glaser, J., Dixit, J., & Green, D. P. (2002). Studying hate crime with the internet: What 
makes racists advocate racial violence. Journal o f Social Issues, 55(1), 177-193.
Goff, P. A., Eberhardt, J. L., Williams, M. J., & Jackson, M. C. (2008). Not yet human: 
Implicit knowledge, historical dehumanization and contemporary consequences. 
Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 94(2), 292-306.
Gouvier, W. D., & Coon, R. C. (2002). Misconceptions, discrimination, and disabling 
language: Synthesis and review. Applied Neuropsychology, 9(1), 48-57.
Haney, C. (1997). Violence and the capital jury: Mechanisms of moral disengagement 
and the impulse to condemn to death. Stanford Law Review, 49, 1447-1486.
Harris, L. T., & Fiske, S. T. (2006). Dehumanizing the lowest of the low: Neuroimaging 
responses to extreme out-groups. Psychological Science, 77(10), 847-853.
Haslam, N. (2006). Dehumanization: An integrative review. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 10(3), 252-264.
Haslam, N., & Bain, P. (2007). Humanizing the self: Moderators of the attribution of 
lesser humanness to others. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33(51),
305
57-68.
306
Haslam, N., Bain, P., Douge, L., Lee, M., & Bastian, B. (2005). More human than 
you: Attributing humanness to self and others. Journal o f Personality and 
Social Psychology, 89(6), 937-950.
Haslam, N., Kashima, Y., Loughnan, S., Shi, J., & Suitner, C. (2008a). Subhuman, 
inhuman, and superhuman: Contrasting humans with nonhumans in three 
cultures. Social Cognition, 26(2), 248-258.
Haslam, N., & Loughnan, S. (2008b). Attributing aberrant emotionality to others. In L. 
Charland & P. Zachar (Eds.), Fact and Value in Emotion (Vol. 1, pp. 139-155). 
Amsterdam, Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Haslam, N., Loughnan, S., Kashima, Y., & Bain, P. (2008c). Attributing and denying 
humanness to others. European Review o f Social Psychology, 19, 55-85.
Haslam, S. A. (2004). The social identity approach. In S. A. Haslam (Ed.), Psychology 
in organizations: The social identity approach (pp. 17-39). London: SAGE 
Publications.
Hewstone, M., Rubin, M., & Willis, H. (2002). Intergroup bias. Annual Review o f 
Psychology, 53, 575-604.
Hitlan, R. T., Carillo, K., Zarate, M. A., & Aikman, S. N. (2007). Attitudes toward 
immigrant groups and the September 11 terrorist attacks. Peace and Conflict 
Studies, 13(2), 135-152.
Hodson, G., & Costello, K. (2007). Interpersonal disgust, ideological orientations, and 
dehumanization as predictors of intergroup attitudes. Psychological Science, 
18(8), 691-698.
Hogan, H. W. (1980). Factors associated with the attribution of human traits to 
nonhumans. Journal o f Social Psychology, 112( 1), 161-162.
Housing arrangements: Housing of recent migrants. (1998). 4102.0 - Australian Social 
Trends, 1998 Retrieved 20/10/2011,2011, from
307
http://www.abs.gov.aU/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/2f762f95845417aeca25706c0 
0834efa/e673856b3a04e0acca2570ec0019ela2!QpenDocument 
Hummert, M. L. (1990). Multiple stereotypes of elderly and young adults: A
comparison of structure and evaluations. Psychology and Aging, 5(2), 182-193. 
Iversen, T. N., Larsen, L., & Solem, P. E. (2009). A conceptual analysis of ageism. 
Nordic Psychology, 61(3), 4-22.
Jetten, J., Spears, R., & Manstead, A. R. (1997). Strength of identification and
intergroup differentiation: The influence of group norms. European Journal o f  
Social Psychology, 27(5), 603-609.
Jones, J. M. (1999). Cultural racism: The intersection of race and culture in intergroup 
conflict. In D. A. Prentice & D. T. Miller (Eds.), Cultural divides:
Understanding and overcoming group conßict (pp. 465-490). New York, NY, 
US: Russell Sage Foundation.
Kanazawa, S., & Kovar, J. L. (2004). Why beautiful people are more intelligent. 
Intelligence, 32(3), 227-243.
Kite, M. E. (1991). Stereotypes of young and old: Does age outweigh gender? 
Psychology and Aging, 6(1), 19-27.
Kleinfeld, J. S. (1973). Intellectual strengths in culturally different groups: An Eskimo 
illustration. Review o f Educational Research, 43(3), 341-359.
Labour force participation of migrants. (2006). 4102.0 - Australian Social Trends, 2006 
Retrieved 05/10/2007, 2007, from
http://www.abs.gov.aU/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/7d 12b0f6763c78caca257061001c 
c588/f930564143dfa8a8ca2571 bOOO 153dd7!OpenDocument 
Leach, C. W., van Zomeren, M., Zebel, S., Vliek, M. L. W., Pennekamp, S. F., Doosje, 
B., et al. (2008). Group-level self-definition and self-investment: A hierarchical
308
(multicomponent) model of in-group identification. Journal o f Personality 
and Social Psychology, 95( 1), 144-165.
Levecque, K., Lodewyckx, I., & Vranken, J. (2007). Depression and generalized anxiety 
in the general population in Belgium: A comparison between native and 
immigrant groups. Journal o f Affective Disorders, 97(1-3), 229-239.
Leyens, J. P. (2009). Retrospective and prospective thoughts about infrahumanization. 
Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 12(6), 807-817.
Leyens, J. P., Cortes, B. P., Demoulin, S., Dovido, J. F., Fiske, S. T., Gaunt, R., et al. 
(2003). Emotional prejudice, essentialism, and nationalism: The 2002 Tajfel 
Lecture. European Journal o f Social Psychology, 33(6), 703-717.
Leyens, J. P., Demoulin, S., Vaes, J., Gaunt, R., & Paladino, M. P. (2007). Infra­
humanization: The wall of group differences. Social Issues and Policy Review,
/(1), 139-172.
Leyens, J. P., Paladino, M. P., Rodriguez-Torres, R., Vaes, J., Demoulin, S., Rodriguez- 
Perez, A., et al. (2000a). The emotional side of prejudice: The attribution of 
secondary emotions to ingroups and outgroups. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 4(2), 186-197.
Leyens, J. P., Rodriguez-Torres, R., Vaes, J., Demoulin, S., Rodriguez-Perez, A., & 
Gaunt, R. (2000b). The emotional side of prejucide: The attributions of 
secondary emotins to ingroups and outgroups. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 4(2), 186-197.
Leyens, J. P., Rodriguez, A. P., Rodriguez, R. T., Gaunt, R., Paladino, M.-P., Vaes, J., 
et al. (2001). Psychological essentialism and the differential attribution of 
uniquely human emotions to ingroups and outgroups. European Journal o f
Social Psychology, 31(4), 395-411.
309
Lippi-Green, R. (1997). Language ideology and the language subordination model
English with an accent: Language, ideology, and discrimination in the United 
States (Vol. 1, pp. 63-73). London: Routledge.
Loughnan, S., & Haslam, N. (2007). Animals and androids: Implicit associations
between social categories and nonhumans. Psychological Science, 18(2), 1 lb- 
121 .
Loughnan, S., Haslam, N., & Bastian, B. (2010). The role of meat consumption in the 
denial of moral status and mind to meat animals. Appetitie, 55(1), 156-159.
Loughnan, S., Haslam, N., & Kashima, Y. (2009). Understanding the relationship
between attribute-based and metaphor-based dehumanization. Group Processes 
and Intergroup Relations, 12(6), 747-762.
Madon, S. (1997). What do people believe about gay males? A study of stereotype 
content and strength. Sex Roles, 37(9/10), 663-685.
Maoz, L, & Clark, M. (2008). Threat, dehumanization, and support for retaliatory
aggressive policies in asymmetric conflict. Journal o f Conflict Resolution, 52(1), 
93-116.
Marcu, A., & Chryssochoou, X. (2005). Exclusion of ethnic groups from the realm of 
humanity: Prejudice against the gypsies in Britain and in Romania. Psicologia 
Politico, 30, 41-56.
Marcu, A., Lyons, E., & Hegarty, P. (2007). Dilemmatic human-animal boundaries in 
Britain and Romania: Post-materialist and materialist dehumanization. British 
Journal o f Social Psychology, 46(A), 875-893.
Martens, A., Johns, M., Greenber, J., & Schimel, J. (2006). Combating stereotype 
threat: The effect of self-affirmation on women's intellectual performance. 
Journal o f Experimental Social Psychology, 42(2), 236-243.
310
Martin, J., Bennett, M., & Murray, W. S. (2008). A developmental study of the
infrahumanization hypothesis. British Journal o f Developmental Psychology, 
26(2), 153-161.
May, A. L. (2002). The accuracy of academic self-evaluations in adolescents with 
learning disabilities. Journal o f Learning Disabilities, 35(4), 370-383.
Merloa, N. A., & McGlone, M. S. (2011). Adversarial infrahumanization in the abortion 
debate. Western Journal o f  Communication, 75(3), 323-340.
Milgram, S. (1977). The individual in a social world. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Miller, J. M. (2010). Language use, idneitty and social interaction: Migrant students in 
Australia. Research on Language and Social Interaction, 33(1), 69-100.
Motyl, M., Hart, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (2010). When animals attack: The effects of 
mortality salience, infrahumanization of violence, and authoritarianism on 
support for war. Journal o f Experimental Social Psychology, 4(5(1), 200-203.
Mullen, B., Calogero, R. M., & Leader, T. I. (2007). A social psychological study of 
ethnonyms: Cognitive representation of the in-group and intergroup hostility. 
Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 92(4), 612-630.
Nadler, A., Harpaz-Gorodeisky, G., & Ben-David, Y. (2009). Defensive helping: Threat 
to group identity, ingroup identification, status stability, and common group 
identity as determinants of intergroup help-giving. Journal o f Personality and 
Social Psychology, 97(5), 823-834.
Ng, S. H. (2007). Language-based discrimination: Blatant and subtle forms. Journal o f 
Language and Social Psychology, 26(2), 106-122.
Opotow, S. (1990). Moral exclusion and injustice: An introduction. Journal o f Social 
Issues, 4(5(1), 1-20.
Opotow, S. (1995). Drawing the line: Social categorization, moral exclusion, and the 
scope of justice. In B. B. Bunker & J. Z. Rubin (Eds.), Cooperation, conflict,
and justice: Essays inspired by the work o f Morton Deutsch (pp. 347-369).
San Francisco: Jossey Bass.
Opotow, S. (2001b). Social injustice. In D. J. Christie, R. V. Wagner & D. D. Winter 
(Eds.), Peace, conflict & violence: Peace psychology for the 21st century (pp. 
102-109). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Opotow, S. (2004). Conflict and morals. In T. A. Thorkildsen & H. J. Walberg (Eds.), 
Nutruting morality (pp. 99-115). New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum 
Publishers.
Opotow, S. (2005). Hate, conflict, and moral exclusion. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), The 
psychology/ o f hate (pp. 121-153). Washington D.C.: American Psychological 
Association.
Oren, N., & Bar-Tal, D. (2007). The detrimental dynamics of delegitimization in 
intractable conflicts: The Israeli-Palestinian case. International Journal o f 
Intercultural Relations, 57(1), 111-126.
Paid work: Migrants in the labour force. (1998). 4102.0 Australian Social Trends, 1998 
Retrieved 20/10/2011, 2011, from
http://www.abs.gov.aU/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/2f762f95845417aeca25706c0083 
4efa/add06363e841654eca2570ec001971 cciOpenDocument 
Paladino, M. P., Leyens, J.-P., Rodriguez, R., Rodriguez, A., Gaunt, R., & Demoulin, S. 
(2002). Differential association of uniquely and non uniquely human emotions 
with the ingroup and the outgroup. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 
5(2), 105-117.
Paladino, M. P., & Vaes, J. (2009). Ours is human: On the pervasiveness of
infrahumanization in intergroup relations. British Journal o f Social Psychology,
311
48(2), 237-251.
312
Paladino, M. P., Vaes, J., Castano, E., Demoulin, S., & Leyens, J. P. (2004).
Emotional infra-humanization in intergroup relations: The role of national 
identification in the attribution of primary and secondary emotions to Italians 
and Germans. Cahiers de Psychologie Cognitive/Current Psychology’ o f 
Cognition, 22(4-5), 519-536.
Pereira, C., Vala, J., & Costa-Lopes, R. (2010). From prejudice to discrimination: The 
legitimizing role of perceived threat in discrimination against immigrants. 
European Journal o f Social Psychology, 40(1), 1231-1250.
Pereira, C., Vala, J., & Leyens, J.-P. (2009). From infra-humanization to discrimination: 
The mediation of symbolic threat needs egalitarian norms. Journal o f 
Experimental Social Psychology, 45(2), 336-334.
Petrasso, S. (2010). What about social class? Situational and dispositional attributional 
processes involved in class-based stereotype threat effects. Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, Long Island University, The Brooklyn Center, New York. 
Population composition: Asian-born Australians. (2001). 4102.0 - Australian Social 
Trends, 2001 Retrieved 05/10/2007, 2007, from
http://www.abs.gov.aU/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/2f762f95845417aeca25706c0083 
4efa/666a320ed7736d32ca2570ec000bf8f9!QpenDocument 
Population composition: Languages spoken in Australia. (1999). 4102.0 - Australian 
Social Trends, 1999 Retrieved 05/10/2007, 2007, from 
http://www.abs.gov.aU/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/2f762f95845417aeca25706c0083 
4efa/d67b7c95e0e8a733ca2570ec001117a2!OpenDocument 
Population growth: Coming to Australia. (2001). Australian Bureau o f Statistics 
Retrieved 05/10/2007, 2007, from
http://www.abs.gov.aU/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/2f762f95845417aeca25706c0083
4efa/964f93de8bb5c425ca2570ec000bf8f8!QpenDocument
313
Rahman, T. (2009). Language ideology, identity, and the commodification of
language in the call centers of Pakistan. Language in Society, 38(2), 233-258.
Ramirez-Esparza, N., Gosling, S. D., Benet-Martinez, V., Potter, J. P., & Pennebaker, J. 
W. (2006). Do bilinguals have two personalities? A special case of cultural 
frame switching. Journal o f Research in Personality, 40(2), 99-120.
Reichl, A. J. (1997). Ingroup favouritism and outgroup favouritism in low status
minimal groups: Differential responses to status-related and status-unrelated 
measures. European Journal o f Social Psychology, 27(4), 617-633.
Religious affiliation and activity. (2004). Retrieved 05/10/2007, 2007, from
http://www.abs.gov.aU/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/2f762f95845417aeca25706c0083
4efa/fa58e975c470b73cca256e9e00296645!QpenDocument
Rohmann, A., Niedenthal, P. M., Brauer, M., Castano, E., & Leyens, J. P. (2009). The 
attribution of primary and secondary emotions to the in-group and to the out­
group: The case of equal status countries. Journal o f Social Psychology, 149(6), 
709-730.
Rookwood, J., & Pearson, G. (2010). The hoolifan: Positive fan attitudes to football 
"hooliganism". International Review for the Sociology o f Sport, 1-16. 
doi: 10.1177/1012690210388455
Rothbart, M., & Taylor, M. (1992). Category labels and social reality: Do we view 
social categories as natural kinds? In G. R. Semin & K. Fiedler (Eds.),
Language, interaction and social cognition (Vol. 1, pp. 11-36). London: SAGE 
Publications.
Schwartz, S. H., & Struch, N. (1989). Values, stereotypes and intergroup antagonism. In 
D. Bar-Tal, C. F. Graumann, A. W. Kruglanski & W. Stroebe (Eds.), 
Stereotyping and prejudice: Changing conceptions (pp. 151-167). New York:
Springer-Verlag.
314
Schweitzer, R., Perkoulidis, S., Krome, S., Ludlow, C., & Ryan, M. (2005).
Attitudes towards refugees: The dark side of prejudice in Australia. Australian 
Journal o f Psychology, 57(3), 170-179.
Shelton, J. N., Richeson, J. A., & Vorauer, J. D. (2006). Threatened identities and
interethnic interactions. European Review o f Social Psychology, 17, 321-358. 
Slotterback, C. S. (1996). Projections of aging: Impact of generational differences and 
the aging process on perceptions of adults. Psychology and Aging, 11(3), 552- 
559.
Smith, E. R. (1998). Mental representation and memory. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske & 
L. Gardner (Eds.), The handbook o f social psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 391-445). 
New York: McGraw-Hill.
Social participation of migrants. (2008). 4102.0 - Australian Social Trends, 2008 
Retrieved 20/10/2011,2011, from
http://www.abs.gov.aU/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/4102.0Chapter4202008 
Spencer, B., & Castano, E. (2007). Social class is dead. Long live social class!
Stereotype threat among low socioeconomic status individuals. Social Justice 
Research, 20(4), 418-432.
Srull, T. K., & Wyer, R. S. (1989). Person memory and judgment. Psychological 
Review, 96( 1), 58-83.
Stangor, C., & McMillan, D. (1992). Memory for expectancy-congruent and expectancy 
incontinent information: A revew of the social and social developmental 
literatures. Psychological Bulletin, 7/7(1), 42-61.
Stephan, W. G., & Renfro, C. L. (2004). The role of threat in intergroup relations. In E. 
R. Smith & D. M. Mackie (Eds.), From prejudice to intergroup emotions: 
Differentiated reactions to social groups (Vol. 1, pp. 191-207). Philadelphia,
PA: Psychology Press.
315
Stephan, W. G., Renfro, C. L., Esses, V. M., Stephan, C. W., & Martin, T. (2005).
The effects of feeling threatened on attitudes toward immigrants. International 
Journal o f Intercultural Relations, 29(1), 1-19.
Szathmary, E., & Szamado, S. (2008). Language: A social history of words. Nature, 
456(6), 40-41.
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. 
Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology o f intergroup relations (pp. 
33-47). Monterey, California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.
Tam, T., Hewstone, M., Cairns, E., Tausch, N., Maio, G., & Kenworthy, J. (2007). The 
impact of intergroup emotions on forgiveness in Northern Ireland. Group 
Processes and Intergroup Relations, 10( 1), 119-135.
Tam, T., Hewstone, M., Kenworthy, J., & Cairns, E. (2008). Postconflict reconciliation: 
Intergroup forgiveness and implicit biases in Northern Ireland. Journal o f Social 
Issues, 64(2), 303-320.
Tausch, N., & Hewstone, M. (2010). Social dominance orientation attenuates stereotype 
change in the face of discontinuing information. Social Psychology, 41(5), 169- 
176.
Tausch, N., Hewstone, M., & Roy, R. (2009). The relationships between contact, status 
and prejudice: An integrated threat theory analysis of Hindu-Muslim relations in 
India. Journal o f Community and Applied Social Psychology, 19(2), 83-94.
Turner, J. C. (1978). Social categorization and social discrimination in the minimal 
group paradigm. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), Differentiation between social groups: 
Studies in the social psychology o f intergroup relations (pp. 101-140). London:
Academic Press.
316
Turner, J. C. (1982). Towards a cognitive redefinition of the social group. In H.
Tajfel (Ed.), Social identity and intergroup relations (pp. 15-41). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Turner, J. C. (1999). Some current issues in research on social identity and self­
categorization theories. In N. Ellemers, R. Spears & B. Doosje (Eds.), Social 
identity, context, commitment, content (Vol. 1, pp. 6-34). Malden, MA:
Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987).
Rediscovering the social group: A self categorization theory. Basil Blackwell.
Turner, J. C., Oakes, P. J., Haslam, S. A., & McGarty, C. (1994). Self and collective:
Cognition and social context. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20(5), 
454-463.
Turner, J. C., & Reynolds, K. J. (2001). The social identity perpective in intergroup
relations: Theories, themes and controversies. In R. Brown & S. Gaertner (Eds.), 
Blackwell handbook o f social psychology: Intergroup processes (Vol. 4, pp. 
133-152). Malden, MA, USA: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
Vaes, J. (2006). "They" are less human than "we" are: Modem prejudice in human 
terms. Cahiers de l'Urmis, 10. Retrieved from 
http://urmis.revues.org/document 184.htm]
Vaes, J., Heflick, N. A., & Goldenberg, J. L. (2010a). "We are people": Ingroup 
humanization as an existential defense. Journal o f Personality and Social 
Psychology, 98(5), 750-760.
Vaes, J., & Paladino, M. P. (2010b). The uniquely human content of stereotypes Group 
Processes and Intergroup Relations, 73(1), 23-39.
Vaes, J., Paladino, M. P., Castelli, L., Leyens, J.-P., & Giovanazzi, A. (2003). On the 
behavioral consequences of infrahumanization: The implicit role of uniquely
317
human emotions in intergroup relations. Journal o f Personality and Social 
Psychology, 85(6), 1016-1034.
Vaes, J., Paladino, M. P., & Leyens, J. P. (2002). The lost e-mail: Prosocial reactions 
induced by uniquely human emotions. British Journal o f Social Psychology, 
47(4), 521-534.
Vaes, J., Paladino, M. P., & Leyens, J. P. (2006). Priming uniquely human emotions in 
the in-group (but not the out-group) activates humanity concepts. European 
Journal o f Social Psychology, 36(2), 169-181.
Vaes, J., Paladino, M. P., & Magagnotti, C. (2011). The human message in politics: The 
impact of emotional slogans on subtle conformity. The Journal o f Social 
Psychology, 151(2), 162-179.
Van Hiel, A., & Mervielde, I. (2005). Authoritarianism and social dominance
orientation: Relationships with various forms of racism. Journal o f Applied 
Social Psychology, 55(11), 2323-2344.
van Rijswijk, W., & Ellemers, N. (2002). Context effects on the application of
stereotype content to multiple categorizable targets. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 28( 1), 90-101.
Verkuyten, M. (2007). Ethnic in-group favoritism among minority and majority groups: 
Testing the self-esteem hypothesis among preadolescents. Journal o f Applied 
Social Psychology, 37(3), 486-500.
Viki, G. T., & Abrams, D. (2003). Infra-humanization: Ambivalent sexism and the 
attribution of primary and secondary emotions to women. Journal o f  
Experimental Social Psychology, 39(5), 492-499.
Viki, G. T., Winchester, L., Titshall, L., Chisango, T., Pina, A., & Russell, R. (2006).
Beyond secondary emotions: The infrahumanization of outgroups using human- 
related and animal-related words. Social Cognition, 24(6), 753-775.
318
Vorauer, J. D., & Sasaki, S., J. (2011). In the worst rather than the best of times:
Effects of salient intergroup ideology in threatening intergroup interactions. 
Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 101(2), 307-320.
Walmsley, S. A. (1978). A life and death issue. Mental Retardation, 16(6), 387-389. 
Wenzel, M., Mummendey, A., Weber, U., & Waldzus, S. (2003). The ingroup as pars 
pro toto: Projection from the ingroup onto the inclusive category as a precursor 
to social discrimination. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29(4), 461 - 
473.
Wohl, M. J. A., Hornsey, M. J., & Bennett, S. H. (2011). Why group apologies succeed 
and fail: Intergroup forgiveness and the role of primary and secondary emotions. 
Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology.
Yoo, H. C., Gee, G. C., & Takeuchi, D. (2009). Discrimination and health among Asian 
American immigrants: Disentangling racial from language discrimination.
Social Science and Medicine, 68(4), 726-732.
Yzerbyt, V. Y., Provost, V., & Corneille, O. (2005). Not competent but warm...really? 
Compensatory stereotypes in the French-speaking world. Group Processes and 
Intergroup Relations, 5(3), 291-308.
319
Appendix
The Appendix shows the additional significant effects from the five-way, 
country by condition by valence by group by level ANOVA used to analyze Hypothesis 
10.1a and 10.1b that were not theoretically relevant to the hypotheses of the study. In 
the study of infrahumanization, valence is only relevant in the event that it moderates 
the group by level interaction. These interactions have already been described in the 
chapter.
The interaction shown in Table A.l shows overall more emotions being 
attributed to in-groups than out-groups but this being more the case for the aged adult 
condition than the criminal condition, and the effect being much stronger for the 
Spanish sample than for any of the other countries.
Table. A.l
Country X  Intergroup Context X  Group Interaction 
¥(3,423)=3.64, p<.05_____________
Country
Inter-group
Context Group Mean 5>D
Australia Criminal In 0.20 0.02
Out 0.18 0.01
Aged In 0.32 0.02
Out 0.22 0.01
Spain Criminal In 0.43 0.02
Out 0.16 0.02
Aged In 0.63 0.02
Out 0.24 0.02
Switzerland Criminal In 0.18 0.02
Out 0.15 0.02
Aged In 0.27 0.03
Out 0.21 0.02
Poland Criminal In 0.18 0.03
Out 0.16 0.03
Aged In 0.27 0.03
Out 0.20 0.03
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Table A.2 shows more positive than negative emotions being attributed 
overall for the Australian, Swiss and Polish samples but more negative than positive 
emotions attributed in the Spanish sample.
Table.A.2
Country x Valence Interaction 
¥(3,423)=47.79, p<001
Country Valence Mean SD
Australia Positive .307 .012
Negative .155 .010
Spain Positive .310 .018
Negative .420 .015
Switzerland Positive .276 .019
Negative .130 .016
Poland Positive .285 .024
Negative .121 .020
Table A.3 shows the interaction between inter-group context and valence of 
emotion. The pattern is that while there were more positive emotions attributed in the 
aged adult condition, there were more negative emotions attributed in the criminal 
condition.
Table.A.3
Inter-group Context x Valence Interaction 
¥(1,423)=219.04, y<.001______________
Inter-group
Context Valence Mean SD
Criminal Positive 0.19 0.01
Negative 0.22 0.01
Aged adults Positive 0.40 0.01
Negative 0.19 0.01
Table A.4 shows the group by valence interaction. In it, the in-group is 
attributed significantly greater levels of positive emotion than negative emotion. The 
out-group is attributed relatively equivalent levels of positive and negative valenced
emotions.
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Table A.4
Group x Valence Interaction
¥(1,423)=J 16.32, y<.001_____________
Group_______ Valence Mean SD
In-group Positive 0.39 0.01
Negative 0.23 0.01
Out-group Positive 0.20 0.01
Negative 0.18 0.01
Figure A .l. The above group by valence interaction shown in Table A.4 is qualified by 
country, F(3,423)=53.17,/?<.001. This Figure shows the group by valence by country 
interaction. There is a similar pattern of more positive than negative to the in-group, 
and relatively equal levels of positive and negative to the out-group. However, this 
pattern reverses in the Spanish sample with more negative than positive attributed to the 
in-group
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Figure A.2. The above group by valence interaction shown in table A.4 is qualified by 
inter-group context F(l,423)=59.99,/?<.001. This Figure shows the group by valence 
by inter-group context interaction. There are more positive than negative emotions 
attributed to the in-group in both inter-group contexts. The difference emerges in the 
out-group attributions in which the aged-adult out-group is attributed more positive than 
negative emotions but the criminal out-group is attributed more negative than positive 
emotions.
Table A.5 shows the interaction of level of emotion by valence of emotion.
While attribution of positive and negative primary emotions are relatively equal, there is 
attribution of much higher levels of positive secondary emotions than negative 
secondary emotions overall.
Table A.5
Level x Valence Interaction,
¥(J,423)=159.19, p<001__________________
Level Valence Mean SD
Primary Positive 0.28 0.01
Negative 0.29 0.01
Secondary Positive 0.31 0.01
Negative 0.13 0.01
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Figure A.3. This Figure shows the three way interaction of level by valence by country 
that qualifies the level by valence interaction shown in Table A.5, F(3,423)=55.75, 
/?<.001. The predominant features are overall more positive than negative traits in 
primary and secondary emotions, but a different pattern for primary emotions in Spain 
with more negative emotions than positive emotions attributed.
